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ABSTRACT
My doctoral dissertation, an in-depth case study of the Phulbari Coal Project in Bangladesh,
accentuates the interests and engagements of Indigenous peoples (Adibasi people) in the decisionmaking process in resource extractive industries through an environmental justice framework. My
primary aim is to observe how and to what extent Indigenous peoples’ interests are reflected in
official environmental decision-making processes versus how they frame their own claims in a
mining conflict situation. I employ extensive qualitative research in the project area to demonstrate
how Adibasi communities articulate and implement their claims through raising their voices and
ultimately stimulating a movement that stopped the development of a ‘perilous’ open-pit mining
project. The resistance movement began more than a decade ago in 2006, but Adibasis, other
farming communities and activists are still bearing the spirit of the movement, which they shared
in the interviews I conducted. This research analyzes their motivations for fighting a multinational
corporation and identifies how their movement articulates with national and transnational activists’
conceptions of environmental justice in the global South. I explore how these ideals play out in
practice on the ground, in a context where the development is highly contested, and disparities of
power are prevalent. I anticipate that this empirical research will attract other ethnographic
research on the environment, Indigenous peoples, resource extractive industries and sustainable
economic development in the global South.

Keywords: Environmental justice; procedural justice; participatory rights; recognition;
Indigenous peoples; Adibasi; multinational corporation; transnational corporation; transnational
justice groups; resource extractive industries; EIA; mining conflict; resistance movement;
Indigenous environmental justice movement; global South; open-pit coal mine; environmental
activists; Phulbari coal project; Bangladesh.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1.

Introduction

The dissertation is about resistance to coal mining in Bangladesh. The proposed ‘Phulbari Coal
Project’ in Dinajpur district would establish one of the largest open-pit or surface coal mines in
the world. If established, this large-scale development project would present several environmental
degradation risks, including economic and social problems like any other extractive resource
project. Tension first rose in the local communities when the minerals were discovered in 1998,
and it was declared that the project proponent would extract coal through the open-pit mining
process. Local people, including a large number of Adibasi communities,1 protested the decision
beginning a resistance movement called Phulbari Koyla Kkoni Anodolon in Bangla language and
Phulbari Coal Mine Movement in English language that would spur violence by 2006. ‘Khoni’ is
a Bangla word means ‘mine’ and ‘andolon’ means ‘movement’. The movement is popularly called
as Phulbari Khoni Andolon by local people which I use throughout the dissertation.
I take Adibasi communities or Indigenous peoples of the mining region as the ‘subject’ of my
research and examine whether they have experienced a lack of recognition, limited or insignificant
consultation, and participation in the decision-making process of the project proposal. The study
explores and documents how Adibasi communities mobilize arguments based on human rights,
compensation, recognition, distributive justice, and procedural justice in the course of their

Adibasi communities are self declared Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh. As the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is not
commonly used in the local context, throughout the dissertation, I use ‘Adibasi’ in the Bangladesh context to mean
Indigenous peoples. Although ‘Adivasi’ term is popularly used in India, I use ‘Adibasi’ to keep consistent how
Bangladeshi people pronounce the term.
1

1

resistance. This research aims to explore the rationale of meaningful integration of the rights of
Adibasi communities into development decisions: how affected peoples understand and how they
react to a development process conducted by a multinational company. I examine the resistance of
Adibasi communities to the Phulbari Coal Project with an environmental justice lens. I ask: what
lessons about environmental justice can we draw from observing the resistance of Adibasi
communities to halt the Phulbari Coal Project in Bangladesh? Do the protesters’ actions reflect
concerns primarily about the distribution of risks and benefits, or instead, do they focus primarily
on ideas about recognition and procedural justice, or both? Is there something distinctive about
environmental justice movements as they emerge in the global South?
I begin by investigating the interests of Adibasi communities, as they would be affected by the
open-pit coal project, emphasizing the socio-economic and environmental impacts. I consider
whether they are ‘Indigenous peoples’ under international law and if their claims form a new
dimension of the environmental justice movement from the global South. I found much research
conducted on the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, but an environmental justice lens and Adibasi accounts
were not taken into consideration in those researches. My research fills this gap by intensifying
the Adibasi voices as they struggle for recognition as ‘Indigenous peoples.’ Since self-identified
Adibasi communities around the Bangladeshi open-pit coal mine and throughout Bangladesh are
not recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’ or ‘Adibasi’ by the government, I examine how the
surrounding Adibasi communities attempt to establish their identity as Indigenous peoples
according to international law through qualitative research conducted in the mining region. The
purpose of this effort is to demonstrate the recognizable legal and political character of Adibasi
communities so that their voices are adequately heard in every stage of development decision in
their traditional territories and lands.

2

Moreover, threats to rights, lands, and cultures of Indigenous peoples have triggered resistance
against multinational and transnational corporations (MNCs and TNCs), governments, and
international financial institutes (IFIs) in the process of protecting land rights, sacred sites, food
security, climate change, and traditional ecological knowledge around the globe.2 Through their
struggles against powerful actors who continuously threaten to displace them from their traditional
lands and drive them away towards assimilation into mainstream majority communities,
Indigenous groups have embraced diverse notions of environmental justice.3 The resistance of
Indigenous peoples and other marginalized communities who traditionally lived and worked
closest to the land is a central strand of the environmental justice movement.
Adibasi communities and other local people of the Phulbari coalmine area threatened with
dislocation, vastly depend upon agriculture since the land is fertile enough for three seasons’ crops.
The air, soil, and water of the surrounding area of the project are likely to be contaminated by the
mining. Critics argue that the contaminated water, air, and soil would significantly affect the
fertility of agricultural lands, the health of workers and local people near the project area and that
the local bio-diversity and ecosystem would be destroyed permanently.4 Furthermore, extracted
coal would be transported by vessels for export to the Mongla Seaport through the Sundarbans,
the largest mangrove forest in the world, which is the habitat of many wild animals, including the
Royal Bengal Tigers and a UNESCO World Heritage Site.5
A mine development project can minimize the impact of its activities on the neighboring
communities and the surrounding environment by careful pre-planning, and policy
David Schlosberg and David Carruthers, “Indigenous Struggles, Environmental Justice, and Community
Capabilities” (2010) 10:4 Glob Environmental Politics.
3
Ibid.
4 Manaranajan Pegu, “The Phulbari Movement: Resisting Neo-liberalism in Bangladesh.” In Sustainability and
Ownership in People Centred Advocacy in South Asia (Dhaka: National Centre for Advocacy Studies, 2011).
5
Mangrove Action Project, “Save the Sundarbans- Stop The Phulbari Coal Mine: Mangrove Action Plan” (2012),
Online: http://mangroveactionproject.org/save-the-sundarbans-stop-the-phulbari-coal-mine/
2

3

implementation, through environmental impact assessment (EIA), social impact assessment (SIA),
and pollution control measures, and by monitoring the effects of mining and rehabilitating the
mined areas.6 In line with these expectations, the Department of Environment (DoE) of Bangladesh
granted an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECA) in September 2005 and approved the
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) prepared and published by Asia Energy7 in
2006 for the Phulbari Coal Project.8
The people of Phulbari and the surrounding areas, however, formed movements to protest the
company and the open-pit coal project for the sake of the affected people and the country’s
economic and environmental interests. Protesters were not convinced that coal extracted from the
open-pit mine would create a benefit surpassing the overall human losses and environmental
impacts. They disagreed with the company’s claims about the damage and the number of people
to be displaced. For that reason, local opposition against the project was strong. A group of local
politicians took the initiative by forming a committee to protest Asia Energy that later became
weaker due to political influences. However, a national interest protection group consisting civil
society and left-wing politicians called the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral
Resources, Power and Ports of Bangladesh (also known as the National Committee of Bangladesh
or NCBD) emerged and organized a mass protest on August 26th, 2006. The protest was locally
called the Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi9 (Occupy the Asia Energy Office). The popular
Phulbari Khoni Andolon has multiple layers. The movement was the result of eighteen months of

6

Irene Sosa and Karyn Keenan, Impact Benefit Agreements Between Aboriginal Communities and Mining
Companies: Their Use in Canada, (Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Law Association, 2001).
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campaigns, networks, meetings, assemblies, and discussions among local and national activists
and Adibasi leaders. Their goal was to increase awareness of the potential negative impacts of
mining and to help local farming and low-income communities to organize protests against the
company and the open-pit mining method.10
On the 26th of August 2006, thousands of people from surrounding sub-districts started
gathering in Phulbari town to express their grievances. Adibasi and local Bangalee farming
communities, teachers, students, small entrepreneurs, women, children, public interest groups,
civil society members, and solidarity groups from Dhaka and other parts of Bangladesh gathered
at the outskirts of Phulbari to send a message to the government, the company, and international
financial institutions (IFSs) that they did not want the open-pit mine. As the demonstration
concluded, security forces opened fire on the rally. Three young men were killed, and as many as
three hundred people were injured. This incident heightened public sentiment against Asia Energy.
Another reason for the mass protest was the contract between the Government of Bangladesh
and the foreign company, which was perceived as going against the interests of the country, though
the government looked forward to economic gain from the project. The low royalty percentage on
the project, which is only 6% for Bangladesh, angered local people and motivated them to raise
voice against the foreign company.11 The protesters assumed that the government would not
benefit from the project since the company would export most of the extracted coal. They asserted
that the government did not consider national and local interests during signing the contract
because the project would destroy local dwellers, economy, biodiversity, sacred and religious sites,
and environment. The protesters’ frustrations could be ‘justified’ in the sense that if the project
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proceeded, their households and livelihoods would be destroyed, and local people in the project
area would be displaced, which would ultimately make them environmental refugees.
Soon more people, especially women and children, joined the mass protest. They gathered in
Phulbari town and blocked all major roads during four days of protests. The protestors
disconnected communication among major cities. During this period, activists faced several
obstacles. The company employed powerful people as their agents (locally called Dalal)12 to
threaten movement activists. Security forces raided and arrested some activists after the company
filed criminal charges. Government representatives finally sat with the protest leaders to negotiate.
They agreed to meet all the demands of Phulbari demonstrators and signed a social contract. The
contract stated clearly, among other things, that the government agreed to the expulsion of Asia
Energy from Bangladesh and to dropping the open-pit mining method everywhere in the country.
The Phulbari Khoni Andolon was one of the most widely publicized local resistances against
the extractive industry in Asia in the last decade. The movement became the focus of national and
international media, public interest groups, civil society members, non-government organizations
(NGOs), national and transnational environmental justice organizations (TEJOs), and many
studies were conducted throughout the period. It has been 13 years since the project was
suspended. Although the company had wound up their activities in Phulbari and shut down their
offices in Bangladesh, they have been continuing their business on the London Stock Exchange in
the name of the Phulbari Coal Project. The resistance is still going on. Local people observe
‘Phulbari Day’ on 26th August every year and vow to fight until the project is ultimately canceled.

The word ‘Dalal’ is popularly used in Phulbari to mean agents who were appointed by Asia Energy to manipulate
local people and protesters to work in favor of the company. They take repressive measures to force local people to
transfer their lands for the project and are supported by local administration.
12
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Although the ESIA of the Phulbari Coal Project provides special provisions for ‘Indigenous
peoples’13 as has become the norm in these procedures, the document identifies only three Adibasi
communities (Santal, Munda, and Mahili) as ‘Indigenous peoples.’14 But Jatiyo Adibasi Parishad
(JAP), a national Indigenous NGO,15 claims that some other ethnic communities who are not
included in the document should also be regarded as Indigenous peoples.16 According to different
environmental and Indigenous organizations in Bangladesh, the ESIA of the Phulbari Coal Project
does not accurately describe Adibasi or Indigenous peoples’ participation in the decision-making
process.17 They claim that the documentation of the company consultations with Adibasi
communities is also grossly inadequate, and some Adibsis are excluded from the process.18 The
company’s explanation for not holding satisfactory consultation was “our communication and
consultation process in the project area was interrupted in 2006, due to political instability and
protests in the project area,” but critics complain that they still have not completed the process to
date.19

Indigenous People’s Development Plan (IPDP) Volume 4.1, Section 4 of the ESIA. In this document, three
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‘Indigenous peoples.’
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more appropriately classified as ‘small ethnic minority’ groups rather than ‘Indigenous,’ given their historic past,
their social structure, religious practices and non-agricultural livelihoods.”
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1.2.

Adibasi and the Politics of Recognition in Bangladesh
Bangladeshi Indigenous leaders
who are vocal for their rights prefer
the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ in
English and ‘Adibasi’ in Bangla,20
arguing that there is no difference
between the two terms. The Sanskrit
word ‘Adibasi’ is comprised of the
phrase ‘Adi’ and ‘Basi’; the former
means ‘original or earliest times’ and
later

means

‘residents

or

inhabitants.’21 In this sense, Adibasis
are original or earliest residents or
inhabitants in a particular region.
Figure 1: Concentration of Adibasis in Bangladesh

These groups are believed to be

Source: UNDP

descendants of a ‘pre-Dravidian race’,

who are considered as the oldest inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent.22 According to Joseph
Dineker, the Dravidian race is mixed of both the Indonesian and Australian which is prevalent
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Bangladeshi Indigenous peoples, both from the CHT and the plains, have started to refer themselves as Indigenous
in English and as Adibasi in Bangla when the International Year of the Indigenous Peoples was declared by the
United Nations.
See also: Raja Devasish Roy, The ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations, 1957 and the Laws of
Bangladesh: A Comparative Review, Project to Promote the ILO Policy on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and the
ILO Office, Dhaka, Bangladesh, July, 2009.
21
Mesbah Kamal, “Introduction” eds Mesbah Kamal, Jahidul Islam and Sugata Chakma, Adibasi Communities
Bangladesh Asiatic Society, Dhaka: 2007, at xiii. Also see: David Hardiman , The Coming of the Devi: Adivasi
Assertion in Western India ( Delhi : Oxford University Press , 1987).
22
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among the peoples of Southern India speaking the Dravidian tongues and some other people of
India.23 He mentions that most of Indian race are mixed of the Afghans, the Rajputs, the Brahmins
and crosses with Assyroid, Dravidian, Mongol, Turkish, Arab and other elements.24
It is assumed that Tibeto-Burman language-speaking tribal groups belong to social groups who
have been inhabiting the region before the coming of the dominant sections of the current Indian
society, such as, the Aryans. The Bangalees, Gujaratis, Ariyas are said to the descendants of the
Aryans.25 The tribal groups have generally been described as Adibasis or the original people by
scholars, social workers, missionaries, and some administrators since the beginning of the present
century.26 The term ‘Adibasis’ was being used to identify and differentiate a group of people
different in physical features, language, religion, custom, and social organization.27 However,
critics argue that the identity of Adibasis which was forced upon them from outside to differentiate
them from the dominant community has now been internalized by Adibasis themselves.28
Prathama Bannerjee also makes a similar argument to Xaxa about original inhabitants or earlier
settlers. She argues that “the term Adivasi was an emphatically historicist, nationalist category—
literally meaning ‘original’, perhaps true inhabitant of the country.”29 According to her, the use of
the term ‘Adibasi’ is a historical claim which is not easily established within Indian politics like
Indian nationalism itself, rather the claim often turned into a culturalist approach where Indigenous
identity was reduced to maintenance of the autonomy of tribal traditions.30 Given the situation in
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the Indian sub-continent, the name ‘Adivasi’ is a political statement of distinctiveness and
autonomy originating from colonial anthropological categories such as ‘tribe’ and ‘aborigine’ that
cast them forever as low and backward.31
Virginius Xaxa has contributed to the scholarly debate about ‘original inhabitants’ in the Indian
context. He explains that it is certainly difficult to say that all self-identified tribal people in Indian
sub-continent are earlier settlers than Aryans, and therefore, they are Indigenous, and others are
not.32 Some argue that the non-tribal groups like the Bangalees, Gujaratis, and Oriyas have a much
longer history of settlement than these tribes.33 If ‘who came first’ is taken foremost consideration
for being Indigenous, many Tibeto-Burman speaking tribal groups in India would not be
considered as Indigenous peoples because Aryans settled earlier than them.34 According to Xaxa,
then, for the purpose of identifying the existence of Indigenous peoples, there is no need to make
a distinction between settlement in the country as a whole, and settlement within its parts or
regions.35 The author explains that the settlement of the Mizos, who are one of the Adibasi groups
live in the North-east India, may have been a later development than those of the Gujaratis or
Bengalis, but the fact is that they are the original settlers of the place where they live now. The
Mizo people are said to have settled in the territory where they live only in the 16th century.
Similarly, the Santals may have settled in the territory where they live now later than the
Bengalis, but it cannot be said that their settlement in India is prior to that of the groups commonly

31

Ibid. at 113.
Xaxa, supra note 25 at 3592.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid. at 3591.
35
Ibid.
32

10

referred to as the Aryans.36 Therefore, to claim Indigenous status on this ground, a group can say
they are the original settlers of the area they live now from the time immemorial.
In the Indian sub-continent, especially in India and Bangladesh, self-defined Indigenous
peoples call themselves and prefer to be called ‘Adibasi’, but they are neither recognized by the
state Constitution nor other legal instruments exclusively. The Indian government classified ‘all
ethnic communities who are calling themselves Indigenous peoples’ into three categories in its
Constitution: ‘scheduled tribes’, ‘scheduled castes or forward castes’, and ‘other backward
classes’.37 As Pooja Parmar points out in the Indian context, “the claims of Adivasis as original
inhabitants were thus effectively written out of the Constitution, foreclosing any possibility of a
future recognition in the country's law. Since there are no recognized Adivasis, there is no legal
basis for any claim as an original inhabitant.”38
Adibasis are also not recognized in Bangladesh, and there are no such categorizations.
However, some ethnic groups are generally recognized as ‘tribes,’ ‘minor races,’ ‘ethnic sects’ and
‘communities,’ ‘small ethnic groups,’ ‘upojati,’ etc., and some are not recognized at all. For
example, the 1991 official census data identified and recognized only 27 ‘tribal’ communities in
Bangladesh, as reflected in the Small Ethnic Groups Cultural Institution Act 2010 (SEGCI Act).
There are around 1.6 million people amounting to 1.7% of the total population Bangladesh are
Adibasis. . However, Adibasi leaders and researchers came up with almost double that number.39
Surprisingly, the 2001 and 2011 official censuses did not categorize any Indigenous groups and
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their numbers, because both the censuses have considered the religious base of the population.40
Although Chattogram41 Hill Tracts (CHT) (the Southern hill districts) have the largest
concentration of Adibasis comprising of eleven Adibasi groups of which the Chakma people is the
largest in number, the North-western region /North Bengal, North-central part, North-eastern
region, and coastal regions have a large number of Adibasis. The Santal is the most populous
Adibasi community in the North Bengal followed by the Oraon. The Garo, Hajong, Koch,
Rajbangshi and Dalu are Adibasi communities live in the North-central part of Bangladesh, of
which the Garo is the largest ethnic group. Many Garos live in North-eastern states of India. There
are some Adibasi groups live in the North-eastern region of Bangladesh such as Khasi and
Monipuri.42 Rakhine is the lone Adibasi community live in the coastal areas of Bangladesh. Most
of the Bangladeshi Adibasi communities are concentrated in the borders of neighboring countries
such as India and Myanmar. More demographic information about Bangladeshi Adibasi
communities are set out in the table 1.
Table 1 Adibasis of Bangladesh
Adibasi Groups

Divisions and
Districts
Chakma,
Marma, Chattogram Hill Bandarban,
Tripura,
Mru, Tracts (Southern- Rangamati,
Khumi,
Lusai, East)
Khagrachhari
Bawm,
Pankhua,
Tanchangya, Chak,
and Khyang
Santal,
Oraon,
Koch,

Regions

Munda, North-western
Paharia, region/North
Mahili, Bengal

Relevant demographic information

These 11 Adibasi communities of the
CHT are collectively called as ‘Jumma
people’. The Chakma is the largest in
number (239417 according to 1991
census). Each community group has
distinct features regarding language,
culture, and social settings.
Rajshahi and According to Bangladesh Statistics
Rangpur
Bureau in their Population Census
Divisions
estimates that Adibasis in this region

40
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It was Chittagong before; the government recently changed the spelling officially into Chattogram to comply with
Bengali pronunciation. Chattogram is one of the eight administrative Divisions (bivag) of Bangladesh. In
Bangladesh, 64 district administrations are divided into different Divisions. Source:
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/04/02/english-spellings-chittagong-comilla-barisal-jessore-bograchanged/
42
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Mahato, Malo, Kol,
Karmakar, Robidas,
Bhumij, Musohor,
Lohar.

(Concentrated constitute 1.5% of the total population and
in
all
16 represent 26% of the entire Adibasi
districts)
groups of Bangladesh. They are also
regarded as Adibasis or Indigenous
peoples of the plains.
Santal is the largest Adibasi community in
Bangladesh, and throughout their history,
they are one of the most marginalized,
persecuted,
and
disadvantaged
communities in Bangladesh.

Garo, Hajong, Koch, North-central
Rajbangshi
and
Dalu.

Dhaka
and Garo is the largest in this region (64,280
Mymensingh
according to 1991 census). The Garos are
popularly known for their matrilineal
nature of society structure Their language
is unique in Bangladesh which is called
Tibeto-Burman.
Most
Garos
are
converted into Christianity. The second
largest Adibasi group of this region is
Koch (16, 567, according to 1991 census).
Sylhet (Sylhet, According to 2001 census, 1.13% of total
Sunamgonj,
population of this region belong to the
Moulavibazar, Manipuri and Khasi people. There is a
Habigonj
considerable number of Garo live in this
districts)
region too.
Chattogram
2001 census indicates that Rakhines
and
Barisal constitutes 5.58% of total Adibasi
(Cox’s Bazar, communities in Bangladesh. They are
Barguna and Mongoloid and follow Buddhism. They
Pautakhali
have their own scripts and language.
districts)
Some Marmas are found in the region too.
The Rakhine and Marma have similarities
regarding their social matters.

Manipuri and Khasi

North-east

Rakhine

Coastal

Source: Indigenous Peoples Framework, Ministry of Information of the Government of Bangladesh and
Philip Gain, Survival on the Fringe: Adibasis of Bangladesh, (Society for Environment and Human Development
(SEHD), Dhaka: 2011)

As Pooja Parmar has demonstrated, considering the literal meaning, government authorities of
the Indian sub-continent have tried to argue that ‘Scheduled tribes’, ‘Tribal’ or ‘Ethnic groups’ are
not ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples.’43 Some regard them as ethno-occupational groups.44 The

43

Pooja Parmar, Indigeneity and Legal Pluralism in India: Claims, Histories, Meanings. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2015).
44
Gain, supra note 39.

13

Bangladeshi government contends that the entire Bangalee community of Bangladesh had
‘coexisted’ with other ethnic groups before the geographical divisions by British administrators,
and therefore, “all Bangalee people are Indigenous or Adibasi.”45 In various diplomatic
discussions, government officials have rejected the claim of the existence of Indigenous peoples
in Bangladesh, though the United Nations (UN) acknowledges that the recognition of Indigenous
peoples should not be dependent on whether national governments recognize them as Indigenous
or not.46 Moreover, various international legal instruments and scholars emphasize ‘selfidentification’ as a significant criterion. However, instead of taking the self-identification principle
as the basis of recognizing Indigenous peoples, the Bangladesh government took ‘historical
continuity’ as the primary basis. During the discussion with foreign diplomats and UN agencies
representatives in 2011, Bangladeshi former Foreign Minister Dipu Moni insisted, “‘tribal people’
of the CHT did not exist before the 16th century, and they were not regarded as ‘Indigenous
peoples’ in historical reference books or legal documents; instead, they have been identified as a
‘tribal’ population.”47 When the UN Special Rapporteur Lars Anders Baer presented a study titled
“Status of implementation of the CHT Accord of 1997” in 2011, Iqbal Ahmed, the First Secretary
of the Bangladesh Mission in New York, said, “Bangladesh does not have any Indigenous
population.”48 He also added, “we urged upon the UN forum for not wasting time on politically
fictitious issues in Bangladesh.”49 Furthermore, Bangladesh countered that ‘Indigenous peoples’
refers only to “those countries where racially distinct people coming from overseas established
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colonies and subjugated the Indigenous populations.”50 The government authority also contends
that the CHT has more dominant Bangalee population than ‘tribal people,’ but they do not want to
recognize the enormous population migration from various parts of Bangladesh who settled in
Indigenous lands in the late 1970s, which is still continuing. Indigenous territorial lands were
occupied by Bangalee settlers and legally registered for ownership.51 Against the backdrop of
much debate over constitutional recognition of Adibasi communities in Bangladesh, the Law
Minister Shafique Ahmed stated in 2011, “they are tribal people, not Indigenous.”52 He further
explained the issue, “there are two criteria in the ILO Convention No. 169: the first criterion which
defines ‘tribal people’ is applicable for Bangladesh, but the second criterion that defines
‘Indigenous peoples’ is not applicable for Bangladesh.”53 Eventually, the executive body took a
few initiatives to bolster their claims of the non-existence of Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh.54
For example, on March 2012, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development issued
and circulated a letter to all levels of administrative bodies of the government stating that “in
Bangladesh, there are tribal people, not Indigenous peoples” and urged people to stop celebration
of “International Day of the World’s Indigenous Peoples.”55 The Ministry of Information of the
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Government of Bangladesh on 18 October 2018 published and circulated a notice to the media to
stop using the term ‘Adibasi’, and requested them to follow the terms used in the Constitution.56
The government has disregarded demands for upholding Adibasi rights as well as inserting
Adibasi/Indigenous peoples/Indigenous hill-men/Indigenous tribes as terms in the Constitution.57
Instead, the 15th Amendment to Article 23(A) of the Constitution that took place in 2011 refers to
Adibasi or Indigenous peoples of Bangladesh as ‘tribes,’ ‘minor races,’ ‘ethnic sects and
communities,’58 which becomes challenging for people who are demanding to be recognized
internationally as Indigenous peoples.59 Furthermore, only cultural aspects are mentioned in the
amended provision, whereas issues related to ‘Indigenous peoples’’ economic and political rights,
not just their land rights, remain ignored.60 Before the Constitutional amendment in 2011, these
communities were only regarded as a ‘backward section of people’ in the Constitution under
Article 28 that provides that “the state shall take necessary steps for the advancement of ‘any’
backward section of citizens.”61 The issues or questions raised in this discussion are taken up in
detail in Chapter IV.

1.3.

The Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of the Dissertation

The theoretical framework adopted in my dissertation allows me to explore aspects of
recognizing Indigenous peoples, and their rights over traditional lands and development projects,
in the context of the global environmental justice movement. The framework helps to explore the
case study and answer some questions: How do the affected Adibasi communities articulate their
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claims to environmental justice? Do they primarily claim a right to be heard? Or do they make a
distributional claim? Why do they resist against the coal mine project? Do they want to get
involved in the decision-making process or do they want to share in the benefits? Or do they want
both? Why do national and transnational solidarity groups get involved in the process of
resistance?
The study observes how Indigenous peoples in the global South draw a connection between
procedural justice and distributive justice, gleaned through field interviews. Moreover, since the
ethnic groups around the project area and throughout Bangladesh are not recognized as
‘Indigenous peoples’ by the government, I observe and document how they frame their claims in
order to be heard. The company through the ESIA of the Phulbari Coal Project provides special
provisions for Indigenous peoples like any other resource extraction industry does, which identifies
a list of communities to be recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’. Against this backdrop, I also
examine whether the rights and interests of the surrounding ethnic communities should be
established according to international law, and how their claims impact the struggle in the Phulbari
project area. I also ask whether self-defined Indigenous communities who are widely known as
‘Adibasi’ need to be recognized under the global term ‘Indigenous peoples’ in order to participate
(be consulted and be entitled to free, prior, and informed consent) in the decision-making process
and to achieve environmental justice.

1.3.1. Extraction on Indigenous Territories
Many Indigenous communities around the world delineate their identity as ‘people of forests,
of the plains, of the buffalo, or of the seal,’62 because they have strong ties with lands and wildlife
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around them. National governments often rely on the exploration of their mineral resources for
economic prosperity, and for this reason, they often expand the exploration and production into
traditional Indigenous territories.63 The trend of increased mining activities by national states and
transnational companies is escalated in the global South, i.e., Asia and the Pacific, Africa and Latin
America, and the Indigenous areas of the USA and Canada.64 Approximately 1200 Canadian
Aboriginal communities are situated within 200 km of active mines, 36% of which are located
within 50 km of a mine development project.65 The Mineral Council of Australia estimates that
60% of mining operations in that country are situated in Indigenous territories. 66 The
Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) estimates that between 1970
and 2004, the global extraction of major metals grew by over 75%, industrial minerals by 53%,
and construction materials by 106%, while world population increased by about 72%.67 And while
the experiences of Indigenous peoples with mining has been overwhelmingly negative, in some
cases, Indigenous interests are now recognized and accommodated to various degrees by corporate
policy and practice.68
Extracting minerals is not a sustainable industry, though it brings economic benefits for a
country. Several experiences show that the environmental hazards of mining continue for decades
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by undermining traditional land-use patterns.69 Besides, every stage of a resource extraction
project leaves behind abandoned pits and mine shafts, ore and waste rock deposits, roads, railways,
heavy equipment, storage facilities, oil spills, and hazardous wastes, the garbage that can have
long-term adverse effects on the environment as well as significant risks for nearby communities.70
Extractive industries located in Indigenous territories tend to have more negative outcomes than
other industries regarding environmental impacts, displacement, resettlement, and violation of
human rights by affecting the living conditions of Indigenous peoples.71 And while some argue
that resource extractive industries near Indigenous communities are more incidental than
intentional, because mining companies operate where they find significant deposits of natural
resources, others find that environmental racism impacts how companies operate.72
The negative impacts of extractive industries on Indigenous communities are often enhanced
by their lack of access to traditional lands and practices. It is a common phenomenon that if a
mining project is implemented, most of the people of that area would be displaced from their lands,
and the situation gets even more severe in open-pit mining projects. Problems associated with the
displaced people of resource extractive projects are increasingly becoming the focus of human
rights organizations.73 Moreover, the communities in the areas where the resources are located
tend to carry a disproportionate share of the negative impacts of development through reduced
access to resources and direct exposure to pollution and environmental degradation.74 Forced or
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involuntary displacement from the original habitations often means not only physical relocation
but also the loss of livelihoods derived from the subsistence resources offered by the local
environment.75 Indigenous peoples have traditional ways of managing resources around them, but
most of the conventional resources would be missing in new places. Displacement from their
traditional lands and resettlement in another location may lead to a breach of individual and
collective human rights such as the right to life, liberty to security, the right to non-interference
with privacy, family, and home, and the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions.76

1.3.2. Rights of Indigenous Peoples on Traditional Lands and Management of
Natural Resources
Various international instruments and organizations have collectively recognized Indigenous
peoples’ right to cultural identity, traditional lands, and territories, right to self-determination, right
to meaningfully participate in the decision-making process and respect their way of development
and traditional knowledge.77 Article 14(1) of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention-1989
(the ILO Convention No. 169) affirms:
“The rights of ownership and possession of [Indigenous peoples] over the lands which they
traditionally occupy shall be recognized. Also, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases
to safeguard the right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by
them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional
activities.”
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States and other international actors have legal duties and obligations to comply with those
rights. Article 13 of the Convention emphasizes that states should respect the cultures and spiritual
values of Indigenous peoples with distinctive importance as well as their relationship with the
lands or territories. Also, Article 15 requires nation-states to safeguard Indigenous peoples’ access
to natural resources in their regions, including the right to participate in managing, conserving and
altering. However, Article 12.1 of the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention- 1957 (the
ILO Convention No. 107) states that Indigenous populations ‘shall not be removed without their
free consent from their habitual territories’—unless the government wants to develop the said
territory for their own purposes. I find this provision enables nation-states to continue their
oppression on Indigenous peoples.
It is relevant to note that if any government signs and ratifies a convention or an agreement, it
will be legally binding or enforceable for that country. But it is observed that governments are
often reluctant to implement those commitments within their national boundaries. It is evident that
many governments have signed and ratified international conventions and declarations recognizing
the rights of Indigenous peoples, and they have adopted national legislations accordingly.
However, many states have favored multinational corporations (MNCs) and transnational
corporations (TNCs) in dealing with extractive projects on Indigenous territories by overlooking
international law obligations,78 as power relations are decisive of the extent to which participatory
instruments can be used for transformative engagement.79 Nevertheless, Indigenous peoples see
the recognition of their cultural and other rights as the only way for their survival and development.
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1.3.3. Right to Self-determination of Indigenous Peoples
It is well documented that environmental degradation commonly harms Indigenous peoples. It
is a significant threat to their lives and culture.80 By complying to establish the rights of people in
international law, Article 1(2) of the UN Charter incorporated the principle of equal rights and the
right to self-determination of peoples. Similarly, Article 1 (1 and 2) of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) recognize:
“1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation,
based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people
be deprived of its own means of subsistence.”81
Again, Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP) states that Indigenous peoples have right to exercise the right to self-determination. By
that right, they can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development. Article 4 of the same Declaration states, “Indigenous peoples, in
exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in
matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their
autonomous functions.” Therefore, Indigenous peoples should not be prevented from taking any
decision (social, economic, political or cultural) of whether they want any development in their
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territory or not.

1.3.4. Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)
James Anaya states that as part of their right to self-determination, Indigenous peoples have
the right to decide whether they will allow a development project in their territory or not. 82
UNDRIP, the ILO Convention No. 169, and the International Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) articulate that if any state or any corporation wants to go forward
with development in Indigenous territories, FPIC must be obtained before deciding on
development projects. Indigenous peoples have the irrevocable right to offer and withhold their
consent to those developments before any authorization of development activities.83 It empowers
them to negotiate how the project will be designed, controlled, managed, implemented, monitored
and evaluated.84 Regarding Articles 19 and 32(2) of UNDRIP, the government must confirm
“consultation in good faith through Indigenous peoples’ representative institutions, in order to
obtain their FPIC before adopting or implementing legislative or administrative measures that may
affect them and prior to approval of projects that may affect their lands, territories or resources.”85
Article 10 states that Indigenous peoples should not be forcibly removed from their lands or
territories. No relocation shall take place without the FPIC of Indigenous peoples concerned. The
governments should comply with the Declaration before the approval of projects that may affect
lands, territories, or resources of Indigenous peoples.
Article 7.1 of the ILO Convention No. 169 states:
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“The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the
process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual
well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to
the extent possible, over their own economic, social and cultural development. In
addition, they shall participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation
of plans and programmes for national and regional development which may affect
them directly.”86
James Anaya argues that a nation-state must respect and protect the rights of Indigenous
peoples, and it must ensure other safeguards are implemented before proceeding with an extractive
project. A state must take specific steps to minimize the limitation on the rights they can obtain
through impact assessments, measures of mitigation, compensation, and benefit-sharing.87 Any
decision by the government to construct an extractive project without the consent of Indigenous
peoples that impacts them negatively should be subject to review by an impartial judicial authority.
The right to FPIC of Indigenous peoples has a secure connection to the right to selfdetermination. Both rights empower the community to decide their political status freely and
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. FPIC requires that Indigenous peoples
should have the right to access full information regarding the proposed development on their
ancestral lands.88 As Papillon and Rodon state, “the principle of FPIC is rooted in the recognition
that Indigenous peoples, as self-determining peoples, should be empowered to make decisions over
their future and that of their traditional lands.”89 The consent they express must be free from any
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pressure, and they must have all relevant information regarding the proposed activity and its
potential impact.90 Papillon and Rodon argue that FPIC is a powerful political discourse by which
Indigenous peoples can play an essential role in the natural resource economy where they freely
express their identifiable priorities through an informed and collaborative process by fully engaged
in decision-making.91 The authors contend that FPIC must be considered as one of the criteria for
project authorization, and no project should be allowed without it. Project proponents or states
should apply FPIC in every case, engaging not only Indigenous peoples but also all projectaffected communities unless it is exhibited that the impact of the proposed project would be
minimal, and the project is in the public interest.92
Although there is much debate as to whether Indigenous peoples’ participatory rights extend
to veto power over the state action,93 James Anaya and Shin Imai argue that in cases where
Indigenous peoples are utterly and willfully ignored in a process that would have a significant
impact on their lands and livelihoods, a veto right is certainly applicable.94 Exercising or
employing this right to FPIC does not mean that international and domestic regulations and donor
policies for developing a resource extracting project are to be ignored.95 Given the situation and
the position of the right to self-determination and right to FPIC of Indigenous peoples, national
legislation and practice seem to be particularly weak concerning implementation. Although in
many cases, Indigenous peoples accept such resource extraction initiatives, research shows that

90

Anaya, supra note 82.
Papillon and Rodon, supra note 89 at 7.
92
Ibid. at 17.
93
James Anaya, “Indigenous Peoples’ Participatory Rights in Relation to Decisions about Natural Resource
Extraction: the More Fundamental Issue of What Rights Indigenous Peoples Have” (2005) 22:1 Arizona J Int Comp
Law at 7.
Shin Imai, “Consult, consent and veto: International norms and Canadian treaties.” In Michael Coyle and John
Borrows eds. The Right Relationship: Reimagining the Implementation of Historical Treaties, (Toronto, UofT Press,
2017).
94
Ibid
95
Papillon and Rodon, supra note 89 at 2.
91

25

Indigenous peoples are also resisting them in many more places around the world, especially in
the global South.96

1.3.5. Engaging Indigenous Peoples in Development Decisions
The crucial role played by Indigenous peoples and their communities in environmental
management and development has received generous recognition in international law.97
Significantly, most extractive projects are increasingly taking place in the territories of Indigenous
peoples. States and corporations mostly advance these projects without the meaningful
involvement of Indigenous peoples in the decision-making process. In most cases, states and
project proponents minimally recognize rights, cultures, and traditional knowledge of Indigenous
peoples. In many countries, especially in the global South, instead of seeing the interests of ‘people
of the land’ and negative social and environmental impacts on lands, ecological diversity, and
human health, the governments favor companies’ interests for their economic benefits. Most of the
resource extractive companies and their sub-contractors are not interested in taking appropriate
measures to address environmental and social impacts on Indigenous peoples. Rather, they look
for how effectively they can extract mineral resources for their financial gain.
Generally, it has been observed that low-income and Indigenous communities affected by
mineral development exert little influence on the decision-making processes of legislative and
environmental agencies because such groups are not represented among the interest groups that
lobby and litigate against environmental authorities.98 Moreover, they are hardly involved in a
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complex network of political, cultural and social relations within communities and with regional
organizations. As a result, Indigenous interests persistently struggle to pursue negotiations on both
fronts.99 The scenario is common across the global South due to weak environmental regulations,
health and safety standards, although progressive mining companies conduct partial impact
assessments with essential impacts left unmitigated or ignored.100 Moreover, community
consultations are often restricted to discussions on immediate consequences and not on long-term
effects.101 Furthermore, the recognition of the vulnerability of the collective rights of many
Indigenous communities to environmental degradation is essential.102
Indigenous organizations have signaled their concern about the negative impacts of major
development projects on their environments, livelihoods, lifestyles, and survival. As mentioned,
very often, these projects entail involuntary displacements and resettlement of Indigenous
communities. As a result, Indigenous peoples resist major projects because of the violations of
their civil and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights. The conflict between economic
development, environmental protection, and recognition of human rights is seen in the livelihoods
of Indigenous peoples.103

1.3.6. Struggle/ Resistance by Indigenous Peoples
As part of exercising their rights to self-determination, freedom of expression, and
participation in decision-making processes under international law, Robert Bullard and Glen
Johnson argue that Indigenous peoples and grassroots groups necessarily organize themselves,
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educate themselves, empower themselves, and resist in their communities.104 These rights
necessarily entail the ability of Indigenous peoples to pursue their own initiatives for resource
extraction within their territories if they choose.
It is widely documented that mining activities have fostered ecological distribution conflicts
around the world. Communities opposed to mining projects have been facing human rights
violations. The Latin American Observatory of Mining Conflicts (OCMAL) reported more than
150 active mining conflicts in the region, most of which started in the 2000s.105 However,
Indigenous communities across Latin America are also resisting mining operations in their
territories. Canadian and other multinational mining interests have been successful since most
Latin American resource-rich countries adopted mining policies that favor corporations over
Indigenous peoples, other marginalized communities, the environment, and labor rights.
Concerning struggles over the environmental and ecological impacts of mining activities on
the lands of Indigenous peoples, Keeling and Sandlos illustrate that the efforts not only manifest
themselves as local conflicts but also as global settings of capital accumulation, profit
maximization, and neo-colonialism.106 Indigenous communities and their leaders observe that the
operation on their lands is a direct assault against their people as well as their cultural practices
and beliefs. Indigenous leaders thus articulate environmental injustice as a set of conditions that
remove or restrict the ability of individuals and communities to function effectively. 107 Brosius
argues that Indigenous campaigners have frequently found support outside national borders, as the
rights of Indigenous peoples have become a global concern. Such groups, legitimately concerned
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about local issues, refer to global discourses and are increasingly brought into transnational
advocacy networks.108 Moreover, the solidarity sectors of the global North support the selfdevelopment of Indigenous peoples to gain the degree of self-determination to control over their
lands and economic conditions.109
Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans argue that MNCs and TNCs are maintaining profits by relying
on unsustainable forms of production in resource extractive industries and other development
projects. Corporations are making enormous financial gains using ‘neo-liberal economic policies’
that affect the society at large through higher levels of pollution, greater resource exploitation, less
social security for workers, and displacement of local and Indigenous communities.110 The authors
claim that human inequality is dangerous for environmental quality though not all people bear
these costs equally, depending on the quality of environmental regulations. The countries in the
global North have higher environmental quality than the global South, and they tend to be affected
less.111 The above situation can be configured as ecological distribution conflicts, which was
coined by Martinez-Alier and Martin O’Connor in 1996 to describe social conflicts evolving from
a disproportionate share of burdens and benefits of environmental goods and bads among different
actors.112 Scheidel et al. argue that the unsustainable use of resources creates both environmental
destruction and ecological distributional conflicts.113 These conflicts put particular emphasis on
distributional aspects and distributional justice claims, and therefore, sometimes “transform into
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collective action which becomes very powerful when they challenge current understandings of our
relationship with the government.”114 In other words, ecological distribution conflicts give rise to
many environmental justice movements by requiring the distributional perspective; that is, the lack
of participation and recognition leads to the unjust distribution of burdens and benefits.115

1.3.7. Environmental Justice Movement to “Just Sustainability”
The concept of ‘environmental justice’ is used to illustrate the fact that low-income
communities and communities of color bear and face greater environmental and health risks than
the dominant communities in their neighborhoods and workplaces.116 This disproportionate risk is
linked to other injustices in economic and social conditions the disempowered communities face.
The environmental justice movement emerged in the U.S.A. in the late 1980s when an AfricanAmerican community in Warren County of North Carolina organized a resistance movement when
the area was chosen as the state’s waste dumping site without their consent.117 Although the
struggle of ‘people of color’ against a government decision was unsuccessful, it gained enormous
attention from both domestic and international policy and decision-makers, environmental
scholars, and solidarity groups. Robert Bullard, a pioneer of the environmental justice movement
in the USA who led the protest from the front, terms the condition as ‘environmental racism,’
which is one form of environmental injustice fortified by different government bodies.118 David
Schlosberg makes a connection between the environmental justice movement and environmental
racism: both are concerned with low-income communities and the disproportionate risks they
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face.119 Bullard and Johnson call for the environmental justice movement to identify some firm
objectives for eliminating existing unequal enforcement of environmental regulations, policies,
and practices. These environmental regulations and policies often limit some individuals and
groups from participation in decision-making.120 Additionally, government policies also allow
MNCs and TNCs complete control over development projects.121 One of the fundamental goals of
the environmental justice movement is to challenge the capitalist growth economy.122 Dayna Scott
makes a clear distinction between the environmental movement and the environmental justice
movement.123 Environmentalists in the environmental movement have been focusing on legal
strategies to achieve social change, which she sees as problematic because law reform continues
to privilege elites at the expense of people working on the ground.124
David Pellow argues that the environmental justice movement is not a sustainability movement
or an environmental movement; instead, it's about the fight for social, procedural, and distributive
justice.125 Differentiating the environmental justice movement from the sustainability movement,
Agyeman and Evans idealize Faber’s argument that the struggle for environmental justice is not
about sustainability because environmental justice wants to share risks and benefits equally; it does
not talk about how to get rid of jeopardies at the same time.126 The question of environmental
justice can be addressed without solving ecological problems.127 Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans
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contend that sustainability and environmental justice may conflict with each other, as the primary
focus of the environmental justice movement is on the issues of social equity and equality, and the
center of ‘environmental sustainability’ is on green issues.128 However, scholars and policymakers
have placed environmental justice within the principles of sustainability and sustainable
development. Therefore, the movement on two concerns can be found in local fights for just
transport, community food security, and sustainable communities and cities.129 Dayna Scott states
that although the environmental justice movement has focused on the health and wellbeing of
people rather than protecting the natural environment, the activists of the movement started by
concentrating on environmental impacts and harms to surrounding communities derived from air,
water, soil contamination as well as toxic workplaces, urban planning, and transit decisions.130
Scheidel et al. point out that environmental justice movements arise out of ecological distribution
conflicts leading to ‘just sustainability’ that addresses both environmental quality and human
equality.131 The authors argue that environmental justice movements can turn from victims of
environmental injustices into fighters for sustainability by articulating creative forms of
mobilization and action.132
According to Agyeman and Evans, ‘sustainability’ ensures a better quality of life for all in a
just and equitable manner by protecting ecosystems, whilst living within the limits of supporting
ecosystems.133 Their definition focuses on four main areas of concern, such as quality of life,
present and future generations, justice and equity in resource allocation, and living within
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ecological limits.134 The authors single out ‘just sustainability’ and ‘environmental sustainability’,
and mandate, “governments at the local, regional, national and international levels to learn from
these environmental justice and progressive, or ‘just sustainability’-based organizations and to
seek to embed the central principles and practical approaches of ‘just sustainability’ into
sustainable development policy.”135 By ‘just sustainability’, the authors mean “an equal concern
with equity, justice and, ultimately, governance on the one hand, and environment on the other,”136
that has an equal value of environmental justice. The justice-sustainability coalition is being
addressed through transnational activism and in the policy debates of international environmental
regimes.137 Therefore, environmental sustainability concerns, both at the national and the global
level, have become major binding constraints to development initiatives.

1.3.8. Conceptions of Environmental Justice
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has a working definition of
environmental justice, which has been widely used to define environmental justice. It states,
“environmental justice is the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless
of race, color, income, or national origin concerning development, implementation, and
enforcement of environmental laws, policies, and regulations.”138 In EPA’s definition, ‘fair
treatment’ means that there should be fairness in the distribution of goods and bads among all
actors resulting from industrial, governmental, or commercial activities. Again, ‘meaningful
involvement’ affirms that affected communities should have the voice in the decision-making
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process.139 The communities must be involved by the government bodies or project proponents
while making decisions. EPA argues that the goal of environmental justice will not be achieved
until everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from environmental harm, and equal access
to the decision-making process.140 According to David Schlosberg, environmental justice is the
equitable and fair distribution of risks and benefits associated with any development project,
meaningful participation of communities in the decision-making process, recognition of rights,
local knowledge, cultural differences and distinctiveness of surrounding communities, and the
capability of individuals and communities to function in society.141 Therefore, environmental
justice is a theory of justice and a social movement that is concerned about fair and equitable
treatment towards all people regarding sharing benefits and bearing burdens of environmental
harm, involvement in the decision-making process, and recognition of rights.
Seventeen principles of environmental justice were adopted to build a national and
international movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction that is occurring on their
lands, especially in Indigenous territories.142 All principles except the final principle include a
social justice component (the seventeenth talks about environmental integrity). To sum up,
environmental justice principles affirm to protect the sacredness of the ‘Mother Earth’ and
maintain sustainability for protecting humans and other living things. Environmental justice
confirms to uphold the fundamental right to social, political, economic, cultural, and
environmental self-determination of all people, and as such, demand the right to participate as
equal partners at every level of decision-making by enforcing the principle of informed consent.
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The principles of environmental justice assure the safeguarding of the rights of all victims of
environmental injustice by confirming they receive full compensation for damage as well as
quality healthcare. The principles of environmental justice oppose the destructive operations of
multinational corporations to sustain the complete protection of human beings and the natural
environment.143 Robert Bullard puts forward that governments should adopt five principles of
environmental justice to end unequal environmental protection: guaranteeing the right to
environmental protection, preventing harm before it occurs, shifting the burden of proof to the
polluters, obviating proof of intent to discriminate, and redressing existing inequities.144
According to Dayna Scott, “employing an environmental justice lens means that we take
account of the sharing of costs and benefits associated with environmental policy and natural
resource development decisions, and the extent to which the decision-making has meaningfully
included the participation of affected communities.”145 According to Schlosberg, the term
environmental justice is used to cover two overlapping parts of the grassroots environmental
justice movement: the anti-toxic movement and the movement against environmental racism.146
According to Schlosberg, three conceptions of justice should exist in environmental justice
movements such as equitable distribution, recognition, and participation. I will discuss each in
turn.
1.3.8.1.

Equitable and Fair Distribution of Risks and Benefits

Most environmental justice movements focus on just, fair and equitable distribution of benefits
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and burdens among various actors as well as the meaningful involvement of Indigenous persons
and members of other marginalized communities in the environmental decision-making processes
for developing resource extractive or other large-scale projects.147 However, environmental
degradation cannot be separated from other problems afflicting low-income communities and
communities of color. Young acknowledges Rawls’ ‘Theory of Justice’ as a useful apparatus for
justice and claims that this is the most well-known and frequently applied approach to questions
of justice that focus on ‘fairness’ of the distribution.148 This theory of justice can address the
question of the ‘fairness’ of the distribution of burdens resulting from the authority’s decision.
Young claims that a distributive analysis of justice considers what risks, benefits, and
responsibilities should be distributed among various organizations, corporations, state organs, state
environmental agencies, municipal governments, and local communities in a development
project.149 Connecting to the unequal distribution of harms and disproportionate burdens, antimining groups frequently argue that the approval of mining projects involves the misrecognition
of their material and cultural dependence on the land and ignores the concerns expressed in
participatory stages.150 It is crucial to intervene at the nation-state level to eliminate unequal
distribution among various actors.151
According to Schlosberg, there is more to the conception of environmental justice than just
this distributional aspect, and a focus solely on distribution is problematic.152 The arguments and
critiques of Young and Schlosberg regarding distributional justice exposed some new opinions
about environmental justice. These ideals of distributive justice developed and recognized by
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various scholars, including Rawls, Young, and Schlosberg, are useful for extending the legal and
social framework to analyze another dimension of environmental justice, e.g., procedural
environmental justice.
1.3.8.2.

Participation in the Decision-making Process

The right to meaningful participation of local people in the decision-making process of any
development project is an essential component of environmental justice. It requires respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms as part of the development process. Citizens should be
the key actors in economic development, both as beneficiaries of modernization and as those
affected by increasing marginalization.153 Indigenous peoples’ right to participate at every level of
decision-making as equal partners can confirm their claim of environmental justice. Taking
participatory justice into account, Richardson and Razzaque argue that public participation through
community consultation is significant in the context of sustainable development.154 Public
participation can occur through education, information dissemination, advisory or review boards,
public advocacy, public hearings and submissions, and even litigation. By these means, public
participation may assist decision-makers in understanding and identifying public interest concerns
while formulating environmental policies.155 Emphasizing the access to environmental
information, participation in administrative decision-making and access to justice, the authors
claim that while these participatory reforms have improved the quality of many environmental
decisions, they have hardly engendered a substantial paradigm shift to ecologically sustainable
development.156 The issue of justice raised by communities in the development projects calls into
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question just those institutional structures that justify some decision-making procedures.
Therefore, communities, especially Indigenous and other marginalized people, should have the
right to participate in the decision-making process with the power to approve or disapprove any
project.
Affected communities find themselves having to struggle with nation-states, which they
perceive as representing interests other than theirs,157 but ideally, states are entitled to give priority
to the interests of their citizens.158 Although state agencies have the responsibility to make a fair
and equitable decision about the distribution of risks, they favor corporations over their citizens.159
Young contends that a state has a significant interest in attracting large businesses within its
borders and making the conditions of their operations favorable.160 The governments argue that
the decision would bring the most significant benefit to the country. In many cases, where the
primary conflict opposes the interests of corporations to those of residents affected by their
operations, citizens rarely believe that nation-states act neutrally and impartially.
1.3.8.3.

Recognition of Communities and their Rights

Environmental justice activists have called for a more substantial commitment to ‘recognition’
of affected communities that are being ignored by both mainstream environmental movements and
governments. In this respect, Schlosberg believes environmental justice must focus on the political
process to address both the inequitable distribution of social goods and the conditions undermining
social recognition.161 Recognition requires that policies and programs for managing development
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projects must meet the standard reasonably, considering and representing the cultures, traditional
knowledge, values, and situations of all affected parties.162 Kyle Whyte emphasizes the integration
of environmental heritage and recognition-based justice and argues that the heritage should be
blended to the benefit of all affected parties.163 Schlosberg states that “lack of recognition is harm,
an injustice, as much as a lack of adequate distribution of various goods is.”164 He further
rationalizes Young’s claim and argues that lack of recognition is an injustice and a threat to human
dignity because it harms by constraining people from their fundamental rights. Non-recognition or
misrecognition can cause harm and imprisons oppressed communities in cultural and political
dominance.165 If someone is not recognized, he/she cannot adequately participate in any process
of decision-making.166 Moreover, it is also the foundation of distributive injustice.167 According to
Young, lack of participation of local communities in decision-making derives from a lack of
recognition of the victims of environmental degradation, which then leads to environmental
injustice.168
1.3.8.4.

Integrating Distribution, Participation, and Recognition

Schlosberg endorses Young’s argument and claims that the concept of justice needs to focus
more generally on the elimination of longstanding domination and oppression. He argues that the
central focus for Young is in addressing justice both as distribution and as the recognition of the

Kyle Powys Whyte, “The Recognition Dimensions of Environmental Justice in Indian Country.” (2011) 4.4
Environmental Justice at 201.
163
Ibid. at 203.
164
Schlosberg, supra note 119 at 82.
165
Young, supra note 148.
Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition.” in Ajay Heble, Donna Palmateer Pennee, J.R. Struthers eds. New
Contexts of Canadian Criticism (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1997) at 98.
166
Ibid.
167
Ibid. at 85.
168
Ibid.
162

39

difference in decision-making structures.169 Kyle Whyte claims that distributive and procedural
justice cannot be integrated into laws, programs, policies, and institutions without respect for
Indigenous cultures, values, and particular situations.170 In this sense, increased participation can
address issues of unfair distribution and misrecognition of Indigenous communities in any resource
extractive development project. Arguments for procedural justice demonstrate how varied notions
of justice can be incorporated into a single project. The demand for participation in the decisionmaking process involving Indigenous and local communities is central to the environmental justice
movement by which they can be appropriately recognized.
Schlosberg puts forward the argument that unequal distribution of harm is perceived not only
as an environmental injustice but also as a violation of human rights on a local as well as a global
scale.171 But according to Young, the emphasis on only a distributive justice paradigm is
misguided. She claims that lack of recognition itself causes damage to the oppressed communities
because if they are not recognized, they cannot participate effectively in any decision-making
process.172 Schlosberg agrees that justice requires not only an understanding of unjust distribution,
and would include elements of recognition, but argues that these two are tied together in political
and social processes.173 These conceptions of injustice are not competing for notions, nor are they
contradictory or antithetical. Unequal distribution, lack of recognition, and limited participation
all work to produce injustice, and claims for justice can be integrated into a decision-making
process for any development project.174 This is a critical motivation. In the research, I hope to
contribute insight to advance the literature on this point.
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1.3.9. Local to Transnational Resistance in the Environmental Justice Movement
Local communities and activists or justice organizations in the global South cannot succeed
alone; national and transnational justice and advocacy groups and networks join with them and tie
together to resist against development projects to establish rights and justice towards them.
National justice groups and civil society members maintain communication with transnational
coalitions for avoiding further intervention from project proponents in the long run.175 Since local
protesters and right holders cannot trace a company’s most recent activities, transnational justice
organizations through their strong networks can contact and bargain with the company, and to
some extent, with states. Therefore, the justice groups act as a mediator in this case.
Transnational networks campaign, negotiate and create pressure on states and foreign
extractive companies through various means such as presenting evidence on websites, and in
newspapers and social media, and by organizing events and street protests, and making companies
accountable for their actions and through global attention. The campaigners also work with local
communities and activists to assess needs and initiate a legal and direct campaign against
corporations and governments’ oppression.176 The activities by the transnational and global justice
organizations can be called the ‘transnational or cross-border social movement.’177 In other words,
transnational social movements can be defined as movements involving activists from more than
one country, which infiltrate from the local level (where the project is situated) to the national level
(capital city or countrywide) to a transnational space (another country especially, the origin of the
company).178 Additionally, activists themselves may be transnational such as citizens of more than
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one country or solidarity groups supporting a movement in a foreign country. Alongside
transnational methods and strategies may be applied, such as mobilization, protest, social media,
or other web-based activities, and the movement requires cross-border interaction such as activism
based in one or several countries where activists are located.179
I argue that Indigenous peoples around the world tend to be disproportionately affected by
resource extraction activities and have fewer technical, legal, and other resources to participate in
the decision-making process effectively due to their non-recognition. This lack of adequate
participation can be interpreted as procedural environmental injustice. The above discussion in the
process of building a theoretical framework generates a hypothesis that I intend to test: inequitable
or unequal distribution, lack of recognition, and limited participation, all work to produce injustice,
and claims for justice should be integrated into a decision-making process for any development
project. In doing so, my primary aim is to observe how and to what extent Indigenous peoples’
interests are reflected in the environmental decision-making process and how do they frame their
claims by building coalitions with national and transnational environmental justice groups in a
mining conflict situation by qualitative research and policy analysis.

1.4.

My Methodological Journey

1.4.1. Plan of Research
This research study involves human participants and maintains the ethical standards of conduct
required by the Research Ethics Review Board of York University. The Research Ethics Review
Board of York University approved my research project in April 2015. Before going to Bangladesh
for field work in December 2015, I finalized my interview questionnaires and the scope of
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interviews with the consultation of my supervisor. This research primarily utilizes a ‘case study’
approach to facilitate advanced understandings of the recognition, distribution of risks and
benefits, and procedural environmental justice elements for Indigenous peoples. My case study
examines Adibasi and activists’ accounts of the movement to analyze how their claims in the
mining conflict fit into the environmental justice movement.
I use both primary and secondary sources in developing the case study. Bearing in mind the
scope of the project, its ESIA process, and the Adibasi resistance, I focused my fieldwork primarily
on participant observation and key informant interviews with Adibasi communities and some
Bangalees of the mining region, core activists of the movement, local government representatives,
NGO representatives and civil society members that are opposing the proposed project. The
purpose of the interviews is to explore the motivation for and background history of the movement
and its claims. Moreover, interviews of Adibasi members gave me a basic idea about whether they
were properly consulted or not, whether the consents they have given were free or not, and why
they organized and resisted against the project. I learned about their conceptions of distributive
justice and procedural environmental justice and whether they have or seek recognition as
Indigenous peoples. I also completed a document review, including the analysis of reports and
policy documents.

1.4.2. Before the Journey
I find it crucial to share my methodological journey for conducting this research, which can be
helpful for future researchers in a similar case and area setting. Before my visit to Phulabri, several
researchers warned me about the local rage concerning Dalal of the company. I was prepared to
face the situation. A Dhaka University sociology professor who had conducted ethnographic
research in the Phulbari mining region told me that when local people, even after a decade of the
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Phulbari Khoni Andolon, see any Bohiragoto180 hanging around in their locality, “they assume
that person is a Dalal of Asia Energy.” She offered me with a list of activists who organized the
Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi. She also shared the experience of obstacles she had faced
during her ethnographic research in Phulbari and suggested that I proceed with caution because
once I am tagged as a Dalal of Asia Energy, I might not be able to complete my fieldwork in
Phulbari. She suggested me to contact local activists and create peer relations with them before
starting my field activities.
Keeping the experience in mind, I contacted the member secretary of NCBD, Professor Anu
Muhammad. The central NCBD members have had a considerable impact on local activists. Since
I needed to conduct interviews with key activists of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, researchers who
had done fieldwork in Phulbari recommended me to talk to the professor. He knew about my
research, as I had previously contacted him to get consent for participating in my research. After I
reiterated the purpose of my visiting Phulbari, he assured me of help in Phulbari. He said that he
would introduce me to regional NCBD leaders. He explained to me why local protesters and
villagers are suspicious about Bohiragoto and how they are still keen on protesting the company
and their activities. Awareness has been maintained among activists and local villagers because of
the simultaneous efforts of company personnel in the mining area. The protesters and local farmers
became proactive; many of them still believe that the company might develop the opencast mining
project on their lands by influencing the government. Every other month, protesters meet in
Phulbari town to inform people to be aware of Dalal. Professor Muhammad informed the convener
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of Phulbari NCBD and requested him to help me. Although the convener could not help me in my
research directly, he assured me that nobody would obstruct my field activities.
As I knew that most of the regional NCBD members and activists of the movement were also
the members of leftist political parties, I contacted my friend, a central Communist Party leader,
to reach his comrades to assist me in conducting field activities in Phulbari town. He reached out
to Nuruzzaman, a key leader of the movement in Phulbari town.

1.4.3. The Journey Begins
My field activities started in December 2016. I went to my wife’s grandparents’ house in
Birampur sub-district, which is only ten kilometers from the mining footprint and twenty
kilometers from Phulbari town. My father-in-law introduced me to the convener of the Birampur
regional branch of NCBD, one of the organizers of the movement. I met the convener informally
several times, and he became my local link until I moved to Phulbari town to meet other activists.
The convener also gave me some names of local activists. He informed me that the current
Chairman of Khanpur Union Council of the Birampur sub-district had been elected in a popular
vote due to his active role in the movement. My wife’s grandmother told me that the Chairman is
her relative and gave me his phone number. I called and expressed my intention of visiting him
and informed him that I need a place in his area for ethnographic field activities with Adibasi
communities. He agreed to help me and offered a room at his office complex free of charge.
The next morning, I went to the Chairman’s office in the Khanpur Union Council complex. I
could not meet him, as he left the office to go to the city for the day. But he had instructed his
secretary to help me. The assistant told me that most of the villages (hamlets) in this Union are
Adibasi villages and most of the Adibasis were involved in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. He gave
me the name of Cherobin Hembrom, the head of Birampur sub-district traditional institute and a
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key person motivating Adibasis and organizing the movement. He is a Santal, one of the three
communities (along with the Munda and the Mahili) recognized as ‘Indigenous’ or ‘Adibasi’ by
Asia Energy in their official document (ESIA). Cherobin Hembrom is a retired village doctor
popularly known as ‘Cherobin Daktar/Doctor’ in the area, as he served a long time as a leprosy
doctor at the nearby hospital of a Catholic Church.
Cherobin Hembrom told me about his involvement in the movement and his position in Adibasi
society. I understood that he would be a very important key informant of my research. He knows
all the leaders and core activists of the movement. He told me that a portion of his hamlet (mostly
agricultural lands of Dhanjuri village) is included in the preliminary map of the projected mining
area. After a short discussion about the social, political, and economic settings of Adibasi
communities and the Phulbari movement, he invited me to enter his house made with mud and
introduced me to his wife and other family members. Before leaving Cherobin’s house, I expressed
my interest to stay at his house as a paying guest because I wanted to stay with an Adibasi family
to understand their livelihoods more closely. He assured me to help in my research but could not
confirm about keeping me at his house. However, he gave me the phone number of his younger
son, Clinton Hembrom, who has been studying at a college in Dhaka. I observed that Adibasi
family settings are different than non-Adibasi.

1.4.4. Creating Connection in the Field
I went to Phulbari town from Dhaka on January 10, 2016, intending to stay there for a week to
create a connection with local activists. I went to the office of the chief executive of the Phulbari
sub-district to inform him of my presence in the mining area and discovered he was a friend of
mine from university. I described my reason for coming to Phulbari, and he agreed to help me
within his official limit. He also arranged a room for me to stay in the government bungalow. I
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stayed at the bungalow for seven days and observed the township. I saw many slogans of the
movement written on walls throughout the town. When I was staying in Phulbari town,
Nuruzzaman’s home became my regular destination, and he spoke about the movement more
often. He showed me his collection of newspaper reports on the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. I
photocopied them for my research. He gave me a list of prospective interviewees among activists
and their phone numbers; I interviewed most of them at the later dates, and their accounts were a
great deal of help for my research.
I also shared my intention with the caretaker of the bungalow, and he convinced his son to be
my guide during my stay in Phulbari town. His son accompanied me walking through the township
and brought me to a neighboring Adibasi hamlet. Though most of the Adibasi adults were out of
their homes working in the fields, I managed to talk to an elderly Adibasi man from the Munda
community181 who shared his personal experience of getting involved in the movement. I returned
to Dhaka after a significant improvement in conducting field activities in Phulbari.

1.4.5. Into the Field
I met Clinton Hembrom in Dhaka and requested him to persuade his parents to keep me at their
home as a paying guest. I also asked him to be my research assistant (accompany me, recruit
interviewees in their language, and help me with recording and note-taking). As I mentioned
earlier, I wanted to stay close to Adibasis, and to stay at an Adibasi house was my priority. Clinton
convinced his family and agreed to work with me as a research assistant since he was on a study
break. I stayed at their home for two and a half months. For the first few days, I roamed around
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the village observing Adibasi daily lives. Cherobin Hembrom gave me a list of Adibasi members
from

ten

neighboring

Adibasi

hamlets and a non-Adibasi village.
Talking to him at dinner became my
daily task. Mr. Hembrom told stories
about Adibasis’ social, political,
legal, and economic issues, oral and
sacred history, rituals, festivals,
Figure 2: My RA with the Bike we used for commuting

recognition politics, religion, and the

movement. I took notes every night before sleeping. Cherobin formally gave me a three-hour
interview about the recognition politics of Adibasis and protest issues on my last day at his house.
It was a great experience to have such a knowledgeable person as my key informant for my
research.
After spending ten days of observing Adibasi communities, mining issues, movement, and
collecting potential interviewees list, I started the data collection process. My father-in-law
borrowed a motorbike for me, which my research assistant drove. This vehicle helped much in
getting to interviewees in various places. I relied on my research assistant as a local Adibasi person
who knew the area. Understanding and speaking Adibasi languages, he convinced most Adibasi
interviewees to take part in my research. Clinton took me to Phulbari town many times. I conducted
most of the interviews with activists in Phulbari and Birampur during my stay at Dhanjuri hamlet.

1.4.6. Get Ready for Confrontation
“Agents of the company are roaming around. We will resist them at any cost.”
- An Adibasi protester.
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Although I was in an advantageous position entering the mining region,182 I faced multiple
confrontations during my field activities in the mining region. When I was walking through an
Adibasi hamlet, some residents stared at me as if I were a criminal. It took me a while to understand
why they were staring at me. My research assistant told me, “They think that you are a Dalal.” I
requested my RA to inform them that I am not a Dalal or a company agent; instead, I would be
researching for their justice and rights. Another obstacle in Phulbari town was when a man,
accompanying a regional NCBD leader, asked for an explanation of why I am doing this research.
I tried to explain my research agenda and informed him that I am conducting this research as part
of my doctoral study. He told me there is no point in researching. He did not give any explanation,
but I felt that local protesters are frustrated of dealing with Dalal and Bohiragoto and do not want
people to engage in the mining and movement issue.
I also faced a confrontation at my RA’s house. My RA’s brother, the eldest Cherobin son,
works for an NGO in Dinajpur town. He comes home every other two weeks. When he arrived
home, he questioned me
for a whole day, trying to
find

links

with

the

company. I showed him
the documents required
for

conducting

field

research. I even showed
him the website where I
Figure 3: Adibasi farmers busy working in the paddy field

had appeared in my
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university news for receiving scholarships for my study. He was not convinced and took a whole
day to read the documents I provided to him. He talked to his father about the matter. I was worried
that I would be kicked out, I would lose my RA, and I would not be able to conduct my field
research in that area. I was waiting for responses from both persons. The next morning when he
was leaving home for Dinajpur, he told me that I could stay at his house, but he was still confused
about my roles. He later came back four to five times during my stay, and we discussed the Phulbari
Coal Project, the movement, and the Adibasi lifestyle.
During my fieldwork, I struggled to find people who could talk about mining development and
the resistance movement because many people were busy with cultivating. The area became green
all around with paddy fields everywhere.
My landlord had 20 bighas (one bigha is
equal

to

1600

square

yards)

of

cultivating lands. I felt that Adibasis in
the mining area are now living in
harmony with their existing agricultural
practices. Though they are discriminated
against socially with unequal treatment,
they are happily living with their current
economic settings. Although most of the
people are poor, they have their own
mechanisms to overcome their situation.
Figure 4: Adibasi hamlets in the mining footprint collected from
ESIA of Asia Energy

Adibasi

self-government

institutions

monitor if any Adibasi family is going
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through financial hurdles, Majhi Parishad183 try to help. They feel that any changes in that area
would harm their livelihoods and self-governing systems

1.5.

Methods Used

I conducted forty-two semi-structured and open-ended interviews during my field activities in
the Phulbari mining area and Dhaka, Bangladesh. I interviewed Adibasi elders (mostly from the
Santal community, as they are majority in that region including Adibasi people from the Munda,
Karmakar, and Robidas), farmers, and teachers; Adibasi leaders and activists; local government
representatives; local Bangalee people; local and national activists, civil society members; experts,
and NGO spokespersons. Out of forty-two interviews, twenty interviews were conducted in ten
Adibasi hamlets of Khanpur Union of the Birampur sub-district such as (Koromtoli, Ratanpur,
Dhanjuri, Dhakunda, Letason, Laxipur, Sonajuri, Bukshi, Swajanpukur, Dhantola), two from
Phulbari sub-district and two hamlets from Nawabgonj sub-district. Most of these hamlets are
included in the map of the mining footprint.
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Out of twenty Adibasi interviewees, fourteen are from the Santal community, six from the
Munda community, one from the
Karmakar, and one from the
Robidas community. Interviewees
included eight farmers and four
women (one interviewee is elderly,
and one is a local government
representative. Two of them are
Figure 5: An Adibasi respondent signing the Informed Consent letter

farmers), two schoolteachers, four

Mandal184 of Manjhi Parishad from four hamlets, one Adibasi representative in a government
institute, one college student, and one national leader. I also interviewed two representatives from
Adibasi NGOs. I interviewed two local government heads—the Chairman of Khanpur Union
Council of Birampur sub-district and the Chairman of Phulbari Sub-district Council. Both are
Bangalees. I interviewed five Bangalee farmers, including a woman in the Phulbari mining region,
eight protest activists from Phulbari and Birampur, and one national leader. I also interviewed two
spokespersons from environmental NGOs and two civil society members. I could not manage to
find any person from the Mahili community—who are recognized by the company as ‘Indigenous
peoples.’ I had a plan to interview company officials, but I could not find them in Bangladesh.
Because the company shut its office and wound up activities in Bangladesh. I tried to contact them
by telephone in its London office but could not get any response.
I identified the locations by reading various research reports conducted on the Phulbari Coal
Project and the movement. Before visiting the site, I talked to a researcher who gave me a vast

184

The heads of the traditional institution of the Santal and Munda are called ‘Mandal’.

52

knowledge about the area, local peoples’ psychological states, and emotions about the region and
minefield including the motivation about upholding the movement spirit. I got more information
about local and national activists, and a few of them became my interviewees. I also talked to a
researcher who was working in the area on an archeological excavation. He made me understand,
for the first time, that the area is enormously valued not only because of agricultural lands but also
for rich archeological sites. Moreover, Google Earth and maps used in the ESIA helped me to
identify which areas would be affected most.
My interview questions were divided into two segments. In the first part, I asked some openended questions about Adibasi lifestyles, livelihoods, and their position in society. The reason for
the division of questions is to identify the recognition and politics behind the government’s nonrecognition. I also asked similar questions to many interviewees from the Bangalee community
and activists to locate their views about Indigenous peoples. I intended to assess ‘recognition by
others’ criterion of defining Indigenous peoples. Various theorists suggest that to recognize
Indigenous peoples, they need to be recognized by other people who live close to them.185 The
second segment of the questions asked to all interviewees: why did they join and how did they get
involved in the resistance movement?
Most of the Adibasi interviewees gave interviews in the Bangla language. In Bangladesh,
Adibasi languages have assimilated many Bangla words as their own. Many Adibasi groups speak
in Bangla language because of their segregation and association of majority Bangalee people in
Bangladesh. Adibasis who live close to urban areas are more likely to speak Bangla than people
who live in remote hamlets. In many instances, I could not understand their Santal and Bangla
mixed dialect, but my RA helped me understand the meanings. Only three interviewees spoke in

Benedict Kingsbury, “’Indigenous Peoples’ in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian
Controversy.” (1998) American Journal of International Law.
185

53

English; all live in Dhaka. Most of the interviews were transcribed. All participants in my research
were informed in plain language about the nature of the project, condition, duration and topic of
conversations, foreseeable risk, the methodology to be used, and potential benefits that may arise
from research participation. I recorded most of the interviews by simple notetaking and audio taperecorder (subject to the consent of each participant). They could ask questions before and after
each interview. Each interview ranged in length from forty-five minutes to three hours depending
on the situation.
During the consent process, each participant was asked if she or he would like to be assigned
a pseudonym for the study; only two of them declined this option, choosing to have their real
names used in any publications or presentations generated from the research. Except for those two
persons, throughout the dissertation, I used initials of first names (in some cases both names) for
their confidentiality. In Bangladesh, most Adibasi people are known by their first names. Their
last names are almost similar. For example, all Munda people have ‘Pahan’ as their last/family
names. Santals have twelve titles or clans, and they use twelve family names that I explained in
Chapter IV. Bangalees are known by first names, family names, and nicknames. In some cases, I
used initials for first names and family names when I acknowledged that a participant could be
identified if I use their any name.
People who were not aware of the movement were excluded. I selected a key informant first
who had extensive knowledge about the Adibasi lifestyle and took part in the Phulbari Khoni
Andolon in 2006. He helped me to identify the key people to be interviewed. I also identified many
interviewees during interview procedures. To protect participant confidentiality, original research
data will be protected from third parties, stored securely, and destroyed in a timely manner after
the conclusion of the study.
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Participant observations are also reflected in my dissertation. Participant observation activities
included attending various events, such as protests, meetings, press conferences, and Adibasi
festivals, campaigning in a local government election, as well as volunteering in the office of a
local Adibasi NGO and living in Adibasi communities. In this way, I learned about involved actors
in the project and the concurrent demands of Adibasis and local activists of the movement. To
understand the existing knowledge about environmental management, Adibasi traditional
knowledge, their accounts of joining the movement, and their participation (consultation and
consent) in the planned project, I conducted an informal focus group meeting comprised of four
Mandal of the Santal’ Manjhi Parishad from four separate hamlets whose knowledge represents
the question of interest.
I attended a street protest organized by a leftist party when a government geological survey
team arrived in Phulbari, as the
leftists

believed

the

team

would start another mining
activity. I attended another
meeting organized by NCBD
in Dhaka, protesting the S.
Alam project in the Banshkhali
Figure 6: Street protest in Phulbari in 2016

sub-district

of

Chattogram.

The project is going to develop
coal-fired powerplant in the seashore area, which will displace many fishers and farmers, and
destroy the biodiversity conservation of the sea habitats. Local people protested, but the law
enforcement agency fired upon them and killed six people. The meeting also discussed the Phulbari
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project and the Rampal coal-fired power plant. I campaigned in a local government election of the
Khanpur Union Council in favor of Cherobin’s wife, who had been contesting for reserved woman
seats. By taking part in the election campaign, I learned a lot about the Adibasi lifestyle.
I visited the DoE office in Dhaka several times. I used the library of the Department. I gathered
first-hand information about the process of environmental clearance for a large-scale development
project. I conducted an informal interview with an official who gave consent to use the information
without referring to his identity. I visited two environmental NGOs in Dhaka and their libraries.
Representatives from both NGOs did not respond when I requested interviews.
I collected writings, data information, and other related documents from Adibasi and
environmental NGOs and TEJOs to supplement my own empirical data in my dissertation. The
materials include government policy directives, national legislation, reports, environmental impact
studies, press releases, company reports, leaflets, newspaper articles, televisions reports, NGO
reports, and academic publications. My analysis and accounts of TEJOs accounts are based on
their activities in the UK and the USA, as published on their websites. For the purpose of
supporting the understanding of the impact assessment processes, environmental justice and rights
of Indigenous peoples, I examined some international instruments such as the Aarhus Convention,
the ILO Convention No. 169, UNDRIP, Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development (REDD), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). I investigated national
and transnational legal and policy instruments in regulating the relationship between extractive
industries and Indigenous peoples.

1.6.

Outline of the Dissertation
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My dissertation is comprised of three parts. Part I includes Chapters I, II and III. Based on the
ESIA published by Asia Energy and the field data, Chapter II offers a description of the Phulbari
Coal Project. Sub-sections include the neo-liberal context of resource development in Bangladesh,
the location of the project, communities, livelihoods and the reservation of rights and interests for
Adibasi communities in their official document. The chapter also highlights what would happen
(impact of an open-pit mine) if the company were to develop it, such as the impact on livelihoods
of Adibasi communities, loss of agricultural lands, destruction of cultural and religious heritage,
sacred sites, and local biodiversity of the region. In this connection, Chapter II also offers a
discussion about the importance of recognizing various rights of Indigenous peoples and engaging
them in EIA. This part also incorporates a discussion about EIA practice in Bangladesh. I argue
that access to participation and consultation for participating in the decision-making process must
be incorporated in legislative and other mechanisms aimed at promoting procedural environmental
justice. Based on qualitative research in the form of interview data collected from Adibasis of
Phulbari, Chapter III highlights the historical and informative overview of the resistance
movement of the Phulbari Coal Project following the finalization of mining operations in
Bangladesh. Furthermore, the chapter accommodates national and transnational activists’
conceptions of the environmental justice movement. Different layers of organizing the protest
against the multinational corporation give a broader perspective of resisting neoliberal intervention
in Bangladesh which are framed through the accounts of leftist protesters or activists. Moreover,
Adibasi accounts in this chapter also broaden the general meaning of fighting powerful forces.
Part II includes Chapter IV, which is devoted to the recognition of Indigenous peoples in
Bangladesh. Since the ethnic groups around the open-pit coal project and throughout Bangladesh
are not perceived as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ by the government, I observe and report
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how they frame their issues with a specific end goal to be heard. By analyzing various definitions
and conceptions of Indigenous peoples developed by international law, experts, scholars, and
accounts of surrounding Adibasi communities, I argue that the self-identified groups should be
recognized as Indigenous peoples. The overall purpose of this chapter is to identify the ethnic
communities of the mining footprint as a legal and political character through which they can apply
their rights in the decision-making process by articulating different aspects of environmental
justice.
Part III includes Chapters V and VI. By locating environmental justice in the central argument
through qualitative analysis, Chapter V examines the rights and interests of Adibasis, or
Indigenous peoples were reflected in the decision-making process of developing the coal mine
project in Phulbari. The chapter also analyzes the features and principles of the environmental
justice framework in light of the claims of Adibasi communities in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon
they had participated in 2006 and reservation of their rights in the ESIA. In this regard, Adibasi
claims and the company activities to develop the project are analyzed considering the
environmental justice framework. This chapter offers a discussion about different forms of
environmental justice movement and examines if the motivations and elements of the Phulbari
Khoni Andolon that I have conversed in Chapter III form an environmental justice movement that
is perceived in the global South. This chapter also advances national, transnational and
international legal strategies of engaging Indigenous peoples in managing natural resources in their
territories. The final chapter concludes the arguments made in the previous chapters of the
dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
THE NEOLIBERAL CONTEXT FOR THE PHULBARI COAL
PROJECT
2.1. Introduction
The dissertation examines one of the five principal coal mines in Bangladesh: the Phulbari
Coal Project in the Dinajpur district. If opened, the proposed coal mine project would become one
of the most massive open-pit or surface coal mines in the world. Thousands of local people and
civil society members have protested since 2005 to stop its operation. According to the project
proponent, Asia Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd. (now GCM Resources PLC.), it will
give a much-needed economic boost to the area, but critics fear it will also create several
environmental and socio-political problems. A persistent eagerness arose in Bangladesh when it
was discovered that there are vast reserves of high-quality coal in Phulbari. The media were fast
to claim that extracting coal would ensure a reliable supply of energy to produce electricity, which
would contribute to the economic development of Bangladesh. The media, the government, and
industrialists were highlighting that the proposed coal mine would bring benefits to Bangladesh,1
given the fact that the $2 billion project would establish a 1000 MW coal-based power plant and
this mine would have provided support for up to 4000 MW of power generating capacity.
However, it was originally indicated in the contract that the government will receive only a 6%

Manoranjan Pegu, “The Phulbari movement: Resisting Neo liberalism in Bangladesh.” In Sustainability and
Ownership in People Centred Advocacy in South Asia (Dhaka: National Centre for Advocacy Studies, 2011) at 26.
1
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royalty on the proposed project, which was increased to 10% in response to the Phulbari Khoni
Andolon.2
Local communities, including a considerable number of ‘Adibasi’ in the project area, would
be dislocated; these are people who depend upon agriculture since the lands are very fertile for
crops year-round. Experts opined that local people would benefit more economically in the long
run by cultivating their lands than developing an open-pit coal mine. The project would affect the
productivity of agricultural lands on a large scale by contaminating the air, soil, and water in the
mine area. Again, contaminated water, air, soil, and burning coal would also affect the health of
Indigenous peoples and other community members.3 The biodiversity and ecosystem of the
Phulbari area would be destroyed permanently. Besides, the extracted coal would be transported
by vessels for export to the Mongla Seaport through rivers in the Sundarbans.4 According to
experts, coal would be falling in the water during transportation, mixing with the water, and
polluting the ecosystem of the UNESCO World Heritage Site.5 Moreover, the collective impact of
an open-pit coal project, such as displacement that makes local people environmental refugees,
permanent loss of agricultural lands, and destruction of cultural and religious heritage, would
occur.
Knowing all the impacts on the livelihoods and biodiversity of the local area and the
Sundarbans, local people along with environmentalists and various activist groups began protests
against the multinational company in 2005. The bloody movement was huge and attracted
international media coverage; finding no other option, the company fled Phulbari, and the
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government signed an agreement with local protesters assuring that the mining operation would
be stopped immediately, and the company would be expelled from Bangladesh.6
Based on the company’s ESIA report, legislation, my interview data, and secondary sources
such as newspaper reports, working papers, books, and scholarly articles, this chapter explores in
detail the Phulbari Coal Project proposal and the importance of mineral resource extraction for
economic development in Bangladesh. The chapter also includes a discussion on EIA in
Bangladesh and whether the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples should be incorporated in
EIA. Additionally, the chapter examines the implications of neo-liberal policy on resource
extraction in the context of economic development. In this regard, it considers the intervention of
MNCs and TNCs for extracting minerals or development projects in Bangladesh and how foreign
companies deal with the environment and local people in project developments. Furthermore, the
chapter considers the role of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) dealing with companies’
activities as this financial institution has policies for business negotiations between the company
and the Bangladesh government.

2.2. Coal Mining and Energy Context in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated (1115 persons per sq km.), poverty-stricken,
and energy-starved countries in the world. The country’s annual energy consumption per capita is
one of the lowest in South Asia and the developing world due to its over-population with the small
size of the area.7 There is a significant gap between the power supply and demand in Bangladesh,

6

Pegu, supra note 1.
According to World Population Review, Bangladesh has an estimated population of 166.37 million in 2018
making the country the 9th most populous country in the world. The total size of the country is 147570 sq. km. See
more: http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/bangladesh-population/
7

61

although the current government increased the number of power plants from 27 to 108.8 This gap
is due to higher demand by consumers and producers. However, the government recently claimed
that 80% of the country’s total population has sufficient access to electricity with daily power
generation at a record high at 10084 MW.9 Bangladesh will need about 13,500 MW of electricity
to attain a significant annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate projected at 8%, which
should rise to 41,900 MW by 2021.10
Natural resources are very limited in Bangladesh. Therefore, energy security is crucial for
socio-economic development. The Ministry of Finance of the Bangladesh Government confirms
that the share of natural resources for electricity generation in 2010 was natural gas 80%, oil 5%,
coal 4%, and hydropower 3%.11 Even though the natural gas reserves bring hope, the quickly
depleting reserves make it essential to seek alternative ways to produce electricity, such as oilbased power plants and coal-based power plants. Since Bangladesh has a very limited oil reserve
and depends on imports, expensive oil-based electricity generation is not economically viable for
the country. Consequently, the five recently discovered coalfields sparked hope for the country.
Since Bangladesh has significant coal reserves, its exploitation is seen as imperative for the
achievement of the energy security needs.12 International financial institutions such as ADB and
the World Bank suggested that the government should explore using coal for electricity generation.
Coal is primarily composed of carbon, which is harmless to the environment when buried under
the earth but has a wide range of environmental effects because of its extraction process.13
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According to Mear Angen, developed and industrialized countries can mitigate the adverse
environmental impacts of extracting coal using new technologies by implementing strong
regulations. After that, most of the countries are phasing out coal-based power plants because
burning coal produces a massive amount of CO2, which is responsible for climate change.14
Lands over the coal reserve areas in Bangladesh are incredibly fertile and usually sustain two
or three crops a year. The area provides a permanent livelihood for the farming communities,
which could be irreversibly lost if over ground open-pit mining is done. The experience of the only
functioning underground coal mine shows that both water flow in coal layers and temperature are
higher than in some other parts of the country. Thus, coal mining is particularly problematic in
Bangladesh.15 Issues of the open-pit versus closed pit mining (i.e., loss of fertile agricultural land
versus coal exploration, land acquisition versus displacement and resettlement of people, and water
management in the coal areas versus possible environmental damage) have been extremely
important for deciding on an acceptable solution for exploitation of the country’s coal resources.
Therefore, environmental management, human development, and sustainable development
dimensions are igniting debates on the exploitation of coal resources in Bangladesh.16
Five coalfields with high-quality reserves have been discovered in the northwest region of
Bangladesh. Among these five coalfields, only the Barapukuria Coal Project is in operation
through underground mining in the Parbatipur sub-district of Dinajpur district, which contributes
only 4% of the country’s total electricity.17 A government owned-company named Barapukuria
Coal Mine Company Limited (BCMCL) is exploring coal from this project. Recently, the
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government has initiated exploration of coal from the Dighipara coalfield in the same district
through an underground method and signed a 1.67 billion BDT deal for conducting a feasibility
study on a 24 sq km area for 27
months (June 2017- September
2019) with BCMCL targeting
to extract 3 million metric
tonnes per year.18 In 1995, the
Geological
Bangladesh

Survey
(GSB)

of

of

the

Ministry of Power, Energy and
Mineral Resources discovered
the Dighipara coalfield, which
has an estimated coal reserve of
150 million metric tonnes.19 A
study

in

1962

found

the

possibility of 1053 million
tonnes of coal reserve at
Jamalganj,
Figure 7: Mineral Resources Map of Bangladesh

extraction

but
nor

neither
any
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exploration was conducted afterward. The government started studying this crucial depth coalfield,
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and three wells have been drilled to explore natural gas and assess commercial viability.20 In 2015,
Petrobangla (the government’s natural resource department) signed a deal with India’s Mining
Associates Pvt. Ltd. for studying the methane reserve in the coalfield in a 12 sq km area.21 The
GSB discovered the Khalashpir coalfield in 1989, but it was out of action until October 11, 2003,
when the then BNP-led alliance government secretly gave Hosaf Consortium the license to explore
the Khalashpir coal zone with 2,500 hectares of land. Hosaf applied for a mining lease for the area
in the same year for mine development, although the company does not have previous mining
experience. In July 2006, the company in association with a Chinese company named Shandong
Ludi Xinwen Mining Group submitted a feasibility report to the Bureau of Mineral Development
(BMD) with a plan to develop an underground mine.22
Table 2: Coalfields in Bangladesh
Name of the Coal District
Fields
Jamalgonj
Barapukuria
Khalashpir
Dighipara
Phulbari

Joypurhat
Dinajpur
Rangpur
Dinajpur
Dinajpur

Coal Reserve
(Million Metric
Tonnes)
1053
300
143
150
572

The depth of the Discovery
field (in meters) year
640-1100m
118-509m
257-480m
328-407m
150-240m

1962
1985
1989
1995
1997

Source: GSB website

2.3. Overview of the Phulbari Coal Project
Asia Energy submitted its initial environmental examination (IEE) on 10th February 2005 and
received an environmental site clearance (ESC) on 29th May 2005. An EIA was submitted on 30th
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June 2005. The company conducted an EIA including three technical reports that were published
in 2005 (all four volumes together are called ESIA). The Department of Environment (DoE) of
Bangladesh granted an environmental clearance certificate (ECC) on 11th September 2005 and
approved the ESIA later in 2006 for the Phulbari Coal Project, which was submitted by Asia
Energy.23 The company later published the ESIA in August 2006. Three hundred consultants from
several international and national companies, Bangladeshi environmental organizations, and
university academics, recruited by Asia Energy, prepared the ESIA for the project. 24 The ESIA is
comprised of four volumes, including an executive summary. Volume 1 discusses the main report
of the project consisting of 18 chapters. Volume 2 consists of 13 sections and talks about mine
development, infrastructure, and coal transportation. Volume 3 consists of 14 sections and deals
with environmental management. Volume 4 deals with socio-economic issues, consisting of 9
sections. Section 1 of this volume is dedicated to a report titled Public Consultation and Disclosure
Plan (PCDP). Section 2 reports on resettlement plans. Section 4 deals with a report titled,
“Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP)”. Asia Energy, in its ESIA report, claims that they
initiated an open and informed consultation with stakeholders and affected communities to inform
them of the project proposal and developments and assure their concerns would be considered in
the decision-making process.25 According to the executive summary of the ESIA, the company
consultants conducted consultations with environment-related government officials at national and
local levels, NGOs, local government representatives, and local Bangalee and Adibasi
stakeholders.26
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Although the actual coalfield covers only 59 sq km, the project would extend over 135 sq km.
Moreover, a nearly 656 sq km area would be affected directly or indirectly during the mining
operation including de-watering.27 It has an estimated coal reserve of 572 million tonnes which is
9th largest in the world, mainly consisting of bituminous thermal and metallurgical coal types,
fossilized over 270 million years. The average thickness of the coal seam in Phulbari is 38m. An
overburden ranging between 150m and 240m needs to be removed, creating a hollow of a depth
of about 300m.28 ESIA stated that the coal would be extracted by open-pit method for assuring
maximum extraction using hydraulic excavators and trucks. The company expected to recover a
variety of valuable industrial mineral co-products such as high-grade silica (sand), Modhupur clay,
ceramic clay, gravels, and high-quality rocks from the overburden during the excavation.29 Due to
the mine development, the landscape of the area would be changed from farmlands to a hill that is
14 sq km in area and 185 feet high, also featuring a lake that would cover six sq km. Consequently,
this vast area would lose fertility permanently due to open-cast mining.30 The proposed large-scale
project is in a red category according to domestic law and is classified as category ‘A’ by ADB
with significant potential environmental impacts.31 Asia Energy pledged that they would
implement the Equator Principles, environmental and social safeguard policies (on such issues as
involuntary resettlement, indigenous peoples, and cultural property) of International Finance
Corporation (IFC), ADB's Environment Policy (2002) and ADB’s Environmental Assessment
Guidelines (2003), including the involuntary resettlement plan and Indigenous peoples
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development plan, other guidelines of the World Bank and IFC, and proposed a new IFC
performance standards on coal mining.32
The proposed Phulbari Coal Project site is located on the Barind Tract in the northwestern part
of Bangladesh, close to the India-Bangladesh border, which falls within four sub-districts of
Dinajpur district such as Phulbari, Birampur, Nawabganj, and Parbatipur. The Little Jamuna River,
Khari Pul and Nalsissa rivers are located to the east and west of the mine site. The Kharipul River
drains into Ashoorar Beel, which is considered as an important natural resource for the Adibasi
communities of the area.33 The mine footprint covers an area of 5,933 hectares or 59 sq km and is
11 km long and 3 km wide; it includes more than a hundred villages and thousands of acres of
cropland of eight unions in four sub-districts.34 Phulbari’s landscape is mostly comprised of flat
fields with patches of flat forests, all of which would be destroyed to establish the proposed mine.
Dinajpur is a major rice-producing district of Bangladesh with the production of high-quality
rice.35 The Phulbari mining area has a similar pattern.
Asia Energy documents state that the population of the four subdistricts was estimated at
832,220 with an average density of 711 people per sq km. in 2001.36 According to the Community
Report of Bangladesh Population and Housing Census of 2011, the Phulbari sub-district has a
population of 176,023 living within 152 villages. The average density of people per square km is
770. Moreover, the neighboring Birampur sub-district has a population of 170,806 with 806 people
per sq km. A significant portion of the project area falls under the Khanpur Union of Birampur
sub-district which has 18,318 population with a density of 496 people per sq km where Adibasi
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communities live.37 The other two sub-districts such as Parbatipur and Nawabgonj have a similar
or more population density. However, Phulbari township would fall under the projected plan where
population density is several times (4245 per sq km.) higher than villages.38
Figure 8: Phulbari Project Map

Source: Executive Summary of the ESIA
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According to the ESIA report, the development of this mine would require the company to
relocate 49,487 people of 11,287 households in the mining area in different phases over a 30-year
lifespan of the mine.39 However, the neutral expert committee to study the feasibility of the project
assigned by the government estimated that around 130,000 people would be immediately affected,
and as many as 220,000 could be displaced during mining operations.40 The International
Accountability Project (IAP) carried out a detailed analysis of the draft Resettlement Plan (RP)
that the company conducted and determined that it grossly understated the number of people the
project would displace.41 Consequently, thousands of families would be left homeless, become
environmental refugees and destitute, and would not be protected.
Most people at the project location are farmers consisting of Adibasi communities and
Bangalees, who depend on their cultivated lands for food and other subsistence. JAP estimates that
the project would displace 50,000 Adibasis belonging to various groups such as Santals, Mundas,
Mahili, Mahato, Rajbonshis, Oraons, Karmakar (Blacksmith), Robidas or Ravidassia, and a few
more.42 Although the company recognizes Adibasi of Phulbari as ‘Indigenous peoples’ through
IPDP in the ESIA, as has become the norm in these procedures, they understated the number of
affected people by a factor of ten.43 Moreover, the document identifies only three Adibasi
communities (Santal, Munda, and Mahili) as ‘Indigenous peoples’,44 but JAP claims that some
other ethnic communities, such as Mahato, Oraon, Karmakar, Robidas, who are not included in
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the document should also be regarded as Indigenous peoples.45 As will be discussed in more detail
later, it is important to note that the Bangladesh government does not recognize them as Indigenous
peoples or Adibasi.46 Adibasi communities who live in the Phulbari project area have a similar
race history. They have diverse cultures, language, customary laws, and traditions, which make
them distinct from other communities including the majority Bangalee people (98% in
Bangladesh). Regarding the Phulbari Coal Project, experts note that entire Indigenous dwellings
and villages would be destroyed. Such land alienation leaves them separated from the grounding
of their livelihoods, commercial interactions, and community connections.47
Agriculture plays a significant role in the economy of this region, with 85% of the total
population dependent on it for their livelihood.48 People of Phulbari are involved in agriculture,
small business, and work as informal laborers, rickshaw pullers, and van rickshaw drivers to
supplement

their

income.

Farmers are growing crops such
as seasonal rice, wheat, mustard,
potato, corn, banana, jute, chili,
garlic, onions, etc. three times a
year.

Their

livelihood

also

depends on forest trees and fruits,
river resources, and household
Figure 9: Two Adibasi women are taking care of cattle beside the forest and crop
fields. Photo: Fieldwork, 2016
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farms of fishes and cattle. Some are farming on their lands, some are sharecroppers, but most of
them work as day laborers in other people’s fields, as they are landless. However, people of the
area where the company planned to develop the open-pit coal project are happy with the production
of crops, as this area is one of the most fertile in Bangladesh. Again, the ESIA report for the
Phulbari project estimates that 78% percent of families reported having adequate water.49 The flat
field nature landscape of the Phulbari mining region would be destroyed by developing the
proposed mine.50 Local people were aware of the impact of the mining activities and they
calculated the loss they would face. Since they are mostly farmers, they would not be able to
purchase agricultural lands with their compensation money in another place. Consequently, they
protested and resisted mining in their area.
The extraction of coal and other mineral resources would result in various negative
environmental impacts around the minefield. The displacement of small-scale farmers from lands
they depend on would further worsen the situation. These farmers are a group representing between
1.5 and 2 billion people worldwide, which is already marginalized and represents up to half of the
people who are too poor to feed themselves.51 They face numerous problems in new places of
residence. Therefore, resettlement caused by the implementation of any development project is the
most irreparable form of forced internal migration.52 The displacement of people leads to a
violation of many individuals and collective human rights. Problems associated with the displaced
people with the development of mining projects are increasingly becoming the focus of human
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rights organizations.53 They highlight that there should be mechanisms to support people who are
displaced or affected by development projects.54
The Phulbari Coal Project would have an enormous destructive impact on the environment and
local communities. More than a hundred villages, croplands, forests, thousands of houses, markets,
schools, colleges, mosques, temples, graveyards, forestland, and roads will be destroyed.
Furthermore, the project would harm human health, destroy local biodiversity, and increase the
salinity of the water. All the environmental impacts of the Phulbari project would fall on those
displaced people. The people of Phulbari would also be deprived of their means of livelihood, as
they would be displaced and dislocated from their land.
Some of my respondents pointed out that they are ready to compromise for the economic
development of the country, but their livelihoods should be considered. Although the company has
informed the community that they would build a town for the displaced for resettlement purposes,
local people understand that it is
impossible

to

get

similar

opportunities to what they have
been getting for generations in
their

own

agricultural

homes
lands.

and
They

understand that the company
would only provide one or two
rooms for a family whether it is

Figure 10: Adibasi houses in the mining footprint
Photo: Fieldwork, 2016

a small or large family. Most of
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the households have cattle, which are part and parcel of their livelihoods, and there would be no
space for those in the town. They do not want to leave their ancestral graveyards and religious
heritage. Moreover, the residents know that the replacement of land for lost land is not possible in
land-scarce Bangladesh because of high population density. People are concerned about financial
benefits, but they know instant cash compensation would not help them with similar livelihoods.
ESIA recognized that the community wanted separate resettlement as a community; for example,
Santals wanted a separate place for Santals so that they can live and maintain their cultural
diversity. In current settings, ethnic groups are concentrated in hamlets.
According to a summary of the EIA report submitted to ADB, there are six types of ecosystems
that exist in the project area such as cultivated land, roadside vegetation, Sal forests, homestead
vegetation, and wetlands that would be destroyed. The ecosystem carries 512 flora species, 89 fish
species, and 158 terrestrial vertebrate species.55 The mining area also comprises a part of the
Phulbari town with various schools, colleges, and other enterprises.56 There are many permanent
religious sites and graveyards.
The Phulbari Coal Project would cause massive environmental and ecological impacts. The
project would pollute the soil, water, air, ecosystem and biodiversity of the local area, having a
considerable adverse impact on local people including a considerable number of Adibasis. Many
of the environmental issues of concern during the primary stages of the mining process continue
throughout the entire process. During the reclamation stage, traffic to and from the coalfield area
would be continued. The reclamation stage of mining involves restoring soil fertility, recreating
the ecosystem and biological diversity, and landscape.57 Concerning land disturbance, the soil is
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disrupted and can cause the land to be less productive after mining. The erosion of soil may lead
to an increase in sediment in the surface water resulting in degradation of water quality of the
Phulbari area.58 The groundwater in an area covering about 500 sq km would be lowered, and
water would be toxic due to waste and burning. The proposed Phulbari Coal Project would divert
a river and suck an aquifer dry for more than 30 years. For de-watering the mine, the project would
prevent adequate water supplies for agriculture, fisheries, local industries, and households.59
The open-pit coal project would cause noise and dust pollution due to dynamite explosions.
More noise and dust will come from the trucks and trains that would haul coal away from the
mine.60 The coal combustion waste contains pollutants known to cause cancer, congenital
disabilities, reproductive disorders, neurological damage, learning disabilities, kidney disease, and
diabetes. Phulbari’s 572 million tonnes of coal would generate 1.14 billion tonnes of carbon
dioxide and release a substantial portion of methane gas into the air.61
The Phulbari Coal Project threatens the Sundarbans since extracted coal would be transported
through a river of the forest. The Sundarbans is the largest mangrove forest in the world, containing
58 rare and threatened species including the Royal Bengal tiger.62 Up to 8 million tonnes of coal
per year would be transferred from the barges to the shipping vessels at a floating offshore
reloading facility in the forest. The ESIA of the project rates the risk that barge fuel could
contaminate the reserve as ‘extremely high’, which would result in severe damage to mangroves
and other shoreline plant species.63
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Asia Energy assured that the extracted coal
would be used in domestic power generation
(two 500mw power plants) and in domestic
industries such as clay brick and coal briquette
production, which would be transported mainly
from Phulbari by rail. However, after meeting
the domestic requirements, the surplus coal
would be exported to international markets by
rail, river, and sea.64 The company planned to
build direct rail track from Phulbari to Khulna
and a loading terminal at Khulna, navigation
improvements to the Poshur River, a floating

Figure 11: The Sundarbans
Photo: Khasru Chowdhury

platform at Akram Point of the Sundarbans and
channel dredging to the approach channel at the entrance of the Bay of Bengal. All these export
processes would have a severe impact on the Sundarbans, although the company conducted a
feasibility study.65 Beyond economic and social rights, the environmental rights of the local
communities of Phulbari are endangered as well. The effect of mining on health is an equally
pressing issue of concern. The deforestation of large areas of forest causes irreversible disturbances
in local habitats. The environmental consequences are noticeable by the inhabitants at a distance
from the epicenter of the open-pit mines.66
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According to the project agreement, Asia Energy assured to generate more than $21 billion in
economic benefit to Bangladesh over the 36-year lifespan.67 The company claimed a benefit of
$7.8 billion for Bangladesh and $13.7 billion as multiplier benefits that would contribute to 1%
per annum to the total GDP of the country.68 The company further pledged that the project would
bring 2,000 jobs to an impoverished area of Bangladesh and invested $260 million in building
schools and hospitals for local people.69 Also, the project would spend a total of $314 million on
rail and port development to provide a reliable export route.70 According to Anu Muhammad,
Bangladesh would be economically more benefitted than an exploration of coal during the thirtysix-year lifespan. He explained that $225 million per year would be generated from the production
of agriculture, households, and other economic activity of local people in the planned area. On the
other hand, according to the company’s information, Bangladesh would get $216 million per year
by way of six percent royalty and taxes. According to the company’s account, considering the
adverse effect on production and economic activities, loss of coalfield and environment, the total
loss for Bangladesh would be $300 million (BDT 21 billion) per annum.71 However, this loss does
not include biodiversity destruction, destruction of environmental sustainability and human health,
and uncertainty of current and future generations.72

2.4. Significance of EIA in Bangladesh
There is no denying that local people are most affected by any development project. Since
people in the close vicinity of any development project are more affected, their concerns should
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be taken into consideration. In this regard, the project proponents and the government agencies
must identify the impact of the project on local people and the local environment by adopting a
proper environmental assessment plan. A large development project needs proper EIA through
which social, biophysical and other effects of a development proposal are identified, predicted,
evaluated and mitigated.73 In other words, EIA can be an effective tool, which is seen as a route to
involve people at the project level and can be used as a form of social bargaining. EIA is the proper
venue where concerns of affected communities can be properly recognized through their
involvement and participation. Socially marginalized groups can use EIA as a platform from which
to influence the social order. In the case of Phulbari, Adibasi communities have frequently been
raising the issue of their discriminatory status in society and due to their vulnerability, the project
proponent and the government never considered them as ‘qualified’ in the decision-making and
other processes of assessment for the open-pit coal mine project.

2.4.1. What is EIA?
EIA is defined as a systematic process of determining and managing the potential impacts of
proposed human actions on the environment.74 EIA has become a critical space for the evaluation
and mitigation of potential environmental and social impacts of a proposed development project
or plan, and sometimes it is the only space in which the public has meaningful participation through
a public hearing and consultation before going ahead with the project. The USA was the first
country that incorporated EIA in their national legislation for mitigating adverse environmental
impacts in any development project. In the USA, the government’s actions created some major
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environmental problems in the 1960s, which resulted in widespread support for the National
Environmental Policy Act 1969 that manifested the legislative basis for EIA. This legislation
required all government agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their actions.75
National EIA legislation of any country shall also include participatory provisions allowing public
consultation and public participation at every stage. The 1992 Earth Summit provided additional
momentum to these developments. Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration states: “Environmental
impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are
likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a
competent national authority.”76 Though the right of access to information has been given little
formal recognition in EIAs of the global South, attempts are being made to disclose general
environmental information by corresponding public participation and access to environmental
justice for Indigenous communities who are largely affected by development projects.

2.4.2. EIA Practice in Bangladesh
Government legislation and rules, as well as guidelines of the donor agencies,77 play significant
roles in the incorporation of human elements in environmental assessment in Bangladesh. The key
pieces of legislation for the environmental approval of a project in Bangladesh are the
Environmental Conservation Act (ECA) 1995, and the Environmental Conservation Rule (ECR)
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1997. Only industries and large-scale projects received full attention in ECR with provisions of
full-scale environmental assessment to reduce the potential adverse impact on the environment.
ECR contains a list of projects and industries according to the significance of impact and classifies
them into four categories: Red, Amber A, Amber B, and Green.78 Normally, mining and other
large-scale development projects fall under the Red category, which requires EIA.
Apart from this basic legislation based on EIA, several government departments and NGOs
have prepared guidelines for conducting an EIA on a specific sector or intervention.79 Bangladesh
Flood Action Plan (FAP) is one of the first governing authorities that incorporated EIA in
Bangladesh to study ongoing and future FAP and similar flood control, drainage, irrigation, and
water management projects in 1992.80 The Department of Environment (DoE), under the Ministry
of Environment and Forest, is the regulatory body responsible for enforcing the ECA and ECR
and has prepared EIA guidelines only for large-scale development projects.81 Although it is the
responsibility of the company to conduct an EIA of the development proposal, the responsibility
to review EIAs to issue ECC rests on DoE.82
According to the DoE Guidelines, the EIA process consists of three stages: screening, IEE, and
detailed EIA.83 The guidelines provide some techniques for public participation and set the
structure of IEE and the EIA reports. Ahammed and Harvey note that IEE is needed before moving
forward to the full-scale EIA for most development projects in Bangladesh.84 Special emphasis is
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placed on site selection for industries with significant potential for environmental impacts, and the
respective corporations are required to consider alternative sites keeping in view the criteria put
forward by DoE.85 The procedure of EIAs in Bangladesh encourages the direct involvement of
community leaders to gather basic data about the affected community and face-to-face engagement
with community members and local NGOs working in the area of the project.86
Despite these widely accepted legal norms, one of my respondents who is also an EIA expert
claimed that the EIA regime in Bangladesh is non-transparent. It is a practice in Bangladesh that
an EIA can be approved if the project looks lucrative. DoE only determines whether the EIA report
is prepared following national regulations and donor guidelines, they do not consider whether
affected people’s concerns are reflected or not.87 EIA consultants are appointed by a project
proponent for completing the study. The appointed consultants are told that “we will develop the
project here and you have to prepare EIA accordingly so that we get ECC from the DoE.”88 They
must prepare the EIA report following the project proponent’s dictation because not only the
project proponent instruct them to do so, but also the government agencies direct them to prepare
a ‘sound’ EIA so that there is no bar to starting the project. Another EIA expert, who has been
working on the water sector for more than twenty years, told me during the interview that donor
agencies impliedly create pressure on the government so that the project is taken place. According
to him, consultants followed donor guidelines properly, but local peoples’ voices are not reflected
in the final study of the Phulbari Coal Project.89 Although an EIA report, what consultants prepare
for the project proponent, is not final, because the report is reviewed, monitored, and passed by
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decision-makers of DoE. Consultants are planners, they prepare the report. They are not decisionmakers. There is an opportunity to check transparency in reviewing the report.90 In Bangladesh,
decisions are given by technocrats or by bureaucrats in the decision-making process. Since
decision-makers are part of the government, they are bound to follow the government’s order
regardless of the question of feasibility. Even if the project is not feasible, even if local people do
not want the project in their area, the decision-makers often allow the project anyway.91 In almost
all cases, if the government says ‘yes’ to a project, the DoE also approves that project and issues
environment clearance certificate. There are hardly any instances where the DoE has taken a stance
that is against the stance of any other government agency.92
Further, my interviews indicate that the EIA report is never pro-actively disclosed in
Bangladesh. The EIA report is often not reviewed by people who are qualified. It is not presented
to the public at any stage. However, there are cases where affected people object on their own.
Since there is no provision on public hearing in the EIA process and the environmental clearance
process, those objections are not taken into consideration. Hence, the DoE is just serving as a
clearing agent for other government departments.93
The only NGO that is directly associated with the EIA activities in Bangladesh is the National
EIA Association of Bangladesh, which was formed in late 1997. It provides a manifesto for the
EIA planners, practitioners and enforcing agencies in Bangladesh.94 Having been a development
partner of Bangladesh for a long time, the World Bank has developed its own EIA procedures for
the projects it funds. The Bank has effectively incorporated EIA provisions into its project cycle
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and the organizations implementing concerned projects must conduct an EIA. Also, the World
Bank has an environmental section that examines EIAs for approval.95 ADB has developed a new
environment operational strategy for Bangladesh to address the major environmental problems. In
addition to IEE and EIA, an initial social impact assessment is required for every development
project in order to identify its consequences on people of the project area.96 The Bangladesh
government introduced the ‘Equator Principles’ in 2006 as a financial industry benchmark for
determining, evaluating and managing social and environmental risk in project financing.97
Equator Principles Financial Institutions adopt these principles in order to ensure that the projects
financed are developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflects sound environmental
management practices. Accordingly, foreign corporations have a very crucial role to play in the
development and promotion of corporate social and environmental sustainability which can be
seen in a limited manner in Bangladesh.98
Though there are some legislative rules and guidelines for EIA, a strict and effective EIA
regime is absent in Bangladesh. There is no legal requirement for public participation and
disclosure of information or for making the EIA document public at any stage of the process.99 For
this, in every development project, the responsible company can exploit the communities of the
project area. The FAP’s EIA guidelines, ECA, ECR, and the DoE’s guidelines do not mention the
requirement of social assessment separately. Consequently, there is a danger of ignoring social
factors where there are no apparent consequences on the natural environment.100 A reasonable
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number of people should be contacted through all possible means of communication to ensure
maximum and efficient participation in EIA.101 I think implementing the elements of SIA can be
a vital step for sustainable development. SIA is a process that should inform people not only of the
details of the proposed projects but also of the possible positive and negative consequences. An
appropriate amendment to the legislation on EIA is required to emphasize the importance of
SIA.102
Legislation related to EIA in Bangladesh contains provisions for complaints from the public.103
But those complaints are not heard properly by DoE. Very few people know about the process
with DoE due to a lack of their campaign and access to information. DoE receives complaints from
some individuals, however, when complainants see the process takes a long time, they lose their
interest. Bangladesh Environmental Lawyers Association (BELA), a prominent environmental
NGO in Bangladesh, has established its own process for dealing with public complaints. BELA’s
process is easily accessible and quick. The executive director of BELA told me during an
interview, “We receive many complaints from communities against specific industrial units. After
receiving complaints from the communities and verifying news reports, we file cases.”104 She also
added:
“BELA tries to find out whether a particular industrial unit or that commercial venture has
got an ECC. If it has an ECC, then we see whether the EIA report was detailed out properly;
whether it is adequate, and whether it covers all aspects of environmental management
required for that given industry. If we find that it has any deficiency, then we do the media
campaign. If there is no environmental clearance, then we right away challenge the project.

101

Ibid.
Ibid.
103
Razzaque, supra note 86.
104
Interview with S.R.H., Dhaka, April 17, 2016.
102

84

If there is an environmental clearance, then we try to say that the public consultation
requirement has not been fulfilled. Because people gave objection.”105
If the industrial unit is already in operation and if it has an environmental clearance and EIA
report, there is very little any NGO can do. The only option for challenging the actions of the
company or industry is going to the court. However, going to the court with the deficient EIA
report may not be feasible because the court might say that the EIA has been submitted and ECC
has been given based on the EIA. The court would not see whether the EIA is deficient, whether
it’s faulty or not. So, the court would not be interfering in this case.106
The EIA process involves the identification of all positive and negative environmental impacts.
It is observed that the guidelines for legislative control over the EIA system in Bangladesh are not
yet well established.107 The politicization of the EIA process and pervasive corruption has made it
nearly impossible to conduct fair EIA or social assessment in these sectors.108 The absence of
strong legal provisions for some essential components of EIAs all around the world may result in
weaker legislative control over the EIA process. To me, the DoE of Bangladesh should develop a
code of conduct for the consultants conducting EIA for projects that are beyond the supervision of
donor agencies. Moreover, strengthening DoE and making it more efficient, transparent and
accountable would place it in a better position as a lead environmental organization. Some concrete
statutory provisions and active legislative or administrative control over the EIA process are
necessary for meaningful and effective EIA. This can reduce the anger and protests of those
affected communities and motivate them to support the projects.

2.4.3. Employing Indigenous Rights and Concerns in the EIA Process
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2.4.3.1.

Participatory Rights of Indigenous Peoples in EIA

The participatory rights of procedural justice play a vital role in environmental decisionmaking. Employing public participation in EIA can theoretically enhance the public trust of the
government’s decision-making, reduce litigation, and serve to coordinate and reconcile various
environmental strategies.109 Public participation can be defined as ‘any form of interaction between
government and corporate actors and the public that occurs as part of the EIA process’.110 The
fundamental goal of public participation in EIA is to achieve a more equitable distribution of
political power and change existing decision structures. Public participation can be a platform
allowing the decision-maker to draw an ultimate decision in any developing project.111
Community participation in the decision-making process of a development project concerning
natural resources is recognized as essential for the creation and maintenance of a healthy and stable
society.112 Razzaque claims that procedural justice (access to information, public participation, and
access to justice) advances the credibility, effectiveness, and accountability of government
decision-making processes. The effectiveness of participatory rights depends heavily on the
national legal system, courts, and other government agencies.113 Effective participation also
depends on the quality of information available to the community. O'Faircheallaigh argues that the
powerless in society are least likely to participate in EIA, both because they lack the resources to
do so and they often find the processes involved mysterious and intimidating.114 UNDRIP affirms
that Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their political, legal, economic,
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social, cultural and decision-making institutions through which they will apply their right to
participate in the decision-making process.115
For achieving an increased understanding of EIA, the evaluation of public participation in EIA
is essential. The impact of public participation in the decision-making process should always be
evaluated, though it is widely documented in the literature as being a valuable component of the
EIA process. If the results of the consultation are not considered, then the whole exercise might be
considered a waste of time and resources.116 It is the time for regional and international agencies
to support and encourage countries to manage trans-boundary shared resources jointly with rules
on EIA for affected communities. The 1998 Aarhus Convention contributed to bringing about one
of the unique developments in participatory rights to protect the environment and livelihoods.117
But governments of the global South may not be willing to ratify this Convention since it contains
a detailed EIA procedure for development projects, which may be expensive and time-consuming.
Bangladesh has not ratified the Convention.

2.4.3.2.

Indigenous Right to FPIC in EIA

Papillon and Rodon argue that the most effective way to implement free, prior and informed
consent (FPIC) in the EIA process is by integrating Indigenous peoples fully into the various
aspects of the assessment process such as involving them in the design of process and early stage
of evaluation.118 Performance Standard 7 of IFC incorporated guiding principles to ensure FPIC,
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prior consultation, and participation of the affected communities of Indigenous peoples throughout
the project.119 IFC’s policy is generated to eliminate the numerous economic risks that accompany
large projects. Such risks include the risk of project disruption because of civil unrest, local
protests, or violence directly related to a project. In theory, obtaining FPIC of Indigenous peoples
prior to a project could curtail these risks, which in turn could affect the economics of a project.120
ADB’s Indigenous peoples’ policy number 21 states that development initiatives should be
conceived, planned, and implemented with the informed consent of affected communities, and
include respect for the dignity, human rights and cultural uniqueness of Indigenous peoples.121
Though the right of access to information has been given little formal recognition in EIAs in the
global South, attempts are being made to disclose general environmental information by
corresponding public participation and access to environmental justice for local and Indigenous
communities who are largely affected by development projects.
2.4.3.3.

Indigenous Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) in EIA

The inclusion of Indigenous TEK in the policy-making process in their territories is important
for the participation of Indigenous peoples. Employing Indigenous TEK effectively in EIA can
enable Indigenous peoples to participate in the environmental decision-making process. AppiahOpoku contends that Indigenous TEK could be used to reveal scientific data and information in
the global South. Consultations and community hearings may facilitate the incorporation of
Indigenous TEK, especially during the preparation and review phases of environmental
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assessment.122 Further, the timing of public consultations in Indigenous communities is crucial to
the success of the assessment process.
TEK in the EIA process may also help the assessment team to understand handling local natural
resources and can demonstrate local sets of values to interpret, evaluate, and monitor project
impacts on local communities. In this sense, EIA could become part of the solution to the continued
loss of Indigenous TEK by enhancing the participation of Indigenous peoples in environmental
assessment studies.123 Moreover, it is possible to gain the trust of the local and Indigenous
communities through community participation, and incorporation of local and Indigenous TEK in
project development will help to accelerate the smooth implementation of projects. 124 Therefore,
Indigenous TEK could be a tool in the decision-making process of EIA, which is one of the
dimensions of the environmental justice paradigm. Christensen and Grant argue that the inclusion
of Indigenous TEK in EIA is particularly significant because it entails shifting control of the social
production of space and effectively emphasize a right to representation and participation in
decision-making for resource management.125
Through their traditional knowledge, Indigenous peoples can contribute through consultation
and public participation, which may ultimately lead to better decision-making.126 Furthermore,
effective participation of Indigenous peoples in decision-making processes should principally be
recognized for strengthening their democracy and environmental sustainability.
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2.5.

MNCs and TNCs in Bangladesh

Governments of the global South often follow neoliberal policies and invite multinational and
transnational corporations (MNCs and TNCs) to invest in their mineral resource extraction
industries. Bangladesh is no exception. In Bangladesh, the government agencies are not willing to
use expensive modern technology for extracting mineral resources.127 The government wants the
economic development most cheaply, and policies are liberalized for foreign investors. MNCs and
TNCs from the global North are often interested more in mining natural resources from the global
South. They invest in the global South because the regulations and policies are made favorable for
them by eliminating barriers to foreign investment, trade liberalization, privatization of public
sectors, and weakening industry regulations.128 The misappropriation of MNCs and TNCs has
caused adverse economic and environmental consequences that constrained sustainable
development options in the global South.129 Justifying Ruchi Ananda’s argument, Carmen
Gonzalez states, “the ongoing unsustainable extraction of the South’s natural resources to satisfy
Northern’s consumers, and transfer of polluting industry and hazardous wastes from the North to
the South.”130 Communities from the global South are often excluded from the benefits of growth
despite historically high commodity prices and record corporate profits.131
In Bangladesh, neoliberal intervention is characterized by corporate land grabbing and
displacement of people, and governments are friendly to activities of MNCs. Foreign mining
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companies have been trying to grab mineral resources in Bangladesh, and to ensure the highest
profit they are pushing for extracting the utmost, such as in the case of Phulbari.132 Moreover, the
guidelines and policies of international financial institutions such as ADB, the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the International Financial Council (IFC) favor Northern
investors in the global South,133 because the North dominates decision-making in most of the IFIs
and multilateral environmental and human rights treaty negotiations.134 There have been several
cases where foreign companies have created a significant loss for Bangladesh, but those companies
could not be made accountable.135 Before moving into the historical journey of neoliberal policy
in Bangladesh and how it has impacted mineral extraction, the next section starts with a discussion
about neoliberalism.

2.5.1. What is Neoliberalism?
Neoliberalism is the philosophy that fortifies economic globalization through the free market
and minimizes barriers to the flow of goods and services.136 It consists of a set of ideas of economic
liberalization policies such as privatization, deregulation, free trade, individualization, the
transformation of state-citizen relationship, and reduction of government expenditures to increase
the private sector’s responsibilities in the economy and society.137 The neoliberalism approach
advocates that economics should be separated from politics and argues that markets should be free
from the interference of government.138 According to the supporters of neoliberal theory, a free
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market will allow efficiency, economic growth, appropriate income distribution, and technological
progress.139 They also argue that neoliberal policy benefits both rich and poor nations because
every nation can enjoy a comparative advantage from flowing their capital, goods, and services.140
Sometimes, neoliberalism is understood to refer to the process of opening up national economies
to global actors such as MNCs, TNCs and IFIs.141 However, critics argue that any state intervention
to encourage these moves will worsen economic performance.142 Advocates of neoliberal policies
tend to contend that MNCs and TNCs need to be free to pursue operating businesses in host
countries with little national government constraint or regulation.143 On the other hand, critics of
neoliberalism contend that neoliberal economic intervention is not sustainable environmentally,
culturally or socially in many ways.
Isabel Altamirano-Jimenez complicates the connection between neoliberalism and Indigeneity
and argues that the recognition of cultural difference and the compensatory measure of granting
collective rights to Indigenous peoples are integral to neoliberalism.144 These cultural rights
including other socio-economic rights, and distinguish neoliberalism as a specific form of
governance that shapes, delimits and produce differences. The author argues that neoliberalism
opens up a space for the recognition of Indigenous rights as well as for the institutionalization of
management practices.145 Gabrielle Slowey studies the self-determination of Indigenous peoples
of Canada in the neoliberal context. According to her, “the neoliberal ideal of the common good
rests on market-oriented values such as self-reliance, efficiency, and competition. The neoliberal
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ideal is for citizens to recognize their obligation to work longer and harder in order to become
more self-reliant.”146 She argues that self-determination re-establishes the proper balance between
First Nations and the neoliberal marketplace.147 However, it is important to know whether
communities want external investment opportunities or not. Slowey argues that First Nations alone
can generate more jobs by combining the corporate support and First Nations enterprise. This
means Indigenous peoples can become self-reliant with their own initiatives.148 It is common in
both poor and rich countries that MNCs and TNCs are taking advantage of the policies of hoststates to ensure higher profits. Since national governments, especially in the global South,
encourage foreign corporations to invest in projects for their own economic benefit, they pursue
trade liberalization in the interests of investors. Thus, MNCs and TNCs can shape the rules and
regulations of the host country with the help of the host government.

2.5.2. Neoliberal Intervention in Bangladesh
Bangladesh became an independent country after a bloody war in 1971 against Pakistan. The
new nation adopted a socialist approach, and foreign investment from MNCs and TNCs was
discouraged by the policy.149 However, after the assassination of the founder of the nation,
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his four key ministers by a military coup in 1975, a
military-backed government came into power. The subsequent military governments adopted
neoliberal policies as part of a structural adjustment program (SAP) during the 1980s with the
development process confined by the suggestions and regulations of the World Bank, IMF, ADB,
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IFC, and other international financial institutions. The military governments had become more and
more hostile towards the public enterprises, and the crisis of public institutions of health,
education, and other essential services intensified. 150 During that time, the energy and power sector
was handed over to the private sector under the new policy.151 Anu Muhammad argues that
privatization of natural resources and leasing those resources to MNCs for exporting gas and coal
pushed Bangladesh into the “resource-curse” model.152
Developing the mining sector in Bangladesh through MNCs began in the early 1990s when a
new democratic government took power. The new government invited foreign companies to invest
in Bangladeshi mineral resources such as gas, oil, and coal with production sharing contracts (PSC)
in line with the regulations of IFIs. The contracts used by IFIs have always been secretive.153 In
1993-1997, ten PSCs were signed between the Petro Bangla154 and various MNCs in two rounds.155
Besides IFIs, the US, the UK, Germany, and Australia worked together to promote neoliberal
policies in Bangladesh.156 The subsequent governments continued with this trend for the economic
development of the country. According to the agreements with foreign extractive companies, the
government agencies started purchasing Bangladesh’s own extracted natural resources with hard-
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earned foreign currency initially at a price that was at least 30 times higher than that offered by
public-sector companies.157
According to Anu Muhammad, legality and transparency in the environmental sector are not
maintained properly due to the weak policy implementation. MNCs and TNCs used this advantage
in every mineral resource investment case, thinking that they would manage by bribery. 158 As a
result, the government in Bangladesh force people to leave their ancestral lands and provided
minimal compensation.159 In most of the cases, MNCs benefit from weak environmental
enforcement and continued corruption among government officials. Due to this, MNCs are never
held accountable for their negligence, which I have tried to demonstrate in the subsequent section
by describing two accidents in gas fields that occurred just before Asia Energy attempted to begin
coal mining in Phulbari. In each case, responsible foreign multinational corporations violated
regulations, bribed influential persons to change the existing policy, which was implemented by
the party in power, committed negligence, and did not pay compensation for blowouts.

2.5.2.1.

Occidental in the Magurchara Blowout

A massive blowout occurred in the Magurchara Gas field on June 14, 1997, when the USbased energy company Occidental was drilling a well. The gas field was situated very close to the
Lawachara Reserve Forest of which 96 acres of the forest was entirely burnt by the blowout,
including a teak grove which was raised between 1944 and 1950, bamboo shacks, and a strip of
plantation established in 1994.160 Moreover, 50% of the forest resources and 30% of the
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surrounding Indigenous peoples’ lands were damaged. Most of the wild animals those left after
the blowout have still not returned to the forest. According to an expert report, the damage to the
forest resources alone was BDT 98.6 billion along with BDT 460 million loss of the surrounding
29 tea gardens. Furthermore, the Bangladesh Electricity Department, Jalalabad Gas Company, and
Bangladesh Railway suffered a loss of more than BDT 250 million.161
The National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports of
Bangladesh (NCBD) estimated that the blowout caused about 245 billion cubic feet of the gas
reserve to burn in the explosion, worth BDT 90 billion. Experts opined that the burnt gas could
have met two years of the country’s electricity demand.162 NCBD was formed in 1998 after a
blowout in the Magurchhara gas field. NCBD protested the gas export policy and PSC with MNCs
and TNCs, leasing ports, some ground projects by an Indian company, TATA, which were
postponed.163 However, environmental, ecological and wildlife loss were not included in this
estimation.164 Occidental left the country and handed over the license to Unocol Corporation
(2003), which was later merged with Chevron Corporation (2005). Although the total loss was
BDT 200 billion, the government claimed only BDT 39 billion due to PSC between the company
and the government, but Chevron only paid BDT 120 million in compensation as of June 30,
2016.165 Recently, the company wished to sell its assets in Bangladesh for $2 billion. Although the
government wants to buy the assets, environmentalists and economists requested the government
realize the rest of the claimed compensation first. In another note, Chevron lodged an arbitration
suit at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID), an institute of the
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World Bank Group, against Petrobangla regarding a transmission charge the company paid to the
government. Petrobangla also lodged a suit in a domestic court against Chevron, which they
decided to withdraw and fight at the ICSID.166

2.5.2.2.

Niko in the Tengratila Blowout

On January 8, 2005, drilling well operated by a Canadian multinational company, Niko
Resources Ltd., exploded in the Chhatak Gas Field in Tengratila of Sunamgonj district. Around
ten thousand people had to flee from their homes due to the blowout, which was visible from 30km
away. A second blowout happened on June 17, 2005, in the same gas field, while the company
was trying to control the first blowout.167 The blowouts and the subsequent payments in bribes to
settle the issue drew the Canadian company into controversy. Niko stopped their operation after
the blowouts and faced legal challenges when BELA and some other organizations filed a writ
petition (petition number 5673 of SCB) challenging the validity of the joint venture agreement
signed in 2003 between Niko and Bangladesh Petroleum Exploration and Production Company
(BAPEX) to develop two gas fields.168
Furthermore, many lawsuits have been filed against political leaders of Bangladesh in local
and international courts over corruption related to Niko. The Anti-Corruption Commission of
Bangladesh filed two cases in 2007 against the current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the then
Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia over bribery that occurred between 1997 and 2006. Later, in
2010, the case against Hasina was dismissed, a year after she took office.169 However, the case
against Khaleda, her three ministers, and a few acquaintances are under trial. Niko made a mess in
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Bangladesh with corruption, mismanagement of resources and cases. The Supreme Court of
Bangladesh in 2009 ordered the government not to pay for the gas they purchased from Niko until
the company pays the compensation for the blowouts. In 2008, the government filed a damage suit
with a Dhaka court against Niko, claiming BDT 7.5 billion in compensation for the destruction of
properties and gas reserves in and around the Chhatak gas field. The case is still in process. 170
Again, Niko Canada pleaded guilty before a Canadian court for bribing Mosharraf and agreed to
pay a $9.5 million fine in 2011, which was investigated by the ACC, the RCMP, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI).171
On the other hand, Niko filed lawsuits at the ICSID of the World Bank Group in 2010, claiming
the remaining payments for the gas it supplied to Petrobangla. In September 2014, the tribunal
gave its first decision in favor of Niko with insiders alleging Bangladesh's legal battle was timid.172

2.5.2.3.

Asia Energy in the Phulbari Coal Project

The government of Bangladesh is always silent about implementing the proper regulations in
cases of MNCs involved in exploring natural resource projects. Following the trend of adopting
neoliberal policies, the government allowed an Australian company, Broken Hill Proprietary
(BHP), to explore coal deposits in Phulbari under a comprehensive licensing and investment
agreement with the Bangladesh government in 1994. BHP exploration confirmed a significant
amount of coal deposits (382 million tonnes) between 1994 and 1997.173 However, they realized
at one point that the existing water resource could not be appropriately managed, and a disaster
might happen. Bearing in mind their negative experience in Papua New Guinea regarding water
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management, the company decided that it would extract coal through underground mining. The
company reported that it would not pursue the project in Phulbari.174
As a result, BHP left Phulbari in 1997, realizing that it would not be technically feasible for
open-pit mining in Phulbari because of its depth, water system, and geological and geographical
structure. Surprisingly and mysteriously, a new company was formed under the name of Asia
Energy Corporation (Bangladesh) Pty Ltd., targeting only Phulbari, with some Australian and
Bangladeshi persons involved, and the license of BHP was transferred to a newly formed company
without any public notification.175 According to Anu Muhammad, although BHP, a world-leading
mining company, quit Phulbari after finding it too risky, it transferred the license to a newly
formed mining company. The government of Bangladesh has given all sorts of concessions for
mine development in Phulbari to Asia Energy.176 Asia Energy conducted a pre-feasibility study
that confirmed the economic viability of the project as large-scale open-pit mining. Although DoE
approved the EIA and granted the ECC for the project, it was still missing the government’s
approval.177
The government violated its own rules and many international guidelines to facilitate the
Phulbari project; no transparency was maintained in the dealings.178 Clause 41 of the Mines and
Minerals Rules (MMR) 1968 (amended in 1987 and 1989) categorically mentions that only 400
hectares will be allowed for mining and that a company can lease it for only ten years; furthermore,
extensions would only be given after discussions and negotiations. However, in this case, the initial
project area was 10,000 hectares that were later reduced to 5,933 hectares, and the project would
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operate for approximately 30 years at up to 16 million tonnes per annum.179 The license BHP
transferred to Asia Energy was already expired, which was found in an investigation report after
the Phulbari Khoni Andolon.180 The amended MMR of Bangladesh provided that the royalty
percentage for any company would be 20%, which was radically lowered to a minimal 6% for
Asia Energy.181 After the agreement, the government amended the rules, setting the royalty
percentage at 6%. It seemed that lowering the royalty percentage was done for BHP only to hand
over the project to a foreign company. However, there was an agreement signed between the
BCMCL and the BMD with a 20% royalty only a month before the agreement between BHP and
the BMD.182
Furthermore, Asia Energy did not submit 3% of the total investment money to the government
according to the MMR. The environmental clearance for Asia Energy was given even before they
had submitted the ESIA report without any public notification.183 Soon after the transfer of the
license, Asia Energy started drilling at a few points across Phulbari.184 Again, people’s consent is
the primary prerequisite for a project of such colossal gravity to be implemented. The issue of
‘public consent’ assumes greater importance because Phulbari also has a considerable number of
Indigenous communities. Thus, the government had acted imperiously while consenting to the
project without having public consent.185 Also, the company declared that the project would bring
forth sustainable energy in Bangladesh without rationale. Moreover, they manipulated local people
by concealing information. They also created local agents working in favor of the company,
influencing and forcing people to support the project, the issue is detailed out in the Chapter V.
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Civil society members and environmental activists were unaware of all discrepancies, as the media
were silent.186 Some of my respondents claimed that the media were purchased by the company to
write in favor of them.
The government of Bangladesh drafted a National Coal Policy allowing the open-pit coal mine
in August 2008 to accommodate the multiple concerns regarding mining in Phulbari, but this
policy is being scrutinized and criticized by national environmental and economic activist groups
involved in promoting the protests. The draft coal policy has never been implemented after all
these years. Meanwhile, an expert committee formed by the government submitted its report which
opined that the project should be canceled for environmental, economic and legal
considerations.187
The Phulbari Coal Project flows directly from this history of neoliberal intervention. The
government of Bangladesh facilitated the entry of BHP and Asia Energy for extracting mineral
resources. Asia Energy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a British company named Global Coal
Management (GCM) Resources PLC.188 The company was incorporated on the London Stock
Exchange Alternative Investment Market (AIM) (Ticker code: GCM) in September 2003, and it
acquired 100% of Asia Energy Corp.189 The largest shareholder in GCM Resources is RAB
Capital, a London-based hedge fund manager. Other shareholders include some private banks and
hedge funds such as UBS, Fidelity Group, Credit Suisse, and Barclays, LR Group, Ospraie
Management, Capital Group, and Argos Europe Fund.190 Although the company claimed in their
official document that it owns 100% of the project,191 Wikileaks revealed in 2010 that between
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40% and 60% of all GCM shares are owned by a US-based group of the company named Luxor
Capital Group and a U.S. citizen who operates a New-York-based hedge fund in his name.192
London-based transnational environmental justice organizations (TEJOs), including the
NCBD and Bangladesh Communist Party London branches, have been protesting at every annual
general meeting of the company. They demand that the company scrap the project and stop doing
business in AIM because the company does not have any existing contract with the Bangladesh
government on the Phulbari coal project. After a long struggle by TEJOs over the company’s
illegal activities in the London AIM, the Bangladesh government finally acknowledges that the
company has been selling shares to shareholders by providing false information about the mining
project.193 The State Minister of Power, Energy, and Mineral Resources states that the company
got a license from BMD in 2004 for two years which expired in 2006 and was never renewed.
Since there is no valid lease agreement between the Bangladesh government and Asia Energy, the
company has no right to engage in share business in the name of the Phulbari coal project. The
Minister points out that the Bangladesh government is in the process of suing the company.194

2.6.

The Role of ADB in the Phulbari Coal Project

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been involved in the energy sector of Bangladesh
since the early 1980s in formulating policies to privatize common property and to create a
favorable path for MNCs and TNCs. Along with the World Bank, ADB helped foreign and private
companies snatch natural resources through various favorable terms and conditions towards them.
On the other hand, ADB’s loans to public sectors are meant to dismantle institutions and national
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capabilities.195 By these means, ADB has been using its power and influence derived from public
money in different countries to serve MNCs and TNCs at a cost to people and the environment. In
the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, ADB makes its stand clear against the people's verdict of
stopping the project because local people and Adibasis would never accept any foreign investment
that goes against national interest and destroys the environment and livelihoods. ADB’s Private
Sector Operations Department (PSOD) was promoting the Asia Energy’s Phulbari Coal Project
for an investment loan and a political risk guarantee, although there was an immense obstacle from
local people, experts, and national environmental activists.196 The Department emphasized that the
open-pit coal project would economically benefit Bangladesh and provide the country with muchneeded energy. ADB approved the Summary of Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA), which
was submitted in 2005 in accordance with its request to complete the resettlement action plan and
Indigenous peoples’ development plan by following ADB’s Energy Policy (1995), Indigenous
Peoples Policy (1998), Involuntary Resettlement Policy (1995), Environment Policy (2002), and
Communication Policy (2005).
Although ADB’s PSOD cleared the concept for this project on 14 October 2005, 64 civil
society and environmental organizations in a joint statement to the ADB Board of Directors to
discontinue the project contended that the project violates ADB’s policies and human rights.197
Followed by the civil society organizations’ letter, various community leaders and representatives
of the Phulbari area wrote a letter to the ADB’s Executive Directors in December 2007 protesting
the ADB’s involvement in the project. However, earlier the same year in October, the ADB’s
mission head in Bangladesh, Kunio Senga told journalists that coal mining is very effective and
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would give a huge potential benefit for power generation in Bangladesh.198 As international NGOs
point out that the project would cause extensive damage to the Sundarbans where the port facilities
for exporting the coal are to be constructed. As several of the ADB’s Executive Directors began
raising questions about Phulbari, the Bank’s management finally decided to take the project out of
the ADB’s funding pipeline.199 In a statement, ADB said, “We think it is premature to continue
dialogue with the private sector under current circumstances. So, at this stage, we are open to
suggestions of the Government of Bangladesh, civil society, and other stakeholders and prepared
to review our engagement in this project.”200
Not only in Phulbari, but ADB has also so far funded numerous projects in Bangladesh,
including the Meghna Power Project, various forest projects for eco-parks, and rubber plantations
in Chokoria and Madhupur, water and irrigation projects in southern regions. Those projects
created high insecurity amongst local and Adibasi communities. Moreover, in the education sector,
the ADB projects created a path for privatization, high corruption, and disastrous reform. Protests
from teachers and students compelled the previous government to stop implementing ‘reforms,’
but huge money was wasted in the process.201 Anu Muhammad argues that ADB was successful
in lending, but Bangladesh became indebted for creating the mess.202

2.7.

Conclusion

The Phulbari Coal Project forms a perfect manifestation of contemporary neoliberalism. In the
above discussion, it is shown that the primary intention of corporate intervention is to grab lands
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and natural resources where poor and Indigenous peoples live. The governments of the global
South see the interests of MNCs and TNCs instead of seeing sustainability because they want
immediate visible economic development. International financial institutions (IFIs) such as the
World Bank, ADB, and IFC influence governments to hand over their natural resources to MNCs
and TNCs. In Bangladesh, the governments were ordained to take neoliberal policy in line with
the rules and regulations of those IFIs where companies were given excessive opportunities to
explore natural resources. Governments are attracted to privatization and foreign investment with
loans and aids by IFIs.203 However, governments never consider that this neoliberal policy and
opening of the mining sector to MNCs and TNCs will lead to the destruction of areas where poor
people live. I have exemplified three examples including the Phulbari Coal Project, where foreign
companies could not be found accountable for their negligence and violation of environmental
regulations. In the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, the entry of BHP and Asia Energy was
facilitated by the Government of Bangladesh. Instead of seeing the interests of citizens, the
government also liberalized and indemnified the destructive activities, whether their good deeds
or bads deeds, of foreign investors in Bangladesh, which gave rise to public interest groups and
civil society.

These groups have frequently been raising voices against the government’s

neoliberal actions, especially leasing mineral resources out to MNCs. Other grassroots groups are
being educated and started articulating that they are the owner of natural and mineral resources
found in the territory and should not be transferred or leased out to foreign investors without their
consent.
The following chapter (Chapter III) will encompass the accounts of people’s struggle against
the neoliberal intervention. I detail the protesters’ views of the popular Phulbari Khoni Andolon
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as their fight manifested against local and multinational powerful actors. According to them,
different layers of organizing movements have led towards the protest’s success. These layers of
the movement strategies created the foundation for an environmental justice movement in the
global South which eventually voided the company’s presence in Bangladesh.
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CHAPTER III
PHULBARI RESISTANCE: ELEMENTS AND MOTIVATION
3.1.

Introduction

Local resistance against mining projects rarely achieves success, especially in relation to
transnational and multinational corporations (TNCs and MNCs) operating in the global South.1
One explanation for this relates to how national governments or ‘host-states’ and international
financial institutions (IFIs) prioritize the interests of the MNCs or TNCs rather than the interests
of their citizens. In the interest of pursuing economic benefits, regardless of how hazardous the
projects are, the governments often support corporations in developing their projects. In the global
South, this is a common phenomenon. In this case, the Government of Bangladesh was technically
forced by IFIs such as the World Bank, IFC, and ADB to enter into an agreement with an MNC
since Bangladesh does not have the technology to extract coal through the opencast mining method
on its own. Moreover, the government had been looking for foreign investors as part of its
neoliberal policy agenda.2 However, according to my interviewees, Asia Energy took the
opportunity because they knew that they could bypass the country’s weak environmental
regulations and pressure the government to implement the open-pit project.3 In the case of the
Phulbari Coal Project in Bangladesh, the government wholeheartedly supported the British
company’s open-pit coal mine project in order to glean economic benefit by neglecting the interest
of local Adibasi and non-Adibasi farming communities. The Phulbari region is densely populated,
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notably by Adibasi farming communities as well as Bangalee farmers. Consequently, local
grassroots started protesting; the objective was not only to drive the foreign company away from
the country but also to pressure the government to stop projects which, according to them, would
go against local and national interests. Local resistance to the mining project built a coalition with
the National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports of Bangladesh
(NCBD), who successfully fought back against the multi-dimensional powerful forces (the
government, the company, and IFIs) through a bloody resistance movement in 2006. In turn, these
local and national protesters have built coalitions with different transnational environmental justice
organizations (TEJOs). According to key organizers, the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was successful
because movement actors and the Adibasi peoples of Phulbari were able to overcome the divideand-conquer tactics attempted by Asia Energy.

3.2.

Phulbari Khoni Andolon: Layers of Developing an Environmental
Justice Movement

The people of Phulbari and surrounding areas raised their voices and joined a movement to
protest the MNC and the open-pit coal project for the sake of the affected people and the country’s
economic and environmental broader interest. Protesters were not convinced that coal extracted
from the open-pit mine would create benefits surpassing the overall losses and environmental
impacts. They countered the company’s claim about the low number of people that would be
evicted and displaced. For these reasons, local opposition against the project was strong. A group
of local politicians took the initiative by forming a committee to protest Asia Energy, which later
became weaker due to political influences. A national public interest group mediated the process.
Their goal was to increase awareness of the potential negative impacts of mining and to help local
communities organizing protests against the company, their means of manipulation, and the open108

pit mining method.4 The popular Phulbari resistance uprising that happened on 26th August 2006
has multiple layers. It built over eighteen months of campaigns, networks, meetings, assemblies,
and discussions. The protest was locally called the Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi5
(Occupy the Asia Energy Office), which was organized and declared by NCBD to expel Asia
Energy from Bangladesh and drop the open-pit mining method everywhere in the country.

3.2.1. Adibasi Accounts of the Movement

(We don’t want coal mining by destroying humanity, civilization, and environment; we don’t want
coal mining by destroying mosque, temple, graveyards; we don’t want coal mining by destroying
a thousand years’ heritage and archeology.)
--A Popular Slogan of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon in Bangla
Language
When the company technologists drilled in different places to test the feasibility of the Phulbari
project, including on household properties and agricultural lands, they never informed local people
that the project would be an open-pit mine. An elderly Santal farmer elucidated that he had learned
about the negative impact of the proposed mining project through an Adibasi leader of his hamlet.
He was also complaining that no consultants informed the local people that the mine would destroy
the households, agricultural lands, graveyards, schools, playgrounds, and small businesses of the
area.6 When the Adibasi villagers overheard that the Committee to Protect Phulbari or Phulbari
Rokkha Committee (hereinafter PRC), which was formed by Phulbari towners, was holding
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meetings and rallies to stop the operation, some Adibasi leaders met them and expressed their
concern. Initially, Adibasi respondents complained that PRC leaders did not adequately recognize
the interests of the Adibasis.
Before the popular 26th August Phulbari Khoni Andolon, Jatiyo Adibasi Parishad (JAP), with
the support of NCBD and a few local Adibasi NGOs, organized a mass gathering named AdibasiKrishok Somabesh (Indigenous-Farmers Rally) on 29th April 2006 at Phulbari College field.
Researchers, media, national and transnational advocacy, network, and solidarity groups never
focused and highlighted this rally where local Adibasis from 68 hamlets, including Adibasi leaders,
activists, traditional institutional members from various parts of the country, attended and
demanded sharply to suspend the mass destruction project.7 JAP organized the rally to demonstrate
that Adibasis do not want mining activity on their traditional lands and forests they have cherished
for thousand years. The rally was also held to counter the company’s phony campaign, ‘Adibasis
want the mining,’ which they had been circulating to local non-Adibasi villagers and Phulbari
town.8 National Adibasi leaders such as Jatirindra Bodhipriyo Larma (popularly known as Shantu
Larma), leader of the Parbatya Chattogram Jana Songhati Samitee, Sanjib Drong, chairman of
the Bangladesh Adibasi Forum, Anil Mardi, former president of JAP, Rabindranath Soren, current
president of JAP, and Professor Mesbah Kamal, a university teacher and researcher on Indigenous
issues traveled to Phulbari and vowed to fight the transnational corporation. Shantu Larma stated
in the rally:
“We cannot accept this open-pit mining project in this heavily populated Adibasi region.
Not only Adibasis, I believe, but other communities also will not accept this extremely
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destructive project. The government must consult with Adibasis before constructing any
development project in their area.”9
From this initial rally, Adibasi leaders had got the impression that they should organize another
rally with local and national activists to attract national and international media coverage.
According to Adibasi leaders I interviewed, Adibasi-Krishak Somabesh was the foundation of the
popular Phulbari Khoni Andolon.10 A national Adibasi leader stated:
“We had requested NCBD leaders to organize a protest rally to send the company a
message that most people from Adibasi and local Bangalee communities do not want
mining, and the propaganda the company was spreading is not true. However, we also had
fixed a date to hold another rally; rather, NCBD failed to organize a mass rally. Our
declaration was published in the local newspaper which was later circulated to national
media.”11
After observing the spirit towards fighting the company among Adibasis, NCBD activists, who
had already been campaigning against the project and planning for a mass gathering,
acknowledged that the upcoming event would be successful. Members of NCBD met Adibasi
leaders and formed a coalition to stop open-pit mining operations in Phulbari by collaborating with
all people in the area. Before the Phulbari resistance, the regional NCBD members and JAP gave
an ultimatum to the company saying, “If you do not leave Phulbari, you would be evicted through
mass protest.” Many local activists and Adibasi leaders from different hamlets traveled together
and educated people about the negative impact of the project and inspired people to join the
movement. A local Adibasi leader claimed:
“From our meeting, we told Asia Energy to stop their mining activities, but they continued.
Consequently, we had no other option but to organize that mass protest rally on August
26th, 2006. We had learned about the negative impacts of experts that we transmitted to
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Adibasi and local people throughout the campaigning period. We successfully educated
people that if the open-pit coal mining project would have been implemented, human
capital, water, sacred sites, biodiversity, archeological sites, and other natural and
ecological resources would be destroyed.”12
Among the seventy thousand protesters in NCBD’s Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi rally,
at least fifteen thousand protesters were Adibasis who attended from various parts of the Northwestern part of Bangladesh.13 Though the rally had begun as a peaceful protest, after a few Adibasi
youths were shot and wounded by paramilitary forces, it turned into a violent mass struggle for the
next four days by blocking and boycotting the state machinery. The violence ultimately led to the
destruction of the Asia Energy office, houses, and business centers of the local agents of the
company.
National and regional NCBD
members also recall the Adibasi
participation in the movement.
Adibasi leaders told organizers in
the rally that Adibasis were
prepared to sacrifice their lives but
wanted to fight before dying. It
was a huge gathering in Phulbari
where

Adibasi

communities

Figure 12: “No Coal Mine in Phulbari” the Asia Energy Office Gherao rally at
Phulbari, 2006
Photo Courtesy: SEHD

vowed that they would protest

with their lives to protect their traditional lands and natural resources from the foreign company’s
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intervention.14 Most of the Adibasis, especially Santals, thought they were going to a battlefield as
their ancestors joined in Santal Rebellion15 that happened centuries ago against British colonial
power. They wanted to bring their traditional bow and arrow. But NCBD organizers had requested
them not to carry because they wanted a peaceful assembly although some of them did bring bow
and arrow in the rally to show their anger. Adibasis were present in the rally with their traditional
dresses, played dhak and dhol, and energized protesters with their traditional songs and dances.16
Cherobin Hembrom, an Adibasi leader and key informant, told me that although not all the Adibasi
protesters would be affected, they were concerned about Adibasi communities of the mining area
and joined the movement in solidarity. If the mining company could successfully develop the
operation in the area, Adibasis would have been affected. That is why they moved forward to say,
“we do not want any mining in our region, which would displace us and make us refugee”.17
According to Cherobin Hembrom, local Adibasis were the first communities who started
raising their voices against the projected open-pit mining. He was one of the speakers who stated
in the Adibasi-Krishak Somabesh that Adibasis of the area had been facing various vulnerabilities
throughout their existence. They were never given a voice, and all decisions whether they are good
or bad, are imposed on them without their consent. The government should have consulted Adibasi
and non-Adibasi communities of this area, whether they want any large-scale developing project
on their lands. He also stated that the foreign company had not consulted adequately with Adibasi
communities and their traditional institutions. The company had continued deceiving local people.
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Mr. Hembrom’s statement supports the global trend of environmental injustice with the unfair
treatment of Indigenous peoples by nation-states and corporations, as will be discussed in the next
section.

3.2.2. Local and National Activists Accounts of the Movement

“Go back Asia Energy, Leave Phulbari, We don’t want Coal Mine”
‘Go Back Asia Energy, Save the environment’
“Go Back Asia Energy, Save Adibasi”
“We don’t want to be displaced, we don’t want a so-called coal mine”
“My soil is my mother, we don’t want a so-called coal mine”
“Save Humanity, We don’t want a so-called coal mine”.
Some Popular Slogans of the Movement

3.2.2.1.

Building a Local Movement to Resist the Mining

As the grievances and dissatisfaction grew, and the temptation was intensifying among many
local people who were misinformed through Dalal. Local experts, leftist politicians, Adibasis, and
civil society members gathered together in Phulbari town and unfolded a roadmap to protest the
foreign company.18 They formed a committee named Phulbari Shohor Rokkha Committee-PSRC
(Committee to Protect Phulbari Town) on 15th March 2005, taking activists from different political
parties to save the township and its residents from destruction due to the projected mining. While
this organization was the first to mobilize against the proposed mining activity, they were unable
to mobilize against the MNC at this stage. Simply put, PSRC members and other leaders had no
information—whether the open-pit mining would impact negatively or not— and they could not
campaign actively against the company.
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When rural Adibasi and non-Adibasi (Bangalee) villagers realized that they stood to be
displaced and impoverished, they contacted the PSRC and showed their interest in getting
involved. They complained that the project would not only destroy the town but also destroy vast
rural villages and agricultural lands including Adibasi hamlets. By late May 2005, this new scope
prompted the members of the PSRC to remove
the word ‘town’ from their name, to reflect the
interests of a broader Phulbari community as the
Phulbari Rokkha Committee-PRC (Committee
to Protect Phulbari).19
People started mobilizing more frequently.
The Phulbari bazaar became a colorful place
with posters, leaflets, wall slogans, and festoons.
Figure 13: A wall slogan written in Bangla ; Bachao
Sundarbans’ (Save Sundarbans) still exist in Phulbari

On Sundays, thousands of people attended street

Photo: Fieldwork, 2016

assemblies where PRC members inspired people
to say “No” to the project. Phulbari Entrepreneurs Society or Phulbari Byabosai Somitee
(hereinafter PBS), which was already formed in Phulbari bazaar to protect the interest of
businessmen, started campaigning against the company’s activities. PBS wholeheartedly
supported PRC’s every event. PRC submitted a memorandum to the Prime Minister through the
executive head of the Phulbari sub-district and organized human chains and hunger strikes to
attract attention from the media and the government agencies. After submitting the memorandum,
thousands of people roamed around the bazaar and chanted various slogans for saving households,
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agricultural lands, school-college-madrasa, mosques, temples, graveyards, business centers,
heritages, archeological sites from destruction.
PRC’s events, confined to Phulbari, did not attract the attention of the national media, though
they were regularly covered by the local press. The reach of PRC’s message did not always reach
to their audience, leading to a feeling of atrophy and demoralization. Some progressive members
of PRC identified that they were failing to convey their messages to local peasants and Adibasis,
who stood to be the most impacted. Because they did not want to alienate foreign investors, most
major political parties kept silent on PRC’s campaign.20 Most of the members of PRC are
influential political leaders from various political parties, and all political parties want to keep
foreign investors in their hands so that they can use them as a weapon to come into power.
Consequently, local political leaders were threatened by central leaders to leave PRC and work for
the company. It was found that the chairman and other influential committee members had been
maintaining connections with the company officials and their local agents. It was observed that
PRC was not raising any question of methods of extraction, environmental degradation or
displacement of people; their main concern was only to get compensation.
Many members of the PRC got frustrated at one point and failed to communicate among
themselves as well as creating roadmaps to stop operations of the company. Moreover, they
realized that those local leaders would never go against their central leader’s order and
consequently, the ongoing movement could be destroyed. Finding no option to go against them,
some members resigned from the committee. They realized that it would not be possible to fight
locally against the company that is backed by the government and needs to form a coalition with
national organizations that protest to protect the national interest.
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3.2.2.2.

Local to National: Coalition with NCBD

David Szablowski’s ‘social mediation’ can be a compelling idea in mining development that
“refers to the task of addressing community and civil society calls for the construction of a new
framework for governing the distribution of the costs and benefits generated by mining activity.”21
He contends that by constructing a new governance framework for demands, a ‘social mediation’
strategy gains a certain level of acceptance when communities engaged in conflicts are denied
benefits and opportunities that are expected to arise from mining activity.22

According to

Szablowski, grassroots pressures can create new forms of political consciousness, higher quality
of life among local actors, and changes in the existing governance systems.23 Giving the example
of Andean communities’ strong demand for social mediation, Szablowski finds that national NGOs
and transnational allies had facilitated the formation of a national coordinating organization for
mining-affected people. For example, the National Confederation of Peruvian Communities
Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) has later served to raise the profile of individual struggles and
to press for change at the national policies.24 A similar type of organization is seen in Bangladesh
named the National Committee or NCBD.
NCBD helps to uphold community rights by resisting corporate and neoliberal policies.
Initiated and participated in by left political leaders and party representatives, NCBD was formed
in 1998 when they got the news of production sharing contracts (PSC) and gas exports between
the government and MNCs. NCBD was already well-known in Magurchhara and Tengratila gas
explosion cases, where they successfully made the government accountable for regulating
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MNCs.25 Moreover, NCBD received substantial positive responses from mass people for their
protest against the government’s policy of leasing land ports to India and other countries. The
government was forced to cancel those policies due to NCBD’s pressure since they made clear to
policymakers that those policies regarding natural resources would go against the interest of the
country. Although NCBD gained the general reputation of being a left-led forum, people of
Bangladesh realized that ‘where there is an anti-interest activity, there is NCBD’.26
In the case of Phulbari resistance, some young
leftist party activists of PRC thought about
NCBD. They realized that if NCBD would help
them, they could succeed. They went to Dhaka
and met members of NCBD. After an initial study
in the meeting, the activists were assured that
NCBD would look at the merit of the project.
Local activists also contacted students from
Phulbari who were studying in Dhaka and
Figure 14: Leaflet in English circulated by NCBD Collected
from Nuruzzaman

requested them to create a coalition with NCBD.

After returning from Dhaka, the young leftist group arranged a demonstration named Chhatra Jubo
Shomabesh (Student Youth Assembly) at Phulbari without the support of PRC. This was the first
instance an event was organized in Phubari without PRC’s involvement. It is to be highlighted that
people who contacted NCBD were harassed by leaders of PRC and party in power afterward.
NCBD responded positively after reviewing and discovering that the project would have been
mass destruction which would displace thousands of people including many Adibasi communities.
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The scope of NCBD was limited only on protesting the issues related to natural gas, oil, and ports
before the Phulbari Coal Project issue. Before the communication from the Phulbari activists,
NCBD members did not know much about the project since the company had been conducting
their activities secretly and no information was published in the national media.27 The NCBD
modified its name and inserted “Mineral Resources” in the organization making the name “The
National Committee of Bangladesh to Protect Oil, Gas, Mineral Resources, Power and Ports”. A
central leader of NCBD told me in an interview:
“We started working on the issue, contacted responsible ministries, examined a geological
survey of the project, and after our investigation, we have not found any related document.
The government had no document related to this project. They did not conduct any study,
did not have any assessment report. The government completely relied on the documents
made by the company. We collected documents of the company made for circulation
purposes and started working on the project.”28
After a wide range of analyses on economic and environmental issues and consideration,
NCBD published a document titled Phulbari Koyla Khoni: Kar Lav, Kar Kkhoti (Phulbari Coal
Project: whose profit and whose loss?) written by Professor Anu Muhammad in November 2005.
Many experts and civil society members contacted and met with NCBD leaders. After an open
discussion with them, NCBD informed local activists that they would join the fight to stop the
project.
NCBD first came to know all inconsistencies and illegalities when they talked to local people
of Phulbari and surrounding other sub-districts. Local people were unsure if they would be
compensated for their lands to be acquired by the company. However, the compensation was not
vital to them because local political activists who are also members of PRC found that they would
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not be able to protect the area even by going against their personal interests. NCBD decided to
protest the company’s activities in Phulbari after discussing it with experts.29
NCBD formed two regional branches of the organization, one in the Phulbari sub-district and
another in the Birampur sub-district to enter into the area. Regional NCBD members, facilitated
by central NCBD leaders, started coordinating with PRC by helping organizing rallies and other
events. NCBD had become popular among local protesters in a short period of time because of
their strategies and their strong motivational skills. Most of the central leaders had frequently been
traveling to and mobilizing in the mining regions. On the other hand, PRC became silent, but some
leaders had been supporting NCBD. A regional NCBD leader told me:
“Our intention was to establish a non-partisan movement where people from all political
parties will have voices. Most of our activists forgot their political interests and started
focusing only on one issue, that is ‘saving humanity and environment, and protesting the
company’s activities’. A spirit was created among all people with a new pace, and voices
were becoming stronger day by day. We started feeling that this force can break all evil
powers and motives. We realized that PRC might not stay, but we have to fight until it is
confirmed that the company left the country, and the project is canceled.”30
During the mobilization for organizing protests, in the first week of August 2006, the company
published an environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA) in the English language. The
central leaders of NCBD translated important issues into Bangla language and forwarded those to
regional NCBD, which had been circulated to the villagers. The members educated Adibasi and
non-Adibasi (Bangalee) villagers through focus group discussions, street rallies, bazaar
assemblies, showing documentary films and PowerPoint presentations. When local people learned
about the consent and consultation issues which were recorded in the ESIA, they claimed that the
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company lied about obtaining consent from Adibasis. When JAP organized the Adibasi-Krishok
Somabesh in April 2006 to inform the company that they had not given permission and they are
against the project, NCBD helped. However, many programs were held throughout the 18-month
period, such as road march, rallies, student-teacher rally, civil society assembly, street protest,
campaign, mass signature, etc. As a result of continuous pressure from local people, especially
Adibasi communities, NCBD declared the Gherao Kormosuchi on August 26, 2006, to show
people’s power through a mass protest. 31
The regional NCBD leaders informed PRC of the decision and requested them to cooperate.
But PRC disregarded NCBD’s decision and filed a general diary (GD) at a local police station
stating that ‘the upcoming protest is solely organized by NCBD and PRC would not take any
responsibility if anything happens’. Asia Energy took the opportunity; they obtained a copy of the
GD and circulated the information everywhere. The company had been telling people that ‘the
protesters are divided, and they became weak’. Their intention was to demotivate people and
refrain people from going to the Gherao event.
On 26th August 2006, thousands of people from surrounding sub-districts started gathering in
Phulbari town to express their grievances against the company and their open-pit coal project.
Adibasi and local Bangalee farming communities, teachers, students, small entrepreneurs, women,
children, and solidarity groups from the capital gathered in Phulbari outskirts to send a message to
the government, the company, and IFIs that they do not want open-pit mining which would destroy
their livelihoods and the surrounding environment. Protesters from the rally decided to boycott the
company. No sooner had the demonstration been concluded, the security forces opened fire on the
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rally. Three young boys were killed, and as many as three hundred people were injured. But this
incident only heightened public opposition to Asia Energy.
Over the next four days, more people, especially women and children, gathered in Phulbari
town and blocked all major roads. The storming masses cut down communication between major
cities. During this period, many activists faced obstacles. The company employed influential
people as their agents who threatened movement activists. The security forces raided and arrested
some activists after criminal cases were filed by the company. Both Adibasi and non-Adibasi
activists shared their experiences of terror from the events of August 26th and the following four
days. Only after a six-point demand agreement between the protestors and the government was
signed did the tension dissipate. In this action, thousands of people occupied major streets and
effectively shut down all communication with the capital city Dhaka. Rumana Hashem, the
president of the Phulbari Solidarity Group, which she runs from London, the UK for connecting
the local actors with TEJOs, shared an event in Saptahik 2000, a Bangla weekly. She went to
Phulbari the day before from Dhaka and joined the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. She took shelter at a
regional NCBD leader’s house in Phulbari town after the mass violence where police force raided
at night to arrest him, but he escaped. The day after the movement, Rumana saw thousands of
people occupying major streets and effectively shut down all transportation systems. There were
multiple clashes between protesters and security forces. Security forces became intolerant. They
tortured unarmed protesters throughout the period and raided houses of leaders of the movement
during the night.32 Shop owners of Phulbari town closed their shops voluntarily and joined the
protest. Many people selflessly donated cooking materials and foods for protesters. Hundreds of
people brought beds and created temporary shelters on the streets. Protesters remained unmoved
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in front of the government offices and forced them to refrain from working. The situation continued
until 30th August 2006. When local people heard that ‘three people were killed, and hundreds were
injured’, they got scared but took the street as their weapon to show their strength. Adibasi
children, men, women, and the elderly went to major roads to block the mobilization of transport.33
Two ministers of the government contacted the leaders of NCBD, met them in the office of
Parbatipur sub-district council, and signed the agreement on 30th August 2006. The ministers
promised to implement the deal quickly. Although protesters adjourned their protests and returned
home, they swore that demonstrations would be continued until all demands are fulfilled. 34
The six-demands included: a) banning Asia Energy in Bangladesh and canceling open-pit
mining everywhere in the country; b) compensating the victims of police firing; c) trying the
officers responsible for indiscriminate firing on the protesters; d) returning the dead bodies and
those gone missing; e) founding a memorial for the three deceased protesters; f) compensating the
owners of affected shopkeepers, houses, vehicles, and g) trying Dalal of Asia Energy, and
withdrawing cases filed against the protesters.35

3.2.3. Torture and Intimidation
My Adibasi respondents told me that while organizing the Phulbari Khoni Andolont, Dalal of
the company threatened the movement actors and Adibasi community members not to get involved
in the movement. An Adibasi farmer from the Munda community shared his experience of
encountering a company agent who tried to elicit greed and threatened after failing. According to
him,
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“Dalal were given huge economic benefits. I have seen a few Dalal from Adibasi
communities, but most of them were from non-Adibasi or Bangalees. Most of them are
already economically benefitted in the society, and their households and lands would not
be destroyed. Some poor Adibasi people, I knew, were manipulated by them and took
unethical benefits from the company. However, when the movement started, many
villagers rejected the company’s offer and joined the movement. A Dalal threatened to stab
me as I had refused to work in favor of the company.”36
Another Adibasi leader from the Santal community told me:
“Dalal could not dare to come to me with the company’s benefit because they knew that I
am inspiring my community members to join the movement. However, I saw a Dalal file
a false case against an Adibasi activist of Sonajuri hamlet. The police came to the hamlet
several times to arrest him but could not arrest him due to the resistance of his fellow
villagers.”37
One NGO worker who was supporting the movement was killed inside her parked car, 38 and
many fake criminal cases were filed to harass the protesters. Before the Phulbari Khoni Andolon,
the former executive director of Action AID UK, Nasreen Huq, was brutally killed in her car
because of her opposition to the project. The Guardian report revealed that Nasreen Huq told her
sister that David Wood, the chief of the UK Department for International Development in Dhaka,
asked her to drop the campaign against the mine. According to the report, the Department was
becoming increasingly concerned by her opposition to the scheme. Action Aid UK wholeheartedly
supported the company.39
The security forces went irrational when the military government came to power on January
11, 2007. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), special joint forces of Bangladesh, were deployed
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in Phulbari to suppress activists so that they could not organize any protest. The force started
tracking activists’ phone calls and their mobilization. RAB arrested Nuruzzaman40 on February
11, 2007 and was searching for other activists. Around 20-30 members of the force tortured him
in the open bazaar first, and again in the police station. They also arrested Prakash Banik from his
rice shop but released him on the same day. Key activists of Phulbari fled the town for a few days,
but a mass of people gathered in Phulbari and raised their voices against the government’s action.
Although Nuruzzaman was released on bail after 36 hours of detention and torture, police filed a
corruption case against him, which is still pending. Moreover, he has been still attending court
hearings for a criminal lawsuit filed by the company in 2013 for vandalizing the Asia Energy office
along with 40 other activists. Again, there were several false criminal cases filed before the August
26, 2006 Phulbari Khoni Andolon, although those were withdrawn due to lack of evidence. All the
activists must attend regular court hearings, which are deemed to be harassment.
Still, the protests continue this day. The protesters claim that all demands are not yet fulfilled.
The families of the deceased and injured people received partial compensation from the
government. I have interviewed a victim of the movement who was a rickshaw-van puller and the
only earning person of his family before the movement. A bullet hit in his waist, which made him
paralyzed. His wife is now working as a maid for their livelihood. He told me that he had received
partial compensation from the government. He refused the company’s compensation and told, “if
you come to me again, I will kill you. I do not need any support from you. I do not want blood-

Nuruzzaman is one of the first persons to raise his voice against the government’s decision to lease out the mining
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soaked money from a foreign mining company.”41 He told me that although his household and
lands are not included in the mining footprint, he thought about the future generation and attended
the rally. According to him, “the government’s position is political. The government is misusing
its power. Once we have given blood, we will give more, but we will not let the company develop
mining in Phulbari. I am still attending every event in Phulbari going with a wheelchair.”42
Following the days of bloodshed in August 2006, the then opposition leader and the current
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina went to Phulbari with a promise that her party would never allow
open-pit mining in hugely populated and agricultural areas.43 Yet, from then on until 2019, this
commitment was never revisited. In fact, even crucial points of the demand agreement, including
an investigation into three deaths resulting from the August 2006 protests, remain unfulfilled.

3.2.4. Activists Visited Indian Mining Fields and Made Documentary a Film

Following a strong protest and bloodshed on August 26, 2006, against the open-pit mining, the
project has remained in limbo for the last 13 years. However, the plan of open-pit mining in
Phulbari is still alive as a discussion of the concerned authority of government on this issue is ongoing. Local people still think that the government may restart mining at Phulbari, although the
Prime Minister and other Ministers have insisted on multiple occasions that it is canceled. NCBD
members along with local Adibasi leaders and movement activists visited several open-pit mining
projects in India in 2013, 5 years after the Phulbari Khoni Andolon. The members observed the
settings of mining projects. They talked to local Adibasis, who have been settled in neighboring
areas. When I was talking to Adibasi villagers and activists in the Phulbari mining area, most of
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them mentioned the Jharkhand visit of activists and Adibasi leaders. They said that they had
watched a documentary film called Phulbari Debona (“We will not hand over Phulbari”) made by
NCBD on their Indian mining site visit. I collected the film and examined the global trend of power
politics and the negative impacts of open-pit mining in Indigenous settings. I identify that the
Adibasis of the Phulbari mining region have been inspired to carry their spirit of resisting any
hazardous activity on their lands. Professor Anu Muhammad, who led the visit, said in the film:
“Our intention of the visit was two-fold: one, sharing the experience of the Phulbari
movement with activists and local people of mining areas, and two, gaining experience of
local people and environment of mining projects. By that, we could connect through the
process and fighting strategy in future days.”44
Open-pit mining projects in Jharkhand are located in mountainous areas where most of the
residents are Adibasi people, especially Santals. They were displaced from their ancestral lands
and households for the benefit of the country, which made them destitute. Displaced people are
living with various health problems due to mining operations effects such as air pollution, dust,
soil erosion, and water scarcity, which are directly impacting local Adibasi peoples.45 Although
coal is extracted to mitigate the electricity demands of the country, the local people have no
electricity available. A local Adibasi resident said in the film:
“The land you see was ours. We used to cultivate our lands, and our livelihood was
dependent on this land. We must have rights on that land, although the land was acquired
by the government. We want the development of the country although we have lost
everything. However, as we have rights on the lands from which coal is being extracted,
we must have a share of benefits the government gets.”46

The Film titled “Phulbari Debona”
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Because of poverty among local people, they work as daily laborers in the mining project. The
company promised to offer jobs in the mining activity, but most of them did not get jobs. The
company later said that there are no jobs for unskilled people. Since affected Adibasis have no
technical skills and the company did not make any reservation for training them, strategically those
people were excluded from job qualifications. The existing workers are working in hazardous
conditions.47 An accident occurred on December 29, 2016, in an open-pit coal mining where 11
workers died, and 50 were trapped.48 As livelihoods of the local Adibasi and non-Adibasi farmers
are affected tremendously, consequently they take the risk of stealing wasted coal and selling it at
local markets.

3.2.5. People are still Active to Confront the Company in Phulbari
A group of geoscientists arrived to conduct a soil test during my fieldwork in Phulbari town in
2016. I was talking to one of the key activists at his home. After hearing the news, he rushed to
the area where the scientists tried to conduct a geological test and survey. I followed him. I saw
some activists were shouting slogans against the company. The administrative head of the Phulbari
sub-district, whom I have known since my undergrad study at Dhaka University, told me, “I know
the geoscientists have no connection with the company. I gave permission after a sincere inquiry.
Although I know local people will protest, I have to implement the government’s order.”
The government attempted to survey in Phulbari in 2012, which was stopped amid a protest.
The survey team had to escape the area. NCBD declared a rally against the government’s action
and demanded to implement the six-point agreement in November 2012. But the government
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declared an emergency in Phulbari and deployed hundreds of police from 10 sub-districts to hinder
the rally. An NCBD central leader, who went to Phulbari from Dhaka to hold the rally, told me,
“throughout the period of holding rallies and protests in Phulbari after the resistance event in 2006,
no violence occurred. There was no division among activists, and there is no point of incoming
violence.” In that situation, the government assured the survey team to continue the survey, but
they could not start their work. Around twenty thousand protesters started a procession in Phulbari
streets, violating the emergency.49
NCBD leaders managed to make the
police force understand that there is
no chance of the protesters engaging
in any violence. Seeing the situation
might get worse, the police left the
area.
On January 12, 2013, villagers

Figure 15: A street protest in Phulbari during my fieldwork, 2016

opposing the Phulbari Coal Project confined two staff members of the Research and Development
Centre (RDC), believing that they were Dalal and spies of Asia Energy. Rumana Hashem
describes the incident as the “power of the resistance and the passion of people to halt the longdisputed open-pit coal project. The company and their lobbyists are still trying to develop the
mine, but yet to recognize the power of community resistance to the proposed open-pit mine in
Phulbari.”50 Local protesters claimed that the government officials are helping the company by
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providing security forces to facilitate the company’s activity in the area.51 Earlier in the same year,
Adibasi and non-Adibasi farmers led by NCBD of Bangladesh and Phulbari Byabosayi Somitee
(Association of the Phulbari Entrepreneurs) gave an ultimatum to remove Asia Energy’s two local
offices by March 30, 2013.52 It is relevant to mention here that I have not seen any office of the
company in Phulbari, not even in Bangladesh, in 2016, during my field activities. I said in the
scope and limitation of the methodology that I could not get company personnel including
company consultants for my
research.
On January 29, 2013, local
and Adibasi people of Phulbari,
Birampur,

Parbatipur

and

Nawabgonj sub-districts staged a
Figure 16: Rally in Phulbari to Protest Gary Lye's visit, 2013
Courtesy: Nuruzzaman

demonstration

protesting

the

planned visit of the company’s
chief executive officer and country director Gary Lye to the company office in Phulbari, and
different Adibasi hamlets and non-Adibasi villages of the mine footprint including Raghunathpur
of Nawabganj sub-district and Khanpur of Birampur sub-district to distribute warm clothes among
poor.53 However, due to the protest, Lye could not visit the planned areas but had to conduct a
meeting with the Deputy Commissioner and the Police Super of Dinajpur in the town. A daily
newspaper reported, “Gary Lye wanted to give bribes to local people, but he did not know how
local people are spirited to suspend the company from the country. He brought his wife so that he
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would not face any violence, but locals expelled him completely.” 54 Local people brought out a
procession protesting the visit and obstructed him. Despite mass people’s protest and demand,
lease and license of Asia Energy for exploration of natural resources on the area are not yet
canceled. Gary Lye initiated a criminal charge against 13 local activists, which is still pending,
and harassment continues.55
The local and national protesters who participated in the 2006 Phulbari movement are still
confronting the company and the project together. Every year on August 26, NCBD leaders travel
to Phulbari to join the ‘Phulbari
Day’ rally, which regional NCBD
leaders organize in memory of the
three martyrs and injured people
of

the

Phulbari

resistance

movement. Thousands of people
attend the rally each year. When I
was

talking

to

my

Figure 17: Observing Phulbari Day in 2015 by Bangladesh Communist
Party. Courtesy: Nuruzzaman

Adibasi

respondents, they mentioned that they are motivated by the people who died, and they will always
remember them. Through the rally each year, protesters get a new spirit to fight corporate greed.

3.3.

Building a Coalition with Transnational Environmental Justice Groups

Local communities and activists in the global South cannot succeed alone against TNCs;
national and transnational justice and advocacy groups and networks must join with them and act
together to resist mining companies and to establish rights and justice. Transnational networks
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campaign, negotiate and pressure the states and foreign companies through various tactics such as
presenting evidence in websites, newspapers, and social media, organizing events, street protests,
etc. to make them accountable for their actions and gain global attention. The campaigners also
work with local communities and activists to assess needs and initiate the legal and direct campaign
against corporations’ and governments’ oppression.56 The activities in combination with the
transnational and global justice organizations, can be called a ‘transnational or cross-border social
movement.’57
According to Khagram and Alvord, transnational social movement means “phenomena and
dynamics that cross, alter, transcend, and even transform borders and boundaries.”58 In other
words, transnational movements can be defined as movements involving activists from more than
one country, which infiltrate from the local level (where the project is situated) to the national level
(capital city or countrywide) to transnational space (another country, especially the origin of the
company).59 Additionally, activists themselves may be transnational such as citizens of more than
one country or solidarity groups supporting independence movement in a foreign country.
Alongside, transnational methods and strategies may be applied, such as mobilization, protest,
social media campaign, or other web-based activities, and the movement requires cross-border
interaction such as activism based in one or several countries where activists are located.60
Samina Lutfa, a Bangladeshi researcher, investigates how the coalition of local, national, and
transnational activists for resisting the Phulbari coal mine project in Bangladesh was created and
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is still resisting, even after a decade of a successful campaign to suspend the project.61 The author,
through qualitative research, shows that as local activists were experiencing repression by the
military-backed government and false criminal cases filed by the company, it was likely that
mining would begin again and local resistance re-emerged. Lutfa’s research has explored the
transnational coalition activities in a larger scenario for resisting a mine operation in Bangladesh,
but it has not focused on the dynamics of environmental justice for Indigenous peoples in global
settings.
Protesters have attracted considerable attention from national and international groups.
International campaign groups from the UK and the USA working for environmental protection
and human rights collaborated with national groups and organizations using the internet and social
media campaigns. Over the years, those transnational environmental justice organizations created
a network with national and local organizations. They have been researching the company’s
activities and created pressure on the company and the government through publications and
shared them with the NCBD and other local organizations. Moreover, some TEJOs in London62
continued attending the company’s annual general meetings and pressuring its shareholders by
asking questions about the company’s activities in the Phulbari Coal Project.
On the other hand, the company continued to lobby through different influential channels to
resume mining while the community mobilization against the mining project kept on. It is
important to note that the military-backed interim government came into power in January 2007,
and the company continued to manipulate them and tried to take it as an opportunity to go ahead
with the project. A month after the new government’s formation, Asia Energy appointed a retired
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Army General to implement the project to strengthen its power. An NCBD leader told me, “the
company started publicizing through their website that there is a military government in
Bangladesh; they resolved the issue, and they were going to implement the project without any
protest.”63 However, the company consultants became active and started mining activities in
Phulbari with the protection of the security forces. Since the RAB force had started repression of
local activists, there was no strong protest due to fear of torture. Nuruzzaman’s arrest and torture
was a signal that if activists come forward to protest, they would be stifled in a similar way. The
situation of Phulbari became vulnerable, and NCBD members started thinking that the government
could begin torturing innocent people any time, which has become normalized in some extractive
contexts in the global South.64 NCBD central members and civil society in the name of Udbigno
Nagorik (Worried Citizens) organized a protest rally on February 12, 2007, demanding the release
of Nuruzzaman in Dhaka. A central NCBD leader told me:
“From that rally, we started thinking of contacting international solidarity and advocacy
groups, especially ones who are campaigning and advocating for local protesters from
London, the UK. We informed them that local protesters in trouble could be increased, and
national pressure groups would not be able to handle the repression of the non-democratic
government. Our perception of creating transnational ties was to create pressure on the
company as well as the government.”65
Another reason for thinking of building a transnational coalition by NCBD was to inform
others of the existing situation of Phulbari and the company’s activities so that they can spread the
news. NCBD thought that it would be tough for them to continue the tie between them and local
activists for a more extended period without the outside entities continuing the movement against
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the company.66 Moreover, public interest groups maintain communication with transnational
coalitions to avoid further intervention from the company in the long run.67 Since local protesters
and Adibasi right holders cannot trace the company’s most recent activities, TEJOs, through their
secure networks, advocacies, and contact, bargain with the company and to some extent, with
states. Therefore, the national and transnational justice and solidarity groups act as mediators in
this case whose actions and voices reach the company, host and home states.
Lutfa identifies two dimensions, such as ‘reach out’ and ‘pick up connections’ and ‘direct ties’
and ‘mediated ties.’ For the first dimension, local and national activists first reach out to TEJOs,
and transnational groups may or may not ‘pick up’ the case depending on meeting their criteria
and institutional goals. In the second dimension, the connection or coalition can happen through
direct contact or through mediated communication.68 In the case of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon,
to build a transnational coalition, NCBD informed Bangladeshi immigrants to connect the
movement to the transnational arena through the Bangladesh Environment Network (BEN).69 BEN
experts started writing about the adverse impact of this mine and mediated NCBD’s ties with other
organizations. Through this network, some TEJOs came to know about the Phulbari open-pit coal
project and the Phulbari Khoni Andolon.70 TEJOs from the UK, the USA, Japan, Germany, and
Australia responded and successfully built a coalition with NCBD.71 Some groups were contacted
directly by NCBD, and some were mediated through BEN and the Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon
(BAPA).72 BAPA and BEN closely work on issues and have a connection through their
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advocacies.73 At the later stage, TEJOs mediated through other transnational networks and created
a coalition and started working together with solidarity.
Samina Lutfa’s research shows how transnational organizations have their own interests in
getting involved with a movement like the Phulbari Khoni Andolon—to make their struggle to
save the environment more meaningful. Since this is a global movement against mining
corporations, they sometimes come forward to contact local protesters and national activists on
their own initiatives. To expose the interests of transnational groups involving in the movements,
Lutfa argues,
“These transnational–local connections support each side’s goals, and the relationship is
reciprocal. Despite claims that transnational partners are more dominant than the local
groups, the Phulbari case shows us that the transnational groups were not always saviors
rather they also benefited from the resistance showing their potential funders or boards or
supporters that they have achieved measurable impact through it.”74
David Naguib Pellow argues that TEJO activists articulate a conception of global political
economy as “shifting risks and hazards from North to South, from rich nations to poor communities
between and within nations, and from racially privileged communities to racially despised
communities.”75 Pellow further argues that many TEJOs originated not only to combat growing
global environmental problems but also to take responsibility for hazards being transmitted from
the global North to the global South as an ethical obligation.76 In this way, these groups tend to
challenge the most powerful actors such as governments, TNCs and MNCs, and IFIs.77 Despite
developing the cultures of solidarity and its successes, Bandy presents criticisms on transnational
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environmental justice movements. The author argues that ideological agendas may exclude
influential supporters and coalition members, which can hinder the purposes of transnational ties
and the more significant cause.78

3.3.1. Involved TEJOs in Phulbari Khoni Andolon
The following TEJOs got involved in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon through different
activities:
3.3.1.1.

NGO Forum on ADB

This is an Asian-led civil society networking and advocacy organization formed in 1992 to
hold ADB accountable, transparent, and transparent by frequently monitoring of whether the rights
of local communities are affected by the ADB’s policies and large-scale development projects. On
its website, the network group recognizes,
“the perilous situation Asia is facing in the midst of the rising inequality, illegitimate debts,
environmental degradation, displacement, human rights violations and increasing
vulnerability of the poor. The Forum had also strengthened the capacities of its members
through research and policy advocacy on safeguards. It had fought with the struggles of its
members calling for justice in elevating the grievances of project-affected communities to
the Bank.”79
This organization has frequently protested ADB’s statement by cross-checking with local
groups and residents. For example, when ADB claimed in a statement that most of the protesters
were non-residents of Phulbari, this advocacy group countered and told ADB, “this is in complete
contradiction to statements made by local people that most of the demonstrators, including all the
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victims who were killed and injured, were Phulbari residents.”80 After continuous pressure on
ADB by this organization, and a community letter by several Adibasi leaders, the country director,
at last, declared in 2008 that ADB would not fund the project anymore.81
3.3.1.2.

Japan Centre for a Sustainable Environment and Society (JACSES)

JACSES is a networking group that works for the accountability of the Japanese government
on environmental issues.82 Throughout the period of its involvement with the Phulbari Khoni
Andolon, this advocacy group protested through writing action papers to pressure the Japanese
government to pull their support back from the Phulbari Coal Project.
3.3.1.3.

International Accountability Project (IAP)

IAP is an international advocacy organization that supports through advocacy skills local
activists and communities to access and exchange information on development that affects them.
This group seeks to advance development projects that prioritize human rights, environmental
rights, and community participation in the decision-making process. IAP supports the communityled priorities and recommendations directed towards financial institutions, governments and
project proponents connected to the project through their campaign activities. IAP exchanges
expert advice, training, and materials to communities likely to be affected and the civil society
groups supporting them.83 IAP still maintains a frequently updated webpage on the Phulbari Coal
Project and manages ties with other organizations and participates in direct activism to the
resistance.84
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3.3.1.4.

Cultural Survival

Cultural Survival is a US-based advocacy organization that helps Indigenous communities in
mining areas to prevent the destruction of their land and natural resources.85 Since its inception in
1972, Cultural Survival has partnered with Indigenous communities to advance Indigenous
peoples’ rights and cultures worldwide. The organization employs a participatory, rights-based
approach to strengthen Indigenous rights, support access to information, bolster freedom of
expression, and assist them in organizing protests. Lutfa explores that in the case of Phulbari
resistance, Adibasis of Phulbari needed to prove that their traditional agricultural lands, forests,
ecosystem, and their livelihoods were endangered, and consequently, they needed to invite
Cultural Survival. JAP contacted this transnational group to get involved to observe their
situation.86 Paula Palmer, the Director of Cultural Survival’s Global Response Program, stated in
an interview with IAP:
“The project threatens some of Bangladesh’s most vulnerable Indigenous peoples, who
trace their ancestry in the region back 5,000 years. Indigenous leaders fear that if their
small communities are broken apart and dispersed, they will not be able to maintain the
cultural traditions, religious practices, and languages that have sustained them for
thousands of years.”87

3.3.1.5.

The London Mining Network (LMN)

LMN is a network of organizations concerned about human rights, Indigenous rights, social
justice, development, and the ecological integrity of the planet. Most of the world’s biggest mining
companies and many smaller mining companies are listed on the London Stock Exchange, and on
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its Alternative Investment Market (AIM).88 Since Asia Energy started a business in the AIM, LMN
has initiated share-holder activism inside the company’s annual general meetings, participated in
demonstrations and seminars, and organized many advocacy meetings with the UK government
officials. It has also provided research support to activists of other solidarity, networks, and
coalition groups.89
3.3.1.6.

Mines and Communities (MAC)

Launched in 2001, MAC is another London-based network group with the purpose to provide
affected communities, especially Indigenous peoples, NGOs, activists, the media, and the public,
information about aspects of global
mining and its impacts.90 This network
group’s founding document is named
‘the

London

Declaration,’

and

it

encapsulates key demands being made
by many communities affected by
mining around the world.91
3.3.1.7.

Figure 18: Protest by TEJOs in front of AGM of Asia Energy in London
Photo: Peter Marshal and PSG

Global Justice Now

Global Justice Now, formerly known as the World Development Movement, is a democratic
social justice group based in the UK which campaigns and works in solidarity with those fighting
global injustice, especially in the global South.92 This organization has been campaigning against
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Asia Energy’s activities in London and challenged the company ’s allies, such as Barclays Capital,
RBS, and the UK government.93
3.3.1.8.

The Bank Information Centre (BIC)

BIC, a transnational campaign group, supports “those whose health, livelihoods, homes, sacred
sites, and support systems are threatened by the development process, and work[s] to reform the
development finance system to prevent harm to people and the planet.” BIC recognizes that the
policies and programs of IFIs such as the World Bank, IFC, and ADB can exacerbate climate
change, undermine human rights, and further marginalize people who have historically faced
discrimination.94 In their campaign, this group shares information and initiates capacity building,
project monitoring, and policy reform of IFIs.95
3.3.1.9.

Phulbari Solidarity Group (PSG)

PSG is a London-based transnational activist group that originated from activists who
participated in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon in 2006 and later moved to different countries. As a
joint effort of national and transnational activists, this group supports and represents the
communities of the Phulbari mining region, opposes the project, and sought to build a transnational
coalition to halt the open-pit coal project in Bangladesh. Through their advocacy, campaign,
network, and solidarity, PSG sought to ensure that the company quit Phulbari and kept pressuring
the Bangladesh government to fulfill the demands made after the movement.96 In partnership, PSG
works closely with LMN, Coal Action UK, Foil Vedanta, Grow Heathrow, Global Justice Now,
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MAC, Cultural Survival, Mangrove Action Plan, IAP, Reclaim the Power, and South Asia
Solidarity to build transnational resistance and solidarity with local people.97
These are some organizations that made a significant contribution to halting the project and
have been defending communities in Phulbari through their direct and interpersonal advocacy
work, campaigns, and protests against Asia Energy in London.98 IAP was interested in the Phulbari
case since it was highly destructive and in an area where IAP could add their value. IAP had
reliable regional partners and local grassroots were strong, as they required; it was easy for them

Figure 19: NCBD and CPB protesting in front of the Asia Energy Office in London. Photo courtesy: PSG

to take the decision to get involved with the Phulbari khoni Andolon.99 Although JAP contacted
Cultural Survival to get involved to observe their situation,100 IAP mediated a tie with them. LMN
was involved with a direct connection from NCBD. MAC was mediated through LMN and built a
coalition to support Adibasi communities, protesters, and activists.101 When NCBD reached out to
Global Justice Now, they responded quickly and created an alliance in 2008.102 BIC actively
connected with the coalition partners and with media outlets on the Phulbari issue, indicating that
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they continue to be committed.103 Since the Phulbari Coal Project was supposed to be partly funded
by ADB, NGO Forum on ADB kept an eye on it and built a coalition with national grassroots
groups. However, they built a network when a community organization contacted them directly.104
When JACSES learned that the Phulbari mine was funded by ADB, they decided to work against
it. Moreover, the London branch of the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB), NCBD activists,
and concerned Bangladeshi expats in London have been organizing protest rallies and programs
in collaboration with TEJOs to give the Bangladesh government a message not to implement the
project.

3.4. Conclusion
The Phulbari Khoni Andolon happened more than a decade ago, in 2006, but Adibasis and
local Bangalee people are still thriving in the spirit of the movement, which they shared in
interviews I conducted. The protest was the largest against any foreign company in Bangladesh
and set an example for MNC’s and their mining initiatives. Despite threats, criminal cases,
terrorization, corruption, manipulation, and the use of lethal force against local activists and
Adibasi communities, they are still fighting to protect their lands and livelihoods. Indigenous
peoples around the world tend to be disproportionately affected by resource extraction activities
and have fewer technical, legal, and other resources to participate in the decision-making process
effectively. This lack of adequate participation can be interpreted as a procedural environmental
injustice. The issue of justice raised by community residents in the development projects calls into
question the institutional structures that justify some decision-making procedures.
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The resistance to Phulbari was based on the belief that communities, especially Indigenous and
other marginalized communities, should have the right to participate in the decision-making
process by having the power to approve or reject any project. In many cases, where the primary
conflict opposes the interests of a corporation with those of residents affected by its operations,
citizens rarely believe for long that the state is neutral and impartial. They find themselves having
to struggle with the nation-states, which they perceive as representing interests other than theirs,105
but states should ideally give priority to the interests of their citizens.106 The governments argue
that the decision would bring the greatest benefit to the most significant number. However, the
Government of Bangladesh’s actions, in this case, could not assure the protesters that their interests
would be protected. In the Phulbari case, the protesters challenged the government’s decision on
the mine and successfully created a discourse among citizens that ‘not all mining would bring the
greatest benefit to the greatest number.’ They argue that the government has the responsibility to
make decisions based on a fair distribution of risks and benefits among different actors in the case
of mineral resource extraction. Adibasi communities of Phulbari resisted because they thought that
they might not be appropriately compensated, and their voices would not be heard adequately due
to longstanding lack of recognition of their rights.
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CHAPTER IV
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
RECOGNITION POLITICS IN BANGLADESH
4.1.

Introduction

Indigenous peoples are being persecuted systematically around the world by nation-states and
multinational and transnational corporations (MNCs and TNCs) in the name of development in
their own territories. Moreover, Indigenous peoples are also widely deprived of political and social
participation and engagement in various decision-making processes, although different
international legal instruments such as the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (ILO
Convention No. 169), the United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
2007, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) have established rights of self-determination
so that Indigenous peoples can take a decision over their territories and determine their own
identity. Indigenous peoples are defined by the United Nations (UN) as the descendants of the
earliest and original peoples who settled in a region and with new arrivals later became dominated
and marginalized through conquest, occupation, oppression, settlement, or other means.1 As a
result of 500 years of European imperialism, more than 100 million people, mostly Indigenous
peoples, moved away from homelands and have been increasingly marginalized.2 Colonizers tried
to eradicate the cultural identity of Indigenous peoples through the erasure of their sacred histories,
traditional knowledge, customs, and geographies that provide the foundation for Indigenous
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cultural identities and a sense of self-identification.3 Despite all these challenges, Indigenous
peoples retain social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of governing themselves and have
remained distinct from other dominant groups by practicing their unique traditions, customs,
cultures, beliefs, histories, and languages.4 Before they rooted in particular places, they trekked
through one hamlet to another hamlet, from one valley to another valley, and encountered the
power of assimilationist nation-states, making strong claims for self-determination and legal
personality, or for various forms of sovereignty.5
The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) estimates that there are around
400 million Indigenous peoples situated in 90 countries around the world, 6 (80% of them live in
Asia, 7% in South America, 6% in North America, 4% in Africa, 3% in Australia/Oceania and
0.1% in Europe)7 that makeup 5-7% of the world population.8 Roughly, 5000 Indigenous groups
speak over 5000 languages and are regarded amongst the poorest sections of the world population
though they mostly live in rich biodiversity and resource surroundings.9
In this chapter, I observe and report on various approaches to defining Indigenous peoples
developed by scholars and international legal instruments. Based on my qualitative data, my
attempt in this chapter is to identify whether Adibasi communities of the Phulbari mining region
and throughout Bangladesh could establish the definition of Indigenous peoples under
international law.
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4.2.

Indigenous Peoples: From Past to Present

Throughout the process of developing international law, the idea of Indigenous peoples has
evolved.10 Francisco de Vittoria11 stated that nobody could possess the lordship over Indigenous
lands even if s/he were an Emperor or Pope because Indigenous peoples own exclusive territorial
rights over their lands.12 Though Vittoria supported the European invaders apprehending
Indigenous peoples’ lands through his theory of ‘just war’, he suggested that the colonizers should
respect certain autonomous powers and land claims of the original inhabitants.13 The United
Nations (UN) agrees that the concept of Indigenous peoples was developed from the colonial
experience, in which ‘original inhabitants’ were either deported or became marginalized by
colonizers through different types of colonialism.14 The term ‘colonialism’ is broadly used to
describe the atrocious experience that Indigenous peoples and original inhabitants faced, but the
colonial systems could not fully capture Indigenous peoples’ desires, visions, and strategies.15
Through their long encounter with European settlers and colonizers, Indigenous peoples did not
always remain tied to their homelands and often had to migrate to different places, holding distinct
languages and cultures.16
Altamirano-Jiménez identifies ‘settler colonialism’ and ‘extractive colonialism’ in her critical
contribution to the debate over Indigenous peoples. In settler colonialism, the colonizers evicted
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Indigenous peoples from their lands and established new settlements for the settlers.17 Patrick
Wolfe termed settler colonialism as “a structure and not an event”, based on what he called the
‘logic of elimination’.18 In most of the British colonies, especially in North America, Indigenous
peoples were evicted from their lands for settlement purposes, but “were not killed, driven away,
romanticized, assimilated, fenced-in, bred White, and otherwise eliminated as the ‘original
owners’ of the land but as ‘Indians’”.19 Altamirano-Jiménez contrasts this to extractive colonialism
that involved practices of reproductive labor, controlling resources, and labor distribution. Spanish
colonizers used ‘extractive colonialism’ approaches where they did not expel Indigenous peoples
from their land but instead employed them to reproduce mineral resources for the colonizers’
interests.20 However, these types of colonial experiences are not the same everywhere.
Indigenous identity should not be exclusively determined according to the history of European
colonization.21 Altamirano-Jimenez’s insights on settler colonialism are accurate for the Americas,
Russia, Arctic, and some parts of the Pacific but are not applicable for all African and Asian
countries where European colonizers did not displace the whole populations and replace them with
European settlers.22 As Clifford argues, Indigenous movements are positioned in relation to their
experience of dispossession, but not always connected to the European or other imperialist
influences.23 The UN recognizes that it was not only European rulers and settlers but also existing
dominant groups that marginalized Indigenous peoples and displaced them from their lands.24
Nevertheless, arguments are made by many Asian state governments, such as India, Bangladesh,
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China, and Myanmar in the UN system, that as there was no large-scale European settler
colonialism in many Asian and African countries, “there can be no Indigenous peoples in a given
country and, therefore, there can be no distinction between the original inhabitants and
newcomers.”25 It can easily be argued that in the context of European colonization, Africans are
Indigenous to Africa, and Asians are Indigenous to Asia.26 But, some contend that colonial rule
had destroyed the earlier territorial boundaries and communal mapping of the region by creating
new administrative units, which led to increasing dispossession of marginalized communities.27
Differences among Indigenous peoples around the world can be observed in their cultures,
ethnicities, political-economic situations, and in their relationships in some cases with settler
societies created by colonizers. However, Indigenous peoples’ struggle to survive as distinct
communities is ongoing throughout the world.28 One reason is the challenge of identifying their
status in society. Bartholomew Dean and Jerome Levi investigate the puzzle of why and how the
circumstances29 of Indigenous peoples are improving in some places in the world while their
human rights continue to be abused in other places.30 The authors identify that in postcolonial
societies, state actors and their political, intellectual, and development partners (MNCs and TNCs)
marginalized Indigenous peoples for the sake of modernization, development, and economic
prosperity within their national territory.31 Furthermore, contemporary nation-states uphold the
colonizers’ mandate, not by attempting to uproot the physical presence of Indigenous peoples as
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‘human bodies’, but by trying to eradicate their existence as ‘peoples’.32 Equally, the current state
practices corrupt the relationship between Indigenous groups and settlers by the process of
assimilation which produces state-sanctioned legal and political definitional approaches to
Indigenous identities.33 Transnational alliances (between environmental groups, political parties,
human rights organizations, and social movements), Indigenous intellectuals, and leaders have
used ‘strategic essentialism’34 in their efforts to define Indigenous identity, secure the recognition
of Indigenous peoples and uphold their distinct cultural traditions.35 Therefore, ‘Indigeneity’ is
reconstructed and reshaped through every process of colonial arrangement and actively enacted by
Indigenous peoples when they fight against state oppression and external interference.

4.3.

Defining Indigenous Peoples

4.3.1. Debates about the Definition of Indigenous Peoples
The debates over defining and identifying Indigenous peoples have attracted enormous concern
in the international legal arena. As a result, various non-governmental and intergovernmental
organizations have attempted to institutionalize their own definitions of Indigenous peoples,
bringing the category within contemporary international human rights discourse and practices.36
However, little progress has been made. It is still contested in many nation-states and within
Indigenous communities themselves how to identify ‘Indigeneity’. In fact, the real question might
be who ought to have the authority to define Indigenous peoples. Definitions by scholars, policy-
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makers, and legal instruments have considered the circumstances, geographies, distinctiveness and
diversity of peoples or communities or groups to identify them as Indigenous peoples.37
Observers from various Indigenous organizations at the Working Group of the Commission on
Human Rights38 (hereinafter the Working Group) in 1996 took a common position and rejected
the idea of a ‘formal’ definition of Indigenous peoples adopted by the state agencies.39
Governmental delegations from different countries expressed the view that it was neither desirable
nor necessary to elaborate a universal definition of Indigenous peoples.40 Finally, the Working
Group, at its fifteenth session in 1997, concluded that “a definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’ at the
global level was not possible at that time, and indeed not necessary for the adoption of the United
Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”.41 Neizen argues that a “rigorous
definition of Indigenous peoples would be premature and ultimately futile. Debates over the
problem of definition are more interesting than any definition in and of itself.”42 However, setting
a standard and universally accepted definition of Indigenous peoples have been emphasized both
by Indigenous groups/nations and state authorities. Therefore, the definition or identification of
Indigenous peoples and other minority groups is contested, inadequate, and incomplete.
Altamirano-Jiménez observes that the formation of strict definitional standards in international
and national laws excludes some Indigenous groups who need protection.43 Taking consideration
of the set of rights vested in the communities, they can benefit from adopting Indigenous political
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identities.44 It is also observed that an inadequate universal definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’ gives
many state governments a chance to repudiate the existence of Indigenous peoples within their
national borders.45 The pressure continued from some states such as Bangladesh, India, and
Nigeria for a universal definition.46 The Bangladeshi observer in the Working Group stated that a
definition could be an essential step for safeguarding the rights of Indigenous peoples. He said,
“ambiguity or absence of criteria could be a convenient cover for states to deny or grant recognition
of Indigenous status since there would be no international standard to go by.” 47 Both India and
Bangladesh took the chance of non-existence of any formal definition of Indigenous peoples.
Since the Indian government classified ‘all ethnic communities into ‘scheduled tribes’,
‘scheduled castes or forward castes’, and ‘other backward classes’ in the Constitution, India is
motivated to gain support for its position that ‘no category of people in India can be singled out as
‘Indigenous peoples’.48 Indian Courts on different occasions use both ‘Scheduled Tribes’ and
‘Adibasi’ terms interchangeably to mean Indigenous peoples, however, the communities are not
recognized by the Indian government as Indigenous peoples or Adibasis.49 According to Pooja
Parmar, “though Adibasis could certainly be protected by the Constitutional recognition of their
status as ‘backward section of peoples’, that recognition would not include a fundamental right not
to be alienated from the lands they lived on.”50 Following the Indian government’s position of
recognizing Indigenous peoples, the Bangladesh government outright rejects the existence of
Indigenous peoples or Adibasi in Bangladesh; instead, the government in 2011 through 15th

44

Ibid. at 37
Marcus Colchester, “Indigenous Rights and the Collective Conscious.” (2002) 18.1 Anthropology Today at 2.
46
ECOSOC, supra note 38.
47
Ibid.
48
Pooja Parmar, “Undoing Historical Wrongs: Law and Indigeneity in India.” (2011) 49 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
at 496.
49
Ibid. at 498.
50
Ibid. at 512.
45

152

Amendment of the Constitution identified them as ‘the tribes, minor races, ethnic sects and
communities’51 and ‘small ethnic minority’.52
Given the circumstances, Indigenous leaders and organizations often advocate for the direct
endorsement of the accepted international definition of Indigenous peoples and reject any
reference to national laws in identifying Indigenous peoples.53 As Indigenous leaders in the United
Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) announced in 1996, “We categorically
reject any attempts that governments or states define Indigenous peoples”.54 They argue that states
should comply with international legal instruments in this regard and implement them in national
legislation.55 The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) claims, “The recognition or
identification of certain collectivities as ‘Indigenous Peoples’ shall not be dependent on whether a
national government has recognized them as such.”56 Indigenous grassroots groups demand that
only Indigenous peoples can define ‘Indigenous peoples’, and believe that this right of ‘selfdefinition’ derives from international human rights instruments such as ICESCR and ICCPR.
Article 1 of both instruments reveal, “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By that
right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.” Thus, while Wiessner argues that the search for the definition becomes
tainted if interpretations are sought for the purposes of excluding specific communities from the
application of international instruments,57 others argue that formal definitions might help to protect
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Indigenous peoples against governments’ positions of denial.58 The UN has acknowledged that
“no formal universal definition of the term is necessary, given that a single definition will
inevitably be either over or under-inclusive, making sense in some societies but not in others.”59

4.3.2. Definitions of Indigenous Peoples in International Law
Though there are various contentions of identification or definition of Indigenous peoples,
international legal instruments provide guidance on what criteria constitute Indigenous peoples
globally.60 However, there still exists unambiguity about what constitutes its global legal status.
The following part of the chapter examines some features of ‘becoming Indigenous’61 by analyzing
various working definitions and approaches to identify Indigenous peoples provided by
international instruments and scholars.
One of the most cited working definitions of Indigenous ‘communities’, ‘peoples’, and
‘nations’ was given by José R. Martínez Cobo62 in 1982, which is endorsed by Indigenous
representatives in the report of the 1996 Working Group. The working definition reads as follows:
“Indigenous communities, peoples, and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories,
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions, and legal system.

58

Ibid.
UNDESA, supra note 14 at 7.
60
Patrick Macklem, “Indigenous Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations” (2008) 30:July Mich
J Int’l L at 177.
61
Corntassel, supra note 53.
62
The First UN Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, in his famous Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations (1981).
59

154

This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching
into the presence of one or more of the following factors:
a. Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them
b. Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands
c. Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a
tribal system, membership of an indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood,
lifestyle, etc.)
d. Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual
means of communication at home or in the family or as the main, preferred habitual,
general or normal language)
e. Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the world
f. Other relevant factors.
On an individual basis, an Indigenous person is one who belongs to these Indigenous
populations through self-identification as Indigenous (group consciousness) and is
recognized and accepted by these populations as one of its members (acceptance by the
group).
This preserves for these communities the sovereign right and power to decide who belongs
to them, without external interference.” 63
Indigenous peoples’ representatives have advocated the significance of Martínez Cobo’s ‘selfidentification’, as the essential element for identifying Indigenous peoples.64 Taking Cobo’s
definition into consideration, Wiessner categorizes Indigenous peoples as: “peoples with historical
continuity suffering from invasion or colonization; self-identification as distinct from other groups
of the society; a present non-dominant status; and the determination to preserve the groups’
ancestral land.”65 However, Kingsbury takes a different position regarding the working definition
of Martinez Cobo. According to him, “this definition takes potentially a limited and controversial
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view of Indigenous peoples by requiring ‘historical continuity’ with pre-invasion and pre-colonial
societies that developed on their territories”.66
ILO was the first international agency that addressed Indigenous issues. ILO has been working
to protect Indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights since the 1920s. The Indigenous and Tribal
Populations Convention, 1957 (ILO Convention No. 107) defines both the ‘Indigenous
population’ and ‘tribal population’ that has experienced conquest or colonization in the past.67 It
also explains the term ‘semi-tribal’ as “groups and persons who, although they are in the process
of losing their tribal characteristics, are not yet integrated into the national community.”68
However, the difference between ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Tribal’ communities, according to the
definition of the ILO Convention No. 107, is minimal since Indigenous peoples are defined as “not
only encompassing descendants of the inhabitants of the territory ‘at the time of conquest or
colonization,’ but also descendants of people residing there at the time of ‘establishment of present
state boundaries’”.69
The ILO Convention No. 169 definition ascertains the principle of ‘self-identification’ to be
recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’.70 The Convention introduces the concept of ‘self-recognition’
for protecting Indigenous peoples71 and provides self-identification as a ‘fundamental criterion’
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for determining the groups to whom the Convention applies.72 The following definition proposed
by the Convention is recognized all over the world. Article 1 of the Convention defines Indigenous
and Tribal peoples as:
“(a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic
conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose
status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws
or regulations;
(b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as Indigenous on account of their
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of
present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.”
The World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) has initiated the following definition of
‘Indigenous peoples’:
“Population groups who from ancient times have inhabited the lands where we live, who
are aware of having a character of our own, with social traditions and means of expression
that are linked to the country inherited from our ancestors, with a language of our own, and
having certain essential and unique characteristics which confer upon us the strong
conviction of belonging to a people, who have an identity in ourselves and should be thus
regarded by others”.73
According to the ILO Convention No. 169 definition, disruptions caused by colonization or by
present government actions as a form of imperialism if they continue to struggle, are regarded as
elements of a group’s identity as ‘Indigenous peoples’.74 Corntassel argues that the definition of
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the Convention emphasizes the notion of social and cultural distinctiveness based on tradition.75 It
is acknowledged that both the ILO Convention No. 169 and the WCIP definitions ascertain the
principle of ‘self-identification’ to be recognized as Indigenous peoples. UNDRIP did not provide
any explicit definition of Indigenous peoples, fearing that a definition would result in harming the
actual beneficiaries of the rights of the Declaration. Although the Declaration has no solid
definition of Indigenous peoples, there are some defining components there. Paragraph 2 of the
Annex of the UNDRIP states: “The General Assembly is affirming that indigenous peoples are
equal to all other peoples while recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider
themselves different, and to be respected as such.”
Paragraph 18 and 19 say:
“The General Assembly is convinced that the recognition of the rights of Indigenous
peoples in this Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the
state and Indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human
rights, non-discrimination and good faith.”
“Encouraging states to comply with and effectively implement all their obligations as they
apply to Indigenous peoples under international instruments, in particular, those related to
human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the peoples concerned.”
From the above definitions of Indigenous peoples under international law, I have identified the
following common characteristics for ‘being Indigenous’: self-identification as Indigenous;
historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies; a shared experience of
colonialism and oppression; vulnerability in current society; occupation of or a strong link to
specific territories; distinct social, economic and political systems; distinct language, culture, and
beliefs; belonging to non-dominant sectors of society; recognized by others; and resolved to
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maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and distinctive identities. In the following
section, I examine if Adibasi communities of the Phulbari mining area qualify as Indigenous
peoples under international law by relying on the above-mentioned features for testing their
identity.

4.4.

Indigenous Peoples in Bangladesh and Politics of Recognition

In the previous section, I have analyzed various definitions accepted in international law, but
there are many countries, including Bangladesh, that are inclined to disregard those definitions;
instead, they try to assimilate the communities into dominant groups and their cultures. Advocates
argue that the state-enforced assimilation process ultimately leads to the non-recognition of
Indigenous identity.76 According to the UN, Indigeneity does not depend on government
recognition.77 I have taken Adibasi communities around the Phulbari Coal Project as the subject
of my research, and as such, my analysis of the debate over recognition of Adibasis or Indigenous
peoples is limited to the project area, not the whole Bangladesh. Though the study is limited to one
location, there is a discussion of recognition politics of Adibasis in Bangladesh.

4.4.1. Test of Indigeneity in Bangladesh
In my research, I adopt Kingsbury’s ‘constructivist approach’ by engaging empirically with
community members to determine how they identify themselves in society and what they think
about the government’s non-recognition policy. Kingsbury, in his article “‘Indigenous Peoples’ in
International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy”, describes the current
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patterns in Asia as attempts are made to define Indigenous peoples.78 Kingsbury rejects the ‘strict’
historical test, which he terms a ‘positivist approach’ often taken by Western scholars, NGOs, and
intergovernmental organizations.79 Hence, to avoid excluding ‘peoples’ in Asia and other regions
from claiming Indigenous status, Kingsbury suggests a flexible ‘constructive approach’ with four
essential elements: a) self-identification as a distinct ethnic group; b) historical experience of, or
contingent vulnerability to, severe disruption, dislocation or exploitation; c) long connection with
the region; and d) the wish to retain a distinct identity.80 Jeff Corntassel argues that each of
Kingsbury’s four essential indicators has a reasonable basis for inclusion as Indigenous
representatives stressed all of them as aspects of their distinct identity.81 Kingsbury argues that a
constructivist approach makes a global concept of ‘Indigenous peoples’ possible while allowing
functional specificity to meet diverse social circumstances and institutional requirements.82
However, Kingsbury’s constructivist approach means meanings and understandings grow out of
social encounters such as interactions, practices, ideas, and beliefs. As part of the approach,
Kingsbury includes ‘non-dominance’, ‘close natural affinity’, ‘historical continuity’, ‘socioeconomic and socio-cultural differences’, ‘distinct characteristics such as language, race, etc.’,
‘regarded as Indigenous by others’ as strong additional indicators in his definition.83 I apply these
essential characteristics for being ‘Indigenous’ in the following sub-sections.

4.4.1.1.

Self-identification and Self-definition
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Most of the definitions put forward by international organizations and prominent scholars
highlight the self-identification approach. Marcus Colchester points out that many marginalized
communities around the world that are struggling for their identity and control of traditional lands
and livelihoods have redefined themselves as Indigenous.84 However, people who consider
themselves as ‘Indigenous peoples’ must be a self-defined class of people since international law
already recognized this principle of self-identification as one of the essential criteria of being
Indigenous. The significance of Martínez Cobo’s “‘self-identification’ as the most crucial
component for identifying Indigenous peoples” was advocated by many UN member observers
attended in the Working Group in 1996.85 Furthermore, the definition of the ILO Convention No.
169 ascertains the principle of ‘self-identification’ to be recognized as Indigenous peoples. The
Convention also introduced the concept of ‘self-recognition’ for protecting Indigenous peoples
and provides ‘self-identification’ as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to whom
the Convention applies.86 Again, Article 33 of the UNDRIP and Article 8 of the Draft Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1994 vested the right of defining ‘Indigenous peoples’ only
on Indigenous communities by emphasizing the importance of ‘self-identification’. Article 33
states:
“1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or membership in
accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair the right of Indigenous
individuals to obtain citizenship of the states in which they live.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to select the
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.”
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Article 8 of the Draft Declaration reads, “Indigenous peoples have a collective and individual
right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to
identify themselves as Indigenous and to be recognized as such”. Self-identification or selfrecognition is a criterion for being Indigenous that prevents states from putting forward a claim of
not having Indigenous peoples in a territory by enacting law or policy.87 Corntassel notes that selfidentification policies for Indigenous nations have increasingly become accepted as international
legal practice. Despite the accepted practice of unlimited ‘self-identification’ for Indigenous
peoples in global settings, states ‘accommodating’ Indigenous peoples within their borders have
generally contested such an open policy.88 Therefore, peoples who consider themselves as
‘Indigenous peoples’ must be a self-defined class of peoples since international law already
recognizes this principle of self-identification as one of the essential characteristics of being
‘Indigenous’.
Members of Adibasi communities of the proposed Phulbari mining area in Bangladesh identify
themselves as Adibasi. While I was interviewing a Santal farmer, I have observed a resilient
attitude towards the debate about identifying his community. He was saying, “I identify myself as
an Adibasi from a Santal community. I find no distinction between Santals and Adibasis. If you
call me or identify me as a Santal, you have to recognize me as an Adibasi as well.”89 Ram Soren
is an Adibasi leader from the Santal community who was also involved in the Phulbari Khoni
Andolon. He told me that it does not matter to Adibasis whether the government recognizes them
as Adibasi or not because the government has no authority to define or identify them. He contended
that it is enough if someone regards himself as an Adibasi. He questioned: “Why should the
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government identify whether any community or group is Indigenous or Adibasi or Bangalee?” He
later added pointing at me:
“I cannot call you a Santal, because you are not a Santal. You are a Bangalee, which is
your identity, and you would not accept anything other than Bangalee identity. Nobody
would accept this. You only can call me whatever I decide to be called. Only I have the
right to define and identify myself. I am a Santal according to ethnicity, as like other ethnic
communities such as the Oraon, Munda, Mahili, Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Bengalee,
etc.”90
Rob Soren, the president of a national Adibasi NGO and a key activist of the Phulbari Khoni
Andolon, claimed during the interview that ethnic groups in North-west of Bangladesh (where the
mining area is located) are always known and called as Adibasi. Not only Adibasis themselves but
also local Bangalees and local government bodies use the term ‘Adibasi’.91 Some of the
communities are also called ‘Guna’ which is never scheduled in the government documents. Mr.
Soren added that he has been called and recognized locally as a Santal and an Adibasi since he
was born.92 An elderly Santal woman reasoned that the government has no power and right to
identify whether the communities are humans or animals. Since they identify themselves as
Adibasis, they are Adibasi.93 Therefore, throughout my interviews, I heard the view that all ethnic
and linguistic communities should be recognized in accordance with their wishes. I find their claim
on this criterion is strong.

4.4.1.2.

Regarded as Indigenous by Others

Indigenous peoples require themselves not only be recognized as self-determining agents, but
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they should also be recognized by another self-conscious group.94 Therefore, the
institutionalization of a liberal regime of reciprocal recognition would enable Indigenous peoples
to realize their status as distinct and self-determining actors.95 The UN has pointed out that the
self-identification feature alone cannot contribute to building a specific group for becoming
‘Indigenous peoples’, they should have close ties to their lands, with culture and languages distinct
from the dominant groups, and be regarded as Indigenous by other communities.96 The World
Bank stipulates that the surrounding community should also confirm that the communities who
are claiming to be ‘Indigenous’ are maintaining distinctiveness and are dominated by other
groups.97 During my stay in the township of Phulbari and Birampur sub-districts, I talked,
discussed, and interviewed with Bangalee activists, local government representatives, farmers, and
teachers about mining, resistance, and Adibasi issues. Local Bangalees’ sense of identifying the
communities as ‘he or she is from an Adibasi village or hamlet’. Bangalees call the self-recognized
ethnic communities in the mining area ‘Adibasi’, though some people call pointedly as the Santal,
Munda/Pahan, Mahili, and Karmakar. Though the term ‘small ethnic minority’ is being imposed
on the self-identified Adibasi communities by the government, nobody in the area uses or refers
them as a ‘small ethnic minority’ or ‘upojati’ or ‘tribes’.98
R. Begum, a Bangalee woman whose family settled in an Adibasi hamlet, contended that she
calls the ethnic communities ‘Adibasi’ because they are Adibasi in nature. She also claimed, “I
call them Adibasi because they love to be called Adibasi and, I respect their self-recognition and
identification.”99 Her argument explores that all people have their own identity, and they should
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be regarded as such. She questioned, “if anyone calls me Adibasi, I feel insulted because I am not
an Adibasi. Why should someone be called or identified what he/she is not?”100 She added that
Adibasis also feel insulted if they are called otherwise. Having a close attachment to the people,
she found that Adibasis are completely different from Bangalees regarding their lifestyle,
traditional rituals, customs, governance and belief systems. As R. Begum is living in an Adibasi
hamlet and she understands that Adibasis have their Manjhi Parishad, she respects their customary
system and follows their traditional governing policies. She finally connected and said, “that does
not mean I have become an Adibasi. Nobody can change his or her ethnicity; it has to be earned
through birth and practice. Once you are a Bangalee, you are always a Bangalee, and once you are
an Adibasi, you are always an Adibasi unless you do not want to be regarded so.”101
B. Roy, another Bangalee farmer and a rickshaw puller who was shot and severely injured
during the Phulbari Khoni Andolonon 26th August 2016, rejected the government’s position and
stated that the government has to recognize the communities according to their demand and has to
take initiatives to stop persecuting them.102 I also observed that one Adibasi community (such as
Santal) recognizes and identifies another Adibasi community (Robidas) through their longstanding understanding of the lifestyle. S. Baske, a Santal man who was also shot in his leg and
waist during the Phulbari Khoni Andolon and had to stay in the hospital for few months with
injury, talked about Robidas103 community who identify themselves as Adibasi. According to him,
Robidas are marginalized and discriminated in the society, have their own language and distinct
culture, but are not recognized even as ‘small ethnic minority’ by the government and by the
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company.104 He said, “among 23 households of Adibasis in my hamlet, ten households are from
Robidas community. I find Robidas is also an Adibasi.”105
Thus, I find that being ‘recognized by others’ is an important criterion, which can be read with
self-recognition or identification. Accordingly, Bangalee respondents of the Phulbari mining area
were asked: “what do they think about the people who are identifying themselves as Adibasi but
not regarded as Adibasi by the government?” Most of the respondents, regardless of their race,
ethnicity, gender, age, literacy, occupation, claimed that they are Indigenous peoples, and they
must be called either ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ because the people want to be called so.

4.4.1.3.

Historical Continuity

Many scholars favor the ‘historical continuity’ criterion arguing that historical continuation is
enough for being ‘Indigenous’. Macklem claims that Indigenous peoples in international law are
communities who maintained historical continuity in occupied and governed territories before
colonization.106 Benedict Kingsbury contests Cobo’s working definition of Indigenous peoples and
argues that by requiring “‘historical continuity’ with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that
developed on their territories”, the definition takes potentially a limited and controversial view of
Indigenous peoples.107 Kingsbury observes that this historical continuity may consist of the
continuation of reaching into the present.108 Macklem supports this position of Indigenous peoples
in international law and argues that they are the people who maintained ‘historical continuity’ in
occupied and governed territories prior to colonization.109
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The World Bank takes a criteria-based approach for Asian countries by adding ‘historical
continuity’ and ‘colonialism’ because some Asian countries such as India, Bangladesh, and
Myanmar have argued that Indigenous peoples are descendants of the original inhabitants who
have suffered from conquest or invasion from outside.110 The principle of “being conquered and
being dominated by another group is pre-condition for Indigenous status”111 implies that European
conquest and military invasion over Indigenous nations are necessary,112 which I find is
problematic. Because not all Indigenous groups were conquered by European invaders through
military powers, nor they establish non-dominant sections in society.113
Designating the notion of Indigenous peoples as ‘the people who came first’, the Indian
representatives have argued that it is impossible to determine who came first because of mass
migration, preoccupation, and differentiation.114 It is common in the Indian sub-continent,
especially in undivided Bengal, where many people of diverse ethnicities have traveled from other
parts of India and settled down in different places to work as borga chashi (sharecroppers)115 and
agricultural laborers.116 All Adibasi communities of my research area have a similar historical and
cultural background and belong to the earliest inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent.117 They are
believed to have moved from Jharkhand, Nagpur and other parts of current India to their new
places (many forest areas of current Bangladesh) during the conquering time by British East India
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Company fearing to be captured and tortured.118 There is another compelling claim of settling
Adibasis in the Phulbari mining area. Sidhu Murmu and Kanhu Murmu were the Santal rebellions,
who led fighting for liberating Adibasis and their rights from British colonial authority and their
local agents (upper caste Zamindars) in 1885.119 The British East India Company rulers and their
agents had been torturing, persecuting, and marginalizing Adibasis in the name of production and
development. The violence spread all over Adibasi communities, and they became refugees by
traveling from one place to another place as they were displaced. They settled in different parts of
the Indian sub-continent. Many of them settled in the mining area.120
Adibasi communities in the Phulbari mining area are distinct in their way of life, cultures, and
languages from dominant Bangalee Muslim and Hindu populations, though they have coexisted
with them for a long time. Mezbah Kamal, a Bangladesh historian, argues that since the period of
Mughal in the 15th century, the boundaries of the region had been altered various times and became
part of at least three countries. Since the whole region was a part of the Indian sub-continent until
1947, people could migrate from one place to another place, and they could settle anywhere they
wanted.121 Therefore, it cannot be said that “you migrated from India or Pakistan and as such you
are not an Adibasi or Indigenous”. After becoming an independent country in 1971, Bangladesh
has not experienced much migration into its territory.122 However, the ethnic groups who are
claiming themselves as Adibasi in Bangladesh have lived in the region since before the
independence, even before the British invasion in 1757.123
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Therefore, the government’s position that ‘all people of the country are Indigenous’ or ‘there
are no Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh’ is invalid in the sense of ‘historical continuity’.124 With
respect to the notion of Indigenous peoples as the ‘people who came first’, I support the argument
made by the Indian representatives in an international forum that it is impossible to determine ‘who
came first’. Accordingly, the concept of ‘who came first’ or ‘historical continuity’ cannot be
applied in the Indian sub-continent context because of the continuous migration, absorption, and
differentiation of groups in the following centuries of colonization.125 Therefore, the question of
‘who came first’ is illogical in this context.126 Following Xaxa, there is no need to make distinction
between settlement in the country as a whole and settlement within its parts or regions. 127 The
Santals and other Adibasi groups may have settled in some territory where they live now later than
the Bangalee, but it cannot be said that their settlement in undivided Bengal is prior to that of the
groups.128 Therefore, to claim Indigenous status on this ground, a group can say they are the first
settlers of the area they live now from the time immemorial. Again, if we take the ‘historical
continuity’ criterion in Bangladesh's perspective, Adibasis pass the test of ‘Indigeneity’ as well.
Therefore, in my analysis, Adibasis of undivided Bengal are to be treated as Indigenous peoples
of independent Bangladesh.

4.4.1.4.

A Long Connection with Regions and Kinship Networks

Indigenous peoples are often demanding recognition as Indigenous peoples based on their long
connection with regions. They also wish to retain a distinct identity through practicing their
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traditions, cultures, and strong ties with lands.129 The interconnected factors of the relationship to
the land, language, and cultural practices appear to have some promises for discussing the
adaptability and resurgence of Indigenous communities.130 Wiessner suggests adding Indigenous
peoples’ ‘strong ties’ to their ancestral lands, whether they can reside in these territories or not.131
The self-identification and historical continuation criteria are not enough for a particular group to
establish an ‘Indigenous’ identity; they need close ties
to their lands, with identities and languages distinct
from

the dominant

international

context,

groups.132
James

Considering the
Anaya

identifies

‘Indigenous peoples’ as distinct communities with
extensive kinship networks that clearly distinguish
them from ‘minority groups’ by highlighting the
continued colonial domination of homelands as well as
the ancestral roots of the ‘pre-invasion inhabitants’.133
Their extensive kinship networks and continually
devising cultural traditions also form an Indigenous
Figure 20: Sal forest near Adibasi hamlets
Photo: Fieldwork, 2016

identity. Moreover, multi-functionality of kinship

bonds governs Adibasi society and build their social relations.134 Santals and other Adibasi
communities had been living in the mining area before the victims of displacement arrived there.
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They could have settled comfortably in the region because of their kinship networks.135 Kinship is
the main basis of family organization.136 Once an Adibasi group settled in one place, other relatives
of that group followed that group. They started clearing the jungle for houses and carried their
livelihoods by hunting, gathering wild foods from the forest, and working as agricultural
laborers.137 However, they now became victims of marginalization and deprivation. A Santal
farmer was recalling his childhood memories: “the area was full of forest, and now you can barely
see the forest. Many Bangalees migrated here lately from different places, cut trees for settling and
created cultivated lands. Now it has become a crowded area with agricultural lands.” He added,
“If you see any community live close to a forest and if they depend their livelihood on it, you will
understand that they are Indigenous peoples.”138
D. Baske, an elderly Santal woman in her 80s, stated that Adibasis have a long connection with
forests because their livelihood depends on forests where they hunt animals, gather honey, wild
fruits, and flowers. They celebrate ‘hunting and gathering day’ every year as part of their continued
customs, which they call Sohrai. In Santal tradition, Sohrai means ‘throw of a lance’.139 Their
religious beliefs, rituals, and sacred histories also are based on forest dwellings, and they are called
‘forest dwellers’, and ‘hunters and gatherers’. Indigenous peoples have a stable relationship with
the forest; only they understand managing and maintaining the ecological value of forests. D.
Baske contended that when Bangalees started moving in this place, they settled in forest and
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agricultural Khas (demesne) lands140, they began cutting forests, and they acquired colossal forest
lands afterward. Bangalee refugees do not understand the ecological and biodiversity of the forest
inhabitants.141 Though their livelihoods mostly depend on agricultural products and activities,
Adibasis continued their customary traditions of hunting and gathering. Therefore, in D. Baske’s
view, Adibasis created a sincere relationship with forests.
Moreover, Adibasis practice distinct rituals that are entirely different from Bangalees, and they
continue what their ancestors used to follow. Ram Soren described Santals’ rituals of welcoming
a newborn into the family. When a child is born, the mother and the newborn both are bathed with
neem leaves. The child is welcomed in the world by boiling neem leaves and cooking traditional
dessert. Adibasis believe that neem leaves are beneficial for human health, and they use that for
their traditional medicinal purposes. Though most Santals are not formally educated, they have a
distinct system of naming, which cannot be seen in any other community in Bangladesh. Ram
Soren, a local Santal leader, stated that his name was taken after his paternal grandfather’s name.
He added, “when I was born, I got my grandfather’s secret name with the formal ritual ceremony.
My father got his name in the same way; my sons got their names similarly.” Cheroben described
the naming rituals in more detail. He has two sons and two daughters. His elder son got his secret
name from his paternal grandfather (Cherobin’s father), his second son got from his maternal
grandfather. If he would have a third son, he would take his paternal grandfather’s younger
brother’s name. Similarly, his first daughter got from her paternal grandmother’s secret name, and
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his second daughter got her maternal grandmother’s secret name. Through this traditional process,
these names would never be lost, and the tradition will be kept alive for generations. This is one
of the customs through which Santals maintain their kinship networks.
4.4.1.5.

Historical Experience and Vulnerability

Erica-Irene Daes, the UN Chairperson-Rapporteur on the Concept of Indigenous, defines
‘Indigenous peoples’ as “the descendants of the original inhabitants of conquered territories
possessing a minority culture and recognizing themselves as such”.142 Wiessner contemplates
Daes’s suggested factors of voluntary distinctiveness, self-identification, and recognition, as well
as the experience of oppression as a reasonable functional definition.143 Kingsbury’s ‘historical
experience of vulnerability, severe disruption, dislocation, oppression or exploitation’ of selfidentified distinct communities who form non-dominant classes in the society is common
everywhere in the world. Santals, Mundas, and other Adibasis from plain lands always live in the
Northern part of Bangladesh and are being persecuted and marginalized from the very beginning
of the civilization, and it got more intense as time passed.144 Adibasi people in Bangladesh form
the non-dominant sectors of society as against the majority Bangalees.145 Their historical situation
can be labeled as politically powerless, legally unprotected, economically inferior, numerically
inferior, and victims of violence.146 Their present psychological states also support the ‘powerless’
class in every aspect of society. For example, when I was talking to Cherobin about the
marginalization of Adibasis, he told me that though Adibasis are citizens, they cannot become a
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‘Prime Minister’ of the country147, but the Bangladesh Constitution has no racial, ethnic, religious
and gender-based exclusionary provision.148 Article 28(4) of the Constitution states: “Nothing in
this article shall prevent the nation-state from making special provisions in favor of women or
children or for the advancement of any backward section of citizens.” Any citizen who is qualified
for the election to become a member of the parliament (MP) can also become the Prime Minister
of Bangladesh with the support of the members of the parliament.149 Cherobin feels that though
Adibasis are Bangladeshi citizens, they are not actual citizens. They would never be entitled to get
similar opportunities or benefits as Bangalees get, although the Bangladesh Constitution
guarantees equality for everyone.150 As a member of a marginalized and non-dominant group of
the country, his experience was never good dealing with Bangalees and government officials. His
sense of the above state of mind is for their long history of marginalization, deprivation, and
discrimination. He thinks the situation would never be better because Bangladesh is a Muslim and
Bangalee majority country where they dominate everything.151
S. Baske was worried about losing his land to powerful local Bangalees. His grandfather’s
property was grabbed by a Bangalee neighbor by making a forged deed after his death. One of his
Santal neighbors lost substantial agricultural lands recently in the same way.152 This trend is
happening everywhere in Bangladesh among Adibasis.153 D. Baske claimed that Santals and
Mundas were owners of lands, but now most of the lands of the area are owned by Bangalees,
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which they acquired through deception.154 In Bangladeshi land law, a Santal’s or any Adibasi’s
land cannot be transferred or sold to a Bangalee. Adibasi authority and government administrative
body must endorse the document, and then only it can be possible to sell to a Bangalee, 155 which
was not followed in this case. Most of the Adibasis are not formally educated and do not understand
the land-related laws, and many Bangalees, mainly those who migrated later, take this chance to
occupy. Few of my Adibasi respondents confirmed that the relationship between Adibasi and local
Bangalees are good except bohiragoto. They do not want to understand the traditional life of
Adibasi and their culture. Furthermore, there are several incidents where refugees dispossessed
Adibasi people from their lands by creating false ownership documents.156 This is how Adibasi
lands are grabbed by powerful local Bangalees.
Some of the Adibasi and non-Adibasi respondents of my research also confirmed that
Bangalees are buying and alienating Adibasi lands through unlawful means. There were multiple
incidents that happened in this area where clever Bangalees deceived and tempted Adibasis and
offered more price than existing land prices. As they are unaware of land laws and rights, Adibasis
agreed to sell their lands to those Bangalee land grabbers. Adibasis get the agreed prices, but the
size of properties being sold are written wrong by Bangalees. For example, instead of writing one
bigha, they write one-acre157 in the registered land deed. Adibasis understand the trick during the
transfer of the ownership, but by that time, they lose vast properties. Adibasis demand that the
government should establish a separate land commission to deal with the situation. K. Kisku, who
works for an NGO that deals with Adibasi matters in the area, confirmed that he had seen several
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instances where Adibasi lands were grabbed illegally by local Bangalees through deception. To
remedy the situation, Adibasis need a separate land commission so that they can return their lost
territories, which were grabbed by Bangalees.158
S. Baske pointed out that Adibasis feel very upset and marginalized because they do not get
proper justice from the government administration. Corruption in local administration and courts
still exist. People who tend to grab property illegally, they are wealthy and able to bribe officers
who deal with registration and transfer of lands. Most of the Adibasis became poor by losing their
lands through illegal processes, and now they are bound to work as day laborers. Adibasis are so
frustrated that they stopped going to the court because they do not get justice. Judges and
government officials help those Bangalees who grab Adibasi lands illegally through corruption.159
Adibasi communities feel so marginalized due to these ongoing incidents that they think that their
all land will be lost eventually.
A recent incident in Bangladesh supports ‘vulnerability’, ‘oppression,’ and ‘exploitation’
criterion of Adibasi communities. When I was conducting interviews with Adibasis in my field
area, at least two of the respondents informed me of their concern about the situation in Gaibanda,
another northern district of Bangladesh, where Santals are living for ages. My respondents
contended that the government would displace Adibasis from their households and agricultural
lands of the sugarcane farming area because they are powerless and discriminated which turned
into reality in a few months. I have seen the news and a video on social media on November 6,
2016. By that time, I had already returned to Canada. Several media reported that the incident
happened after an eviction drive conducted by a sugar mill management in Gaibandha. The clash
erupted when the Santal people prevented them, police opened fire and killed three Santal men
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and injured many others. A video became viral on social media that shows a platoon of armed
police march towards an abandoned Santal village and set fire on the houses of the Santal people.
Consequently, the Santals were evicted from their ancestral lands and became refugees.
The issue arose when the residents were notified by the government administration (sugar mill
management) to leave their houses saying that they are living in government land and have to leave
the place. The government had acquired the area from the Santals in 1962 for sugarcane cultivation
for the Rangpur Sugar Mill. There was a provision in the deed that the land would be returned to
its original owners if the mill did not in operation. However, it is evident that the eviction notice
was served to Santals for the interest of influential people as the mill authority started leasing the
area to influential local leaders and rich people for the past years.160 Local rich people are
cultivating paddy, potato, mustard, and other agro-products in leased lands. After hearing the
persecution of Santal people, an honorable judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh concluded
that the sugar mill management had no right to lease out the acquired land.161 Since the mill was
not in operation, Santals living in the area was legal. Santals in the area feared getting arrested.
Consequently, they cannot go to their house, cannot go to the temple which has been destroyed.
Children cannot go to school as the school was destroyed too. Though the government offered to
rehabilitate them, their demand is to make sure that their lands and households are returned to
them. Adibasi communities are not satisfied with the government and the highest court’s statement
because of the long-standing injustice they have been experiencing.162
4.4.1.6.

Establishing Non-dominance in the Society

An interview based report titled “Attacks on the Santal Community: Violence Spurred by Greed for Land”
published on November 24, 2016 in The Daily Star. See online: <https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/the-bigpicture/violence-spurred-greed-land-1319371>
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Many Indigenous groups around the world are persecuted and discriminated against due to their
unbending mindset of not being assimilated with dominant groups, and consequently, they are
often keeping themselves isolated. One of the essential features of Indigeneity, as stated in the
definition under international law, is establishing non-dominance in society. Virginius Xaxa argues
that the aspects of marginalization are built into the definition of Indigenous peoples. The use of
the term Adibasi to mean different ethnic or tribal groups other than dominant people in Indian
society have some validity in the sense of marginalization.163 It is argued that only those people
who have been subjected to domination, subjugation and assimilation with dominant groups have
come to constitute the characteristics of the Indigenous peoples. Nonetheless, the use of the term
Adibasi or Indigenous people to designate certain category of people and not the other category
clearly reveals that the aspect of margination works to identify Indigenous peoples.164
Adibasi communities in the Phulbari mining area have formed a non-dominant section of
people which I observed during my field activities. I had visited at least fourteen Adibasi hamlets
during my field activities and observed that local Adibasis are dominated by Bangalees. Though
Adibasis are the majority in the possible affected mining area, they segregate in the whole area
and do not have a mechanism to establish their dominance. I observed a local government election
(Union Council election), which was held during my stay in field area. My landlady165 was running
for reserved Woman Member seat in the election. While campaigning for her, I got a chance to
visit some surrounding Adibasi hamlets. In most cases, my landlady was telling people that
Adibasis are dominated by Bangalees in Adibasi areas everywhere, which should be changed. In
Khanpur Union, most of the members including the Chairman of the Council are Bangalee,

163

Xaxa, supra note 120 at 3591.
Ibid. at 3590
165
She is also my key informant’s wife and my research assistant’s mother.
164

178

although Adibasi population constitutes around fifty percent of the total population of the Union.166
There was only one Adibasi competitor for the Chairman position, and he achieved a few votes.
So, Adibasis did not vote for him, they voted and elected a Bangalee as their local government
chairman, who was also elected in the previous tenure.
A Santal leader claimed that the quota system for the ‘backward section of people’ in public
jobs167 is not maintained accurately. Even if it is maintained, the opportunity is not distributed
equally among all Adibasi groups. Some Adibasi groups are getting more privileges than other
groups.168 He also said: “We are marginalized among marginalized. I saw many graduates in our
community. Getting no suitable job, they are working in the garments industry with low wages.
Since they have nobody in the job fields, they would not get a job. Therefore, our people are
discouraged from going for higher study.”169 A Santal elderly woman was also explaining her
experience: “There was a government financial aid sanctioned in my name, but that financial help
had never reached to me”.170 She contended that the aid had gone to a Bangalee Union Council
member, but nobody came forward to talk about this injustice. She thinks that she had been
discriminated against because of her poverty, gender, race, and ethnicity as a Santal. She also
claimed that if she was a Bangalee, it might not happen to her.171
Cherobin Hembrom expressed his frustration by stating that majority and dominant Bangalees
want to dispossess and displace powerless Adibasis by alienating their lands. Adibasis, in plain
lands and hill areas, everywhere are being oppressed by Bangalees and as a whole by the
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government.172 Cherobin pointed out that some people from the dominant Bangalee community
have already started to insist that ‘Adibasis are refugees’. Through social media, they are
campaigning that Adibasis came from another country and they should be swept away from
Bangladesh which I observed in several occasions. Many people campaign that ‘there must not be
other religions than Islam in Bangladesh. People from other religions must leave the country.’173
Cherobin also mentioned, “if Adibasis are not being educated, they would be more backward and
would not be able to economically, socially, politically and culturally develop themselves”. He
claimed that if this continues, Adibasis and other marginalized groups will have to leave their
ancestral and motherland.174
In some places, especially in Bangalee populated areas, Adibasis are not allowed in restaurants.
Some local Bangalees, especially refugees, hate Adibasis due to their traditional lifestyle. They
think that Adibasis are dirty because they eat some wild animals which are forbidden to
Muslims.175 He shared his experience of a similar incident that he went through at his young age.
He protested and had a heated verbal fight with the owner of a restaurant, but the propensity still
exists. Jovan Baske was sharing a similar experience he had faced in a restaurant in the nearby
bazaar when he and his teammates went to play football. S. Baske said, “there are some Bangalees
who still hate Adibasis. For example, if I am invited to a Bangalee family, they make separate food
and serve them with separate plates, which we find very offensive.”176 From the above
circumstances, it is clear that Adibasis occupy a position of non-dominance in their societies and
the country.
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4.4.1.7.

Socio-economic and Cultural Differences

Socio-economic and cultural differences are one of the essential criteria for being Indigenous.177 I
find Indigenous peoples are distinct in a geographical territory regarding socio-economic and
socio-cultural contexts. They need to maintain their traditional cultural practice and socioeconomic activities in their traditional way. Indigenous peoples can be singled out through their
economic events, festivals, rituals, expressions, folklore, and other cultural events. Adibasi
communities in the Phulbari mining area are distinct from other ethnic groups considering their
socio-cultural differences. S. Baske contends that their cultures such as traditional dances, songs,
histories, arts, crafts, musical instruments, and customary governance, are entirely different from
the Bangladeshi majority Bangalee community.178 He also added that Adibasis observe festivals
and rituals following their ancestors’ traditions. Adibasi culture and historical presence are
portrayed in their artworks on walls in their homes. Most of the Adibasi families I observed during
my fieldwork have mud houses, and they display their artwork on the walls. Moreover, most
Adibasi communities play musical instruments that they make themselves.179 When I met H. Pahan
for an interview, he was crafting a traditional hunting arrow using bamboo and wood in his yard.
Clinton Hembrom, my research assistant and guide, went towards him and started talking to him
in Sadri180 language. Although Clinton is a Santal boy, he can speak in other local languages. He
introduced me to H. Pahan. I was overwhelmed by his hospitality. He went inside and got a couple
of chairs for us and offered food. I observed his small house which is built of mud. Before starting
the interview, I requested him to let me go inside the house. I saw some musical instruments such
as traditional drums and drifts, flutes, traditional dresses such as dhoti (loincloth), and some
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traditionally made hunting tools inside the house. The Santal people use two types of drums while
playing music in their festivals and rituals, such as Tamak and Tumdah.181 Tiriao (the flute) is
considered the most important Santal traditional instrument. The Santal dance and music
traditionally revolved around Santal religious celebrations.182 Their music and dance both retain
connections to conventional ceremonies. The names of many Santal tunes and lyrics are derived
from the traditional rituals and sacred histories. For example, Sohrai tunes were those sung at the
Sohrai festival.183
Most of the Adibasi Parban (festivals) are associated with the traditional agricultural activities
which fall within their agricultural cycle, i.e., from sowing to harvesting. N. Pahan, another Munda
farmer, described Munda rituals and festivals. The Munda community celebrates Ashari Puja
(worship of planting crops), Nobanno Utsab (celebration of harvesting new paddies), Karam Puja
(worship of karam/karma Lord/God), Poush Parban (festival of making cake with new paddies
that includes hunting and gathering), Fagua Puja (celebrate with flowers), Chaitali or Shahrol
Puja (observed with new shaal trees). The Santal have some festivals such as Sohrai Parban (also
known as Bandana), Baha Parban, Dalpuja Parban, etc. that are entirely different from the
celebrations of Bangalees and other ethnic communities in surrounding areas. 184 Cherobin
Hembram stated that Santals also have Nobanno Utsab what they call irgondli (celebrate with new
paddies, traditional alcohol, and worship). In celebrating Sohrai, Yog Manjhi (communication
member of a Manjhi Parishad) takes the responsibility to organize. Baha is observed during the
blooming of Sal tree flowers. Santal women celebrate the Baha with traditional dances and water
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throwing among family members. Holi (Adibasis regard it as the celebration of love) is also
commemorated together with Baha festival, and Santals drink their traditional haria185. Santals
also celebrate starting of cultivating and sowing seeds that they call Ero. Cherobin was discussing
Santal’s traditional way of making haria. He said that haria is used in Sanatan Santals’ marriage
and other festivals and rituals sacredly, but Christian Santals do not use haria as their sacred
anymore.186
S. Mardi, a Santal farmer who had been converted to Christianity at his young age, stated that
they have two main religious festivals, such as Christmas and Easter Friday. People who converted
to Christianity celebrate these two religious festivals by combining them with Adibasi customs,
traditions and rituals. They also celebrate the English New Year’s Eve at the Church. Kali is
followed by most of Sanatan Santals.
A Santal oral story ‘Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri’ by Cherobin Hembrom
Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri187 are the first man and women in the Santals
religious belief system. Satan entered their personal affairs and started provoking them
to make haria (an alcohol/liquor), instructed them how to make it, and requested them
to drink it to feel better. They were convinced and drank it. After drinking haria, they
became drunk and could not recognize each other. They started making love with each
other. They continued the activities after drinking haria and discovered that Pinchu Buri
got pregnant and had a baby. However, before drinking haria, they did not know how to
do sex and had babies. This is how haria was introduced to Santal traditions and used in
weddings, festivals and other rituals.
Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri had seven sons and seven daughters. As they grew
up Pinchu Haram and Pinchu Buri became worried about the marriage of their children.
One day, the sons went for hunting, and the daughters went for gathering wild vegetables
and fruits for dinner to a forest. When the sons were returning from hunting deer, they
saw some women were dancing under a banyan tree but could not recognize them as they
saw them from a distance. The sons started singing ‘who are those fawn’ by indicating
those women. They were concentrated on music and dancing and were drinking haria.
Some of the drunken sons went to the forest for hunting again. Then the elder son started
185

Haria is a homemade alcohol with rice and honey, which is the oldest tradition of Adibasis. This is also called
rice beer.
186
Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.
187
Similar story of Adam and Eve in the Bible or Adom and Hawa in the Quran.

183

making love with the elder daughter, a younger son with a younger daughter, and three
couples got married after. Other sons and daughters were left unmarried. Pinchu Haram
and Pinchu Buri ordered and made a rule that marriage among siblings is prohibited. The
parents were worried about other children and found a solution to the problem. They
formed 12 clans such as Baske, Besra, Hansda, Hembram, Kisku, Mardi, Murmu, Soren,
Tudu, Chonde, Gondwar, Paanwariya. There are 164 sub-clans that exist among Santals.
Since then, the same clan/ inter-clan marriage is prohibited among Santals. Someone
from one clan has to marry from another clan. Also, a Santal cannot marry outside of
Santals clans.

The local Union Council chairman told me that he had chances to see Adibasi festivals and
rituals closely due to his responsibilities. According to him, Adibasis celebrate their ceremonies
and celebrations in their distinct style which are entirely different from dominant Bangalees. They
make haria and drink during their festivals. This is their ancient tradition, and local Muslim
Bangalees do not complain much and respect Adibasi traditions and customs, although alcohol is
prohibited in Islam.188
4.4.1.8.

Distinct Characteristics such as Language, Race, Sacred Oral Story, Religious
Functionality

Kingsbury and the World Bank identify that the surrounding community should also recognize
that the communities who are claiming to be Indigenous are maintaining distinctiveness and are
non-dominant in relation to other groups. Most of the Bangalee respondents of my research area
call the communities ‘Adibasi’ and recognize their distinct cultures, their different languages,
backwardness, their long connection with the traditional knowledge of cultivation and hunting
methods. Ethnic groups in Bangladesh who are claiming to be identified as Adibasi or Indigenous
continue to struggle for their rights and identity bearing in mind the international law context.
Though Adibasis in my research area have been living in miserable economic and social
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conditions, and are subjected to multiple sources of discrimination and exploitation, they retain
their traditions such as myths, belief system, languages, rituals, and other cultural practices which
they inherited from their ancestors. The overall situation of Bangladeshi Adibasi communities is
acutely disadvantaged compared to the rest of the country.189
Religious functionality is inseparably linked to Indigenous peoples’ distinct language and dialects,
their unique Indigenous expressions, sacred oral history, and myths, which can be traced in their
ceremonial festivities.190 The Adibasi groups in Indian sub-continent, especially in India and
Bangladesh, speak a variety of dialects belonging presumably to two main linguistic families, such
as, the Dravidian and the Austric.191 According to Prathama Banerjee, Adivasis such as the Santals
had been clearly asserting cultural, political, social and linguistic differences. When they were
resisting about their right to land ownership or when they clashed with Bangalees in Santal
Parganas, they were writing the language in their own script. Again, they resisted the competing
conversion efforts by both Hindu and Christian organizations by continuing with their own
worship and cultural practices.192 Prathama Bannerjee asserts, “Santal wall-paintings suggest the
European contemporary abstract art movement, and Santal oral stories suggested a surrealist
perspective. The primitiveness of Adibasis associated with every single abstract shape gleaned
from nature, leading to an infinite reproduction of meanings through the unitary sign.”193
One of my Santal respondents stated that they are a distinct ethnic group and have been
maintaining different cultural, religious, linguistic features than dominant Bangalees and other
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ethnic communities of Bangladesh. Santals also follow their diverse societal values and ethics
which make them distinct from others.194 G. Karmakar mentioned that the Karmakar people do
not convert their religions and they observe their ancestor's religion to date.195 Traditional religious
beliefs of Adibasis have been significantly altered as a result of the influence of Hinduism and
Christian missionaries.196 Cherobin Hembrom told me that many Santals had changed their
religion, but it did not affect their ancestor's way of observing festivals and rituals, but the
worshiping system is run at the Church.197 Therefore, Santals are divided into mainly two religions,
such as people who converted to Christianity and people who are following their ancient religious
beliefs (Sanatan Dharma). Inter-religion marriage became prohibited (a Christian Santal cannot
marry a Sanatan Santal), which is a new trend among this community. However, the prohibition
of the same clan marriage in the Santal community is ancient. For example, Santals have twelve
clans, a Hembram titled man or woman cannot get married to another Hembram titled man/woman.
He/she has to marry anyone from other Santal clans. Additionally, a Santal man or woman cannot
marry outside of the Santal community. If anyone does not follow the tradition, he/she will be
restricted in societal functionality.198 Notwithstanding having the religious barrier, I observed that
unlike Bangalees of Hindu religion, Adibasi communities in the mining area are devoid of any
caste system and there is no discrimination by birth among them.
In Santals’ wedding, the groom first chooses a bride, and then a date is set for the formal
wedding. There is a ritual of fixing twelve Bangladeshi taka dowry, which is given to the bride.
The twelve-taka tradition is carried through their twelve clans with separate titles (surname) in

194

Interview with T. Murmu, Dhakundah, Birampur, March 02, 2016.
Interview with G. Karmakar, Dhontola, Birampur, March 10, 2016.
196
Kamal, supra note 121.
197
Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.
198
Interview with Cherobin Hembrom, Dhanjuri Hamlet, Birampur, April 05, 2016.
195

186

Santal culture. Adibasis have traditions of turmeric session before marriage.199 S. Baske, who is
still a Sanatan, added that their marriage system is also different. Although Christian Santals have
no divorce system, there is an unusual custom of divorce among Sanatan Santals than other
communities, which is observed under mango trees, they call it Marwa (a hut is created with mango
leaves). There are some rituals that are observed following ancient traditions.200 In this traditional
ritual, Santal women dance, men, hold bows and arrows with their hands, and a sword is kept in a
hole.201
Adibasis had kept their ancestors’ customs
and traditions. Though Bangalee Hindus and
Sanatan religious Adibasis have similar kind of
worships, Adibasis have distinct systems of
observing.202

Adibasis

also

have

different

customs of observing rituals of a deceased person,
which is entirely different from Hindus and other
Bangalees. When an Adibasi dies, the Mandal of
a hamlet must take the responsibilities and
arrange the funeral rites. The Sanatan Santals
arrange Shraddha (obsequies) after a lapse of
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eight days following the death. In Shraddha, traditional food with haria is served. The Christian
Santals arrange prayer sessions within one to two years following the death.203
Adibasi communities in the mining region speak in their languages, although many of them
can also speak and understand Bangla language. Cherobin claimed that Santal people have a
distinct language with unique alphabets named Ol Chiki,204 which they speak among the
community members.205 When I have been taking interviews with Adibasis, my RA used to talk
to them first in Adibasi languages and made them comfortable to participate in my research.
Moreover, there were few instances, the respondent I chose to talk, could not speak in Bangla
language. The Santal people speak Santali language among their community members, but most
of the Santal people cannot read and write correctly in their distinct language. The Munda people
speak in Nagri language. They also speak in Sadri language which is a mixed language spoken by
some Adibasis such as Munda, Oraon, Mal Pahari people.206 J. Baske was remembering his
childhood and told me that he learned the Santali language in his school. He recalled a book named
Horhopon through which he learned the Santali alphabets and ancient Santal history. In Santali
language, horhopon means ‘sons of mankind’ and they call themselves horhopon.207 Through this
book, Santals can learn and know about their roots, their customs, and oral histories. 208 J. Baske
cannot write his language but can understand what is written in a book or a document. Like J.
Baske, most of the Santals and other Adibasi communities can speak in their languages, but they
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cannot read and write. Jovan told me that the mission schools in the Adibasi area do not introduce
anything in the Santali language.
All courses in the elementary schools to a higher level in the Adibasi area are taught only in
Bangla and English languages, although the government is trying to introduce six more Adibasi
languages such as Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Garo, Santali and Sadri languages. If the plan is
implemented, children from six Adibasi communities can have chances to practice their words in
school. Jovan was contending that their distinct culture, heritage, and identity would be lost if their
words are lost. Adibasi NGO worker K. Kisku was telling me that his NGO is trying to introduce
Adibasi languages at the community-level so that Adibasi people can learn. He added that his NGO
had established few schools in different Santal hamlets where Santali language in Roman scripts
is taught. He also added that the NGO and local Adibasi leaders are negotiating with the
government policymakers to improve the situation.209
Tattoos on body parts are Santal’s one of the oldest traditions in which people continue, though
the predisposition of making tattoos among converted Christian Santals is decreasing day by day.
There is a sacred oral history behind the art of making tattoos. Santals believe that if they do not
draw tattoos in body parts, snakes will attack them after death, and they cannot go to heaven.210
Santals have different tattoos for different parts of the body for different life stages. Santal men
scratch tattoos on their forearms and wrists, and women scratch on their necks and wrists as their
jewelry. Again, the number of these tattoos is always odd numbers because, in Santal cosmology,
odd signifies ‘life’ and even signifies ‘death’.211 Munda people continue inscribing three vertical
lines on their foreheads to mean their victory over Mughals.212
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There is a story of the Jado (deceiver) among Adibasi communities, which still exists in
society. Whenever a person dies in a hamlet, the Jado goes to that family and make them believe
that he knows some secret story about that deceased person. In most cases, he tells with curiosity
that he (deceased) was crying to him in his dream. He offers people to see his paintings with a
story that he painted before in papers or cloths. Then he shows a series of paintings where the
deceased person has been suffering in hell. He then asks for various sacred belongings to collect
so that he can heal his suffering. As the holy belongings are not found quickly, the family members
of the deceased must buy them from the Jado.213
There is another sacred story that continued through generations in Santal communities. Daini
and Dakin214 are seen as evil and wicked souls that transfer to people. The kabiraj215 usually goes
to a family, reads mantras216 and uses bustle, and later says that a Daini exists in a family staying
with someone he identifies who can harm all family members. The news is spread to all the family
members and hamlets. Later, people start blaming that person for any accident that happens in the
hamlet. Cherobin Hembrom is a specialized doctor on leprosy who has an experience of observing
Daini and Dakin. He went to a shalish (hamlet court) at a local Union council. The chairman of
the council requested Cherobin to look after the matter as he is a Bangalee and did not want to
interfere with Adibasi affairs. As he is a modern doctor, he does not believe in Daini and Dakin.
He interfered with the issue and asked people not to follow which ultimately affected his family
matters.217 I observe that Adibasis are much inclined to believe their sacred story and kinship
networks, which affect their traditional way of life.
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4.4.2. Cease to be Indigenous?
According to the World Bank’s Operational Policy 4.10, Indigenous peoples cease to hold
Indigenous status or identity by leaving their communities and entering an urban area.218 In this
regard, Jeff Corntassel argues that the realities of Indigenous refugees caused by war or state
policies of resettlement would harm their identity as ‘Indigenous’ through the policy established
by the World Bank.219 Considering the example of the CHT, the author asks whether Adibasi
communities who were displaced by the state-induced Bangalee settlement in the region would be
regarded as Indigenous or not under the World Bank definition despite their illegal removal from
the area.220 Corntassel also argues that if a group even pursues statehood, as Adibasi communities
in the CHT in Bangladesh, or Mohawk Nations in Canada and US have shown their intention
various times in their history, they would cease to be Indigenous in this conceptualization.221 So,
if any Indigenous community or all groups in a geographical location pursue statehood and form
a state, they would lose their Indigeneity.
In India, it can be effortlessly argued that some Scheduled tribes ceased to be Indigenous, and
have become castes or something else, and this has happened extensively elsewhere as well.222
Although self-identified Indigenous peoples of India are recognized in the Constitution as
‘Scheduled Tribes’, ‘Scheduled Castes’, and ‘Other Backward Castes’, their claims have never
been established as ‘Indigenous peoples’ or ‘Adibasis’. A similar situation can be seen in
Bangladesh, where self-identified Indigenous peoples are called and named ‘small ethnic groups’
or ‘tribes’. In Russia, under new law ‘Indigenous peoples’ are treated as only those ethnic groups

218

The World Bank, Operational Policy 4.10. Online:
https://policies.worldbank.org/sites/ppf3/PPFDocuments/090224b0822f89d5.pdf
219
Corntassel, supra note 53 at 87.
220
Ibid. at 87-88.
221
Ibid. at 80.
222
Beteille, supra note 10.

191

living in the territories of their ancestors, enjoying a traditional lifestyle, and whose populations
remain under 50,000, are known as ‘small’, ‘numerically small peoples’, or ‘small-numbered
peoples’.223
Most of the Adibasi communities, especially the Santal people, in my research area, are leaving
their ancestral religions and converting to Christianity.224 Not all but most of them left their
ancestral Sanatan Dharma and began practicing new religion by assimilating with their old
religious deities and rituals.225 Christian Adibasis in the area do not stop practicing their traditional
festivals, but they practice them under the supervision of the ‘Father’ (priest) of the Church during
Easter, Christmas, and the English New Year.226 Due to the conversion of religion, the Church is
involved in Adibasi festivals. K. Kisku was telling me that the government is helping poor Adibasis
for celebrating Christmas, although Sanatan Adibasis are not receiving any financial help from the
government227.
Moreover, they follow their distinct customary laws and traditions regarding ‘panchayet
shalish’ (hamlet court) system, inheritance, marriages, born and naming, oral history. Though most
Adibasis still make and drink traditional haria in every occasion and trying to be distinct from
Bangalee communities228, I observe that many Adibasis are leading towards accommodating the
Bangalee way of life and their new religious cultures into Adibasi cultures. The former Chairman
of the Phulbari sub-district, who was one of the central leaders of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon,
was telling me with frustration:
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“Adibasis themselves do not want to be ‘Adibasi’ because they are so marginalized that
they cannot protest publicly. Moreover, they are losing their distinctiveness by the
influence of the Church and NGOs. Their main identity was their culture, their livelihood,
dress, languages, festivals, rituals, etc., but due to converting into Christianity, they now
have to follow the Church’s rule and the Father’s order. Churches and NGOs are polluting
their distinctiveness by engaging them into different religious functionalities and detaching
them from Santal’s customs and traditions.” 229
He observed that one of his friends who has a close relationship with Christian missions, he
started introducing himself as a Christian, not an Adibasi. They must struggle to keep their identity
safe from the polluting influence of the dominant culture in society.230 There was a case found in
the Birampur Land Revenue Office where a man named Kanai Nunua was claiming himself as a
Santal man and was trying to buy and register a piece of land from another Santal man. When the
land officer informed a Mandal to confirm that if this man is a Santal or not. The Mandal reported
the officer that ‘Nunua’ is neither a Santal clan (title) nor any of the Adibasi clans in Bangladesh.
Therefore, Kanai Nunua cannot be an Adibasi. Later it was proved that he was a Bangalee man
who tried to forge the land deed.231
Furthermore, considering the current debate of the existence of Adibasi in pre-colonial settings
in Bangladesh, I argue that the Indigeneity of people would not be suspended if any community is
forced to leave their ancestral place and resettle involuntarily in another location of the same
geographical area. However, the question arises whether those communities be still considered as
Indigenous to a region or country if they are migrated from another area that was not colonized or
occupied by colonial rulers? Giving the above instance, are they going to lose their ‘Indigenous’
or ‘Adibasi’ identity? What about not speaking their distinct languages or becoming economically
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stable and educated? Alternatively, can we say, once an Indigenous is always an Indigenous, no
matter what happens after? What about the self-expressed identity of people who are native
speakers of an Indigenous language, do live in a community with rituals and social institutions
different from that of the cosmopolitan culture, and continue to adopt markers of ethnicity such as
hairstyles and clothing and who nevertheless do not identify as Indigenous? 232

4.4.3. Recognition Politics in Bangladesh
At the international level, Bangladesh has ratified the ILO Convention No. 107 on 22 July
1972, which is now closed for further ratification but remains valid for those countries that have
ratified it but have not ratified the ILO Convention No. 169. Since Bangladesh has not ratified
Convention No. 169, the government has obligations to adopt provisions for Indigenous and Tribal
populations under the Convention no. 107. Bangladesh became a party to the International
Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination in June 1979. Bangladesh is one of the
eleven countries that abstained from voting when the UNDRIP was adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 2007, reasoning that there are no ‘Indigenous peoples’ in Bangladesh, and ‘therefore,
Bangladesh has no responsibility to implement its international law obligation’.233 Nevertheless,
Bangladesh has promised several times to work together with Indigenous peoples for the
implementation of the UNDRIP.234 As Bangladesh is a member state of the UN, the country is an
automatic party of the UDHR and the UN charter. In this regard, Bangladesh is obliged by the
UN’s mandates. The Bangladesh government has ratified the ICESCR on 5 October 1998 and the
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ICCPR in 2000 but did not sign optional protocols of both covenants. The covenants have provided
declarations and reservations upon ratification, accession, or succession for each of the
countries.235 The ICESCR has delivered the obligation for the Bangladesh government to
implement at the country level. Article 1 under the ‘Declarations’ states: “It is the understanding
of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh that the words “the right of selfdetermination of Peoples” appearing in this article apply in the historical context of colonial rule,
administration, foreign domination, occupation, and similar situations.” The Declarations also
state that the government has to “implement the said provisions in a progressive manner, in keeping
with the existing economic conditions and the development plans of the country”, and the
government has to adopt the Covenant’s provision in the Constitution and the relevant legislation
of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government has made reservations on specific provisions236 which
Germany and the Netherlands strongly opposed.237 The ICCPR also provides some directions
towards Bangladesh to implement its guiding principles.
As part of international law obligation and to end the debate on Indigenous or Adibasi identity
and recognition of Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs formed a
committee in 2009 to identify the ethnic groups in Bangladesh.238 Executive heads of all districts,
who were asked to make a list of Indigenous groups, sent a list of 228 community names collected
from the whole country to the Ministry. After carefully examining the list (excluding 27
Indigenous communities that are listed in the 2010 SEGCI Act) and visiting some places to identify
the ethnic groups, the committee by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs finally decided to include a
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total of 50 Indigenous groups on the list.239 However, Indigenous organizations and activists are
not satisfied with the initiatives taken by the Ministry, which they believe are ill-motivated and
attempt to deny Indigenous people real recognition.240 In 2013, the Bangladesh government preempted a legislative proposal entitled “Bangladesh Adibasi Rights Bill” that had been submitted
by the Caucus, aimed at ensuring the recognition of Adibasis as ‘Indigenous peoples’ or ‘Adibasi’
and protecting their rights.241 However, the bill was never tabled by the government in the
Parliament, arguing that if the bill was presented as a private bill, “the recognition of the ethnic
minorities as Adibasi” would be a political issue, which the government wants to avoid.242
N. Mardi, a Santal woman from an Adibasi hamlet of the mining area, claimed that the
government is trying to disregard the existence of Adibasi in Bangladesh. Moreover, the
government is assimilating Adibasi communities into Bangalee cultures so that Adibasis forget
their traditional practices.243 Again, their culture, language, spiritual belief, customs, festivals,
everything is different from dominant Bangalees. Adibasi communities of the mining area are
diverse; for example, their physical appearance is different, they speak in distinct languages, they
wear their traditional dresses, celebrate traditional rituals, make and drink haria, their men and
women work in the field, they hunt animals and gather foods from the forest. I observe that all
characteristics of Indigenous peoples in internationally accepted definitions are also found in
Adibasi communities in my research area.
N. Mardi protested the government’s position and demanded the government to recognize all
self-identified Adibasi communities as the universally accepted term ‘Indigenous peoples’ or the
Pallab Chakma and Bablu Chakma, “Bangladesh IW 2019” in IWGIA.
Online:https://www.iwgia.org/en/bangladesh/3446-iw2019-bangladesh
240
Ibid.
241
Binota Moy Dhamai and Sanjib Drong, “Bangladesh” in The Indigenous World-2014, (Copenhagen: IWGIA,
2014) at 324.
242
Ibid.
243
Interview with N. Mardi, Lakshipur, Phulbari, March 07, 2016.
239

196

locally accepted term ‘Adibasi’ so that the rights of marginalized communities of the country are
protected.244 Another Santal elderly woman strongly opposed the government’s forced term ‘small
ethnic minority’ and ‘tribes’, because it will not guarantee any rights embodied in international
law. She contended that most of Adibasis are not aware of the rights.245 Adibasi leader Rob Soren
rejected the term ‘small ethnic minority’ which, according to him, is an assault on all Adibasis of
Bangladesh. Adibasis feel dissatisfaction with the imposition of this term on them. He added that
he would be happy to be known as a ‘Santal’ and as an ‘Adibasi/Indigenous’, but not as an
‘upojati’, a ‘tribes’ nor as a ‘small ethnic minority’. He claimed that if there is a ‘small’, there
should be a ‘large’. Adibasis are proud of their ancient history, and they would not tolerate being
identified as other than Adibasi or Indigenous peoples.246 B. Murmu expressed his anger in the
following words: “A huge number of dominant Bangalees think that ‘Santal’ is the name of an
animal. They do not consider the Santal and other Adibasi communities as human beings. They do
not want to understand that the Santal is one of the earliest ethnic communities in the region.”247
T. Murmu, a school teacher from the Santal community, told:
“We want recognition as Adibasi. There are different ethnic groups living in this area. I am
a Santal; nobody can denounce my identity. Now the question is- if Santals are Adibasi or
not. Identity should emerge from ethnicity, not religion. I have no problem if the
government wants to recognize me as a Santal. Besides Santals, I want all other
communities to be recognized as such.”248
Adibasis in Bangladesh are claiming that since they have clear distinctiveness regarding
linguistic, cultural, and socio-political means and they identify themselves as ‘Indigenous’, they
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demand a separate status in the constitution as ‘Adibasi’.249 Adibasi farmer P. Murmu claimed that
the term ‘Adibasi’ can still be found in many government official documents. He contended that
governments are never in favor of marginalized Adibasi people; dominant Bangalees are getting
all benefits and opportunities. Muslims and Hindus of the area get financial help during their
religious festivals, but Adibasis are given very little importance.250 Political leaders tempted
Adibasis with various mandates during the election times, and after getting elected, they forget
everything they promised. K. Kisku claimed:
“We organized seminars, assembly, workshops demanding to incorporate Adibasi
recognition in the Constitution. When the government called Adibasis as ‘small ethnic
minority’, they felt assaulted and marginalized. Many Adibasis fought in 1971 for the
independence of the country. However, the government is still confused about their
position, which is unfortunate.”251
Adibasis who are aware of their rights and recognition are concerned about the role of the
Adibasi leaders to push the government for their recognition. Cherobin Hembram blamed Adibasi
leaders and organizations who supposed to help Adibasi; instead, they are harming the rights of
Adibasi communities since they have no courage to go against the government's decision but agree
with them in exchange of their personal benefits. He claimed that there are four Adibasi members
in the Parliament, but they never protested when the bill (he meant amendment of the Constitution)
was tabled and passed. They could have walked out or could have said to the government, “suspend
me, but recognize Indigenous people by inserting clear provisions in the constitution”. Moreover,
Adibasi leaders are blamed for the recent language debate.252 The government pre-empted to
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introduce six Adibasi languages in the schools of Adibasi regions. Yet, the project is suspended
for the Santali language; other languages would be implemented soon. Santal leaders are divided
into two groups, some leaders are supporting writing in Roman alphabets, and some are supporting
Ol Chiki. There is also another group that wants to write Santali language in the Bangla alphabets.
They argue that it would be easier to learn.253 Rob Soren was telling me that people who converted
Christianity want Roman alphabets because the church and priests wish to it in that way. The
supporters of Roman alphabets argue that Santals have never written alphabets, and then it was
scripted in Roman alphabets through which everything can be pronounced easily. When Ol Chiki
was introduced in the 1920s, which is close to Sanskrit scripts, Santals became happy. Soon, they
understood that there are many words that cannot be pronounced with Ol Chiki. If Santali language
is written with the Bangla alphabets, the language would be lost forever.254 My observation is that
the debate is helping the state to misrecognize the community.
4.4.3.1.

Only Bangalees are “People” in Bangladesh?

Despite strong demands from Indigenous peoples to be recognized as ‘Adibasi’, “all ‘people’
shall be regarded as Bangalees as a nation”255 provision was inserted in the Constitution through
the 16th Amendment in September 2014 which was done to revive the spirit of the First
Constitution.256 By incorporating this clause, the government intended to include them as dominant
Bangalees, which is a threat to further self-determination of Adibasi or Indigenous peoples in
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Bangladesh. The insertion of the above clause in the Constitution ensured the political and cultural
dominance of Bangalees within the state.257 The supremacy of ‘Bangalee’ nationality over all
ethnic groups of Bangladesh is a disavowal of cultural distinctiveness.258 Although the Supreme
Court of Bangladesh in a recent (July 2017) judgment stated that the 16th Amendment is invalid,
as such, the provisions it inserted in the Constitution would be invalid as well.259 Therefore, the
assimilation process would not be stopped.
Manabendra Narayan Larma (also known as MN Larma) was an Adibasi leader from the
Chakma community. He was the only legislature member of Bangladesh’s inaugural parliament
from the CHT. When ‘all people of Bangladesh shall be regarded as Bangalee’ provision was
inserted in the draft Constitution in 1972, he protested.260 Larma stated in the parliament:
“Under no definition or logic can a Chakma be a Bangalee or a Bangalee be a Chakma. A
Bangalee living in Pakistan cannot become or be called a Punjabi, Pathan, or Sindhi, and
any of them living in Bangladesh cannot be called a Bangalee. As citizens of Bangladesh,
we are all Bangladeshis, but we also have a separate ethnic identity, which, unfortunately,
the Awami League (the then ruling party) leaders do not want to understand.”261
Most of my respondents identified and called themselves ‘Adibasis’, not ‘Bangalees’. They
have similar frustrating feelings about what MN Larma expressed 48 years ago regarding the nonrecognition of Adibasi peoples in Bangladesh. When I asked a Santal leader: “Will you feel
comfortable to be known as a Bangalee?” He replied:
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“I am not a Bangalee. We two (pointing at me) have dissimilarities in many senses. I am
proud to be a Bangladeshi, but I am not a Bangalee. Bangla is not my mother tongue. I
have my own language and ethnicity. Again, according to the Constitution, I am not a
‘people’. Then who I am? I have no existence in the country. All Adibasis rejected to be
‘Bangalees’.”262
Therefore, the Constitution extends a guarantee for Bangalees only. In the name of the
majoritarian rule, Adibasis have been marginalized politically, economically as well as
culturally.263 Adibasis feel that they have no power to protest and convey their messages to the
government as they are marginalized, and nobody hears their demands.264 A Santal elderly woman
stated:
“I heard the government is trying to tag us as Bangalee, but we call ourselves Adibasi
Munda. This is not only us, local Bangalees and other local ethnic communities also call
us ‘Adibasi’ in general. We are Adibasi because we are a distinct community, follow our
diverse societal values and ethics, we have our different language, culture, and religious
beliefs. Though we are living here time immemorial, we are marginalized in the country
and about to be displaced.”265
A Munda farmer who lives in the close vicinity of the mining area, started by introducing
himself as “I am a Munda as ‘people’ and Pahan266 is our clan title. I am an Adibasi, I am also a
citizen of Bangladesh, but I am no way a Bangalee.”267 Cherobin Hembrom told me with sheer
frustration that the government and policy-makers want to remove the term ‘Adibasi’ and
‘Indigenous’. Their intention is to make all Adibasis either ‘Bangalee’ or stateless ‘refugees’, as
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like Rohingya268. According to him, this is one kind of genocide. He said that he is against
eliminating the term ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ from Bangladesh. I saw tears in his eyes
when he was telling me that there will be no existence of Adibasis, not even the imposed term
‘small ethnic minority’ or ‘tribes’ in Bangladesh. As I mentioned earlier, Adibasis may speak in
Bangla, but it is only for their survival because if they want to survive in society, they must deal
with Bangalee people. Nonetheless, Adibasis are not Bangalees at all. They are Bangladeshi as
citizens, but can never be Bangalees. In Bangladesh, there are around 45 ethnic communities,
including Bangalee. There should not be any ‘sub-nation’ or ‘upojati’ or any type of class division
in a country. Protesting the government’s position, Cherobin stated: “if we are kkhudro nrigosthi
(small ethnic group), then Bangalees are brihot nrigoshthi (large ethnic group).”269 He then asked
by pointing at me, “if we call you ‘large ethnic group’, will you accept it? If you feel insulted or
dishonored, please stop using the ‘small ethnic group/minority’ term to mean us. We feel affronted
too if you call me by that name.”270
Ram Soren was telling me that the non-recognition of Adibasi is unfortunate through which
Adibasis would be more marginalized and persecuted. As citizens of the country, Adibasis have
similar rights as Bangalees have, which has been guaranteed by the Constitution under Article
27.271 The cultures Adibasis abide by, the customs they follow, the festivals they celebrate, the
language they speak, all are distinct and unique. When an Adibasi newborn comes to the Mother
Earth, he/she starts accommodating himself/herself into an Adibasi traditional belief system.
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Then how should they be regarded as Bangalees? Ram claimed, “I am a Santal, an Adibasi, not a
Bangalee, but a Bangladeshi citizen.”272
4.4.3.2.

Implied Recognition?

As part of the government’s plan to remove the term ‘Indigenous’ or ‘Adibasi’ from all the
laws, policies, documents and publications of the Bangladesh government, and to establish the
government’s claim of not having Adibasis in the country, several legislative amendments have
been passed by the government without consulting Indigenous peoples whose interests will be
directly affected.273 However, in Bangladeshi law, various provisions specifically use ‘Adibasi’ to
mean Indigenous peoples. The SEGCI Act 2010 uses the term ‘Khudro Nrigoshthi’ (small ethnic
minority) referring to Adibasi or Indigenous peoples. However, when explaining the meaning of
the term ‘Khudro Nrigoshthi’ in the definition section, the legislation uses the term ‘Adibasi’.274
Although the Bangladesh government is not directly using ‘Indigenous’ in their official
documents, they use ‘tribes’, ‘minor races, ‘ethnic sects and communities’ in the Constitution, and
other legal instruments are using ‘small ethnic minority’, ‘tribal peoples’, ‘aboriginal’, ‘hillman’,
‘Adibasi’, etc. Adibasis have argued that the state has impliedly recognized Adibasi or Indigenous
peoples in the country since the provisions of various legislations support their existence and their
distinctiveness. For example, the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act 1950 uses the term
‘Aboriginal Castes’ and ‘Tribes’; and states that “an Aboriginal cannot sell or transfer his/her land
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to a dominant Bangalee without the prior permission of state-endorsed authority”.275 The CHT
Regulation-1900 uses the term ‘Hillman’ to mean distinct ethnic people live in the CHT.
4.4.3.3.

Why does the Bangladesh Government not Recognize Indigenous Peoples?

The rights of Indigenous peoples embedded in international law would enable the communities
to fight for self-determination and some other rights, such as participate in the decision-making
process and access to natural resources. A local Bangalee leftist activist and a Santal young boy
both have similar tones regarding ‘reasons for not recognizing Indigenous peoples by the
Bangladesh government’. They think that if Adibasis get recognition, they will get similar
opportunities (in some cases, they will get more benefits) under international law obligations. In a
discussion earlier of this chapter, I have argued that although the country did not ratify the ILO
Convention No. 169, Bangladesh would be bound by the ILO Convention No. 107. Furthermore,
Bangladesh is concerned about implementing the UNDRIP at the country level, though the country
did not ratify the Declaration yet. However, the government’s eternal promise to the UN system
for the implementation of Indigenous peoples’ rights made a catastrophic situation for itself. If the
government accepts the UNDRIP any time, Adibasis of Bangladesh would be entitled to the right
to self-determination and access to political, legal, economic, and cultural rights. The government
may have concerns about several provisions, especially on Article 30 of the Declaration. Article
30 states:
“1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of Indigenous peoples
unless justified by relevant public interest or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by
the indigenous peoples concerned.
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2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the Indigenous peoples concerned,
through appropriate procedures and in particular through their representative institutions,
prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.”
Adibasi communities in the CHT are being suppressed through militarization and violence
created and instigated by settlers. The Bangalee settlers are brought from various parts of
Bangladesh to the CHT to stop Adibasis’s fight for self-determination. Since the government has
permanent military camps in the CHT region, which is the home of eleven Adibasi communities,
to suppress their self-determination struggle, it would not accept the UNDTRIP provision laid out
in the Article 30. However, there is a way to make the Bangladesh government accountable for
adopting the UNDRIP provisions in national legislation by implementing the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) commitments by the UN General Assembly in 2015. Bangladesh has
taken the National Action Plan to fulfill its commitment.276 Moreover, there are several goals,
targets, follow-up and reviews regarding Indigenous peoples277 the countries have to consider.
Until now, Indigenous peoples have not been consulted and engaged in this process, although a
meaningful engagement in national development is one of the significant components of
UNDRIP.278 So it is imperative that Adibasis of the country be engaged in SDGs, their voices are
heard, and their rights respected, protected and fulfilled in a spirit of UNDRIP.
According to an Adibasi leader, “If Adibasis get recognition, there will be no ethnic
discrimination. If they get constitutional recognition, the future generation will benefit.”279
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Another Adibasi teacher insisted that many communities throughout the world who are
marginalized and threatened to be abolished by losing their cultural, language, spiritual, and social
distinctiveness be recognized and identified as Indigenous peoples. Bangladeshi ethnic
communities are needed to be recognized by the government as Adibasi or Indigenous peoples
because they are largely marginalized. Another Adibasi leader was telling me during the interview
that how he and other Adibasi leaders negotiated in different occasions with government bodies
and protested the decision of recognition of Adibasi or Indigenous peoples. He argued that if the
trend of non-recognition continues and if Adibasis do not oppose, then there would be no Adibasi
or Indigenous peoples in Bangladesh. Adibasis would be endangered, as Adibasi lands are being
alienated by the majority and influential Bangalee people.280
The government officials of Bangladesh acknowledge ‘Adibasi’ as ‘Indigenous peoples’, and
for that reason, they are abstaining from using both ‘Indigenous’ and ‘Adibasi’ in their official
documents. Nevertheless, the Bangladesh government is not directly using ‘Indigenous’ in their
official documents, they use the near term ‘tribes’ in the Constitution, and other legal instruments
are using ‘tribal peoples’, ‘aboriginals’, ‘hillman’, ‘small ethnic minority’ and ‘Adibasi’.

4.5.

Construction of Indigenous Identity or Indigeneity

Indigenous identity adheres to ‘groups’ whose identity as distinct peoples necessitates a certain
lifestyle, threatened by nation-states or by corporations to Indigenous political and economic
structures281 where each person conforms to collectivity as a member of people, community,
ethnicity, tribe or nation.282 The evolution of using the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ has a long history
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in Europe and became popular during the process of decolonization.283 Groups who are struggling
for their identity as ‘Indigenous peoples’ find that any recognition of their rights by a state will not
be achieved easily.284 Through their continuous struggle, Indigenous peoples are now realizing
that they have the power to establish their identity and rights in society.285 In this way, identities
of Indigenous peoples are often delimited within the dominating systems of their states, although
sometimes they constitute a majority of the population.286
The increasing importance of the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is connected to the role of
transnational networks, which helps to construct, organize, and transmit resources that legitimize
and produce Indigeneity.287 The notion of Indigeneity is used to describe Indigenous peoples as
‘nations/peoples’ who struggle for their political autonomy. Altamirano-Jiménez’s ‘articulation of
Indigeneity’ theory explains how meanings are produced through the historical situation and social
practices.288 The root of the theory can be traced from Stuart Hall’s ‘the theory of articulation’ that
states, “it enables us to think how an ideology empowers people, enabling them to begin to make
some sense or intelligibility of their historical situation, without reducing those forms of
intelligibility to their socio-economic or class location or social position.”289 Stuart Hall insists that
identity bridges the gap between the personal and the public worlds; what he understands as the
relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.290
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According to Altamirano-Jimenez, “the concept of articulation is useful in characterizing the
diversity of peoples making Indigeneity claims and multi-scalar production of Indigeneity
politics.”291 One of the most important issues in the ‘articulation of Indigeneity’ is the question of
“who is included and who is excluded”. This process of inclusion and exclusion of Indigenous
identity have been shaped through colonial and post-colonial encounters with Indigenous
peoples.292 Altamirano-Jiménez shows how colonial powers, networks, host-states, and
international agencies have developed and imposed their narrow and exclusionary definitions of
Indigenous peoples. Contemporary nation-states use this strategy of forming exclusionary
definitions to deny the existence of Indigenous peoples in their territory.293 Consequently, the
continuous colonial process pulls Indigenous peoples away from their self-constructed identity
towards ‘Aboriginal’, ‘Indian’, ‘Scheduled Tribe’, ‘Scheduled Caste’, ‘Tribal’, ‘Native American’
or ‘Ethnic Minority’, which is an authoritative assault on Indigenous identity.294 Bob Joseph, the
founder of Indigenous Corporate Training Inc., and member of the Gwawaenuk Nation states that
the term ‘Native’ is considered uncivil and rarely used in respectful conversations. He added,
“Usage of the word ‘Indian’ in Canada is decreasing due to its incorrect origin and connections to
colonizer policies and departments such as the Indian Act, the Indian Department (precursor to
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada), Indian Agent, Indian residential schools, etc.”295
Although the term Aboriginal peoples was a new step, there has been resistance from many groups
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as they argue that the root meaning of the word ‘ab’ is a Latin prefix that means ‘away from’ or
‘not’. And so Aboriginal can mean ‘not original’.296
There are places where various terms such as ‘Native Americans’ (the USA), ‘Aboriginal
peoples’ (Australia), Maori (New Zealand), Scheduled tribes (India), Tribal (Bangladesh) are used
officially in the country level. However, countries who accepted the UNDRIP started using the
term ‘Indigenous peoples’. For example, the Canadian government has started using ‘Indigenous
peoples’ term officially from 2018 in place of ‘Aboriginal peoples’ as part of their commitment
towards implementing UNDRIP nationally.297 The UNPFII states that the term ‘Indigenous’ has
prevailed as a generic term for many years.298 In some countries, there may be a preference for
other terms, including Tribes, First peoples/nations, Aboriginals, Ethnic groups, Adibasi/Adivasi,
Janajati, but they should be treated equally in international and national law.299 Occupational and
geographical terms like hunter-gatherers, nomads, peasants, hill people, etc., also exist and for all
practical purposes, can be used interchangeably with ‘Indigenous peoples’.300
Furthermore, Indigenous peoples want to be recognized as ‘peoples’, not ‘people’. They find
the ‘s’ distinction is crucial, which symbolizes the basic human rights as well as land, territorial
and collective rights.301 Whenever we mean an Indigenous group, nation, or community, we would
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use ‘people’, e.g., the Chakma people, Santal people, Inuit people, etc. However, the whole
Indigenous community in a country should be called ‘Indigenous peoples’ of the country. Again,
there should have only one name or term by which the world population can easily identify the
community groups collectively. For example, the term ‘Indigenous peoples’ is being used and
accepted in international law to understand those community groups. There should not have any
debate about the universally accepted term. The debate between ‘Tribal’ and ‘Indigenous peoples’
terms should be stopped which is creating confusion to recognize and identify that marginalized
group of people as a distinct group. As International law (both hard law and soft law) has provided
certain rights and opportunities for fighting their vulnerabilities, they may get access to those rights
and benefits by asserting their Indigenous identity.
The UN has continued to use ‘Indigenous’ alone, although ILO has regularly suggested to the
UN that it refers to both Indigenous and tribal peoples in its work, following the usage of ILO.302
The ILO Convention No. 169 is treated as a central feature of international laws contemporary
treatment of Indigenous peoples demands303 that include an additional criterion of ‘Tribal peoples’
along with an emphasis on ‘historical continuity’ in its legal definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’,
which will be applicable in all member states.304 The ILO Convention No. 169 refers to ‘peoples’
and not to ‘populations’. It refers to ‘tribal peoples’ but not to ‘semi-tribal’ peoples. However,
there are regions of the globe where the tribal population is the Indigenous population, and this
can be established by historical evidence.305

The ILO shows the reason of using both tribal peoples and Indigenous peoples as: The two terms ‘Indigenous
peoples’ and ‘tribal peoples’ are used by the ILO because there are tribal peoples who are not ‘indigenous’ in the
literal sense in the countries in which they live, but who nevertheless live in a similar situation – an example would
be Afro-descended tribal peoples in Central America; or tribal peoples in Africa such as the San or Maasai who may
not have lived in the region they inhabit longer than other population groups. See also: UNPFII, supra note 67.
303
Anaya, supra note 133 at 58
304
Kingsbury, supra note 66 at 420.
305
Beteille, supra note 10.
302

210

The World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 definition used broader criteria to identify
Indigenous peoples where both the much-debated terms ‘Tribal’ and ‘Indigenous peoples’ were
used expressly to mean certain distinct groups.306 However, the Directive preferred to use
‘Indigenous peoples’ to understand all groups. Paragraph 3 of a new Operational Policy 4.10 of
the World Bank provides the identification of Indigenous peoples which states:
“because of the varied and changing contexts in which Indigenous peoples live and because
there is no universally accepted definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’, this policy does not
define the term. Indigenous peoples may be referred to in different countries by such terms
as “Indigenous ethnic minorities,” “aboriginals,” “hill tribes,” “minority nationalities,”
“scheduled tribes,” or “tribal groups.”
Therefore, OP 4.10 does not differentiate among ‘Indigenous peoples’, ‘tribal population’, and
other terms used by states to mean distinct ethnic communities or tribal populations in various
countries. In this regard, most of the ethnic groups who are claiming themselves as ‘Indigenous
peoples’ but recognized by their governments as different names, can be identified as Indigenous
peoples if we follow the World Bank’s directives and policies.
Bob Joseph contends, “Go with what they are calling themselves”307 and as such, they can be
called in different names in their state boundaries according to the group’s intentions: such as,
Indigenous peoples of Bangladesh and India recognize themselves and are also known as
‘Adibasi’, in Canada ‘First Nations’ ‘Inuit’ and ‘Metis’, in the USA ‘Native Americans’ or
‘American Indians’, in Australia ‘Aboriginal’, in Latin America ‘Indians’ and ‘Amerindians’ etc.
But whenever the communities are discussed in the international forum, they must be called as a
single term Indigenous peoples. There are thousands of distinct communities that have their
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community names. In Bangladesh, there are at least 45 ethnic communities who identify
themselves as Indigenous peoples or Adibasi. In Bangladesh, the groups are using various terms
such as Indigenous communities from plain lands use the term ‘Adibasi’ and 11 Indigenous
communities from the CHT use both ‘Adibasi’ and ‘Jumma’, which I found confusing for their
proper recognition. Adibasi groups have various names such as the Santal, Chakma, Marma,
Tripura, Khasia, and Garo. They can be called by their community names, as mentioned above,
during local and national discussions.

4.6.

Conclusion

The disregarded communities of Bangladesh have emphasized the need for official recognition
as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’. They have also accentuated the importance of recognition of
their right to land and control over natural resources. The Adibasi representatives, leaders, and
activists have expressed their concern about development issues related to using land despite the
signing of an agreement with the government.308 However, the marginalized communities of
Bangladesh meet the requirements of the international legal concept of ‘Indigenous peoples’. The
claim of the distinct ethnic communities in Bangladesh to the status of Indigenous peoples cannot
be defeated on the ground of a lacking or unclear definition or for the common excuse that the
entire or Bangalee population of Bangladesh are Indigenous.309 Moreover, one major challenge
persists, as Bangladeshi Adibasi or Indigenous peoples are not recognized legally, and nongovernmental development agencies are unlikely to gain government approval for their projects
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and development initiatives if they use the term Adibasi or Indigenous peoples in their description
of activities.310
In the above discussion, I have reviewed various definitions of Indigenous peoples in
international law. According to the definitions, Indigenous peoples are those people who have
distinct identities and form non-dominance in society with long-standing persecution and
marginalization history. In the case of the Indigenous situation in Bangladesh, after reviewing oral
histories, participant observation and interviews from Adibasi communities (especially Santals and
Mundas) of the Phulbari mining area, it has been determined that Adibasi communities are the
‘peoples’ who can be identified as Indigenous peoples under international law. In my analysis, I
have shown that Adibasis in the mining region retains most of the characteristics which have been
identified by scholars and international institutions that I have used for my analysis. Most of the
respondents recognized and identified themselves as ‘Adibasi’, which they mean to understand the
universally accepted term ‘Indigenous peoples’. Moreover, local Bangalees also identified them
as Adibasi, and they are habituated to call them ‘Adibasi’. Many respondents claimed that their
ancestors had settled in the area long before Bangalees had settled in the area. Moreover, the
historical documents I have reviewed also supported that the communities existed in the area of
time immemorial. Some even said that Adibasis migrated and settled in the mining area and other
parts of Bangladesh from Jharkhand and Nagpur of current India (Bangladesh was also a part of
India before 1947). However, in all instances, it is proved that Adibasi existed in the area before
the British colonial rule.
Adibasis are victims of colonial and post-colonial oppression and persecution. Their rights are
violated, their territorial lands are being alienated and grabbed by dominant Bangalee people with
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the help of the government. Adibasis have tradition and customs of maintaining kinship networks,
and they have strong ties with natural resources and their traditional knowledge. Interviewees also
claimed that they maintain a sacred oral history of what they believe, maintain their religious and
cultural functionality by following their tradition and customs, have distinct languages which they
practice among their communities. Through all of this, Adibasis find themselves as completely
distinct communities than dominant and majority Bangalees. The festivals and rituals Bangladeshi
Adibasi communities observe are also unique in nature. Furthermore, Adibasis are struggling to
retain their distinct identity, and sometimes they resist for self-determination. As their properties
are being illegally grabbed, alienated and dispossessed by dominant Bangalees, their demand is to
establish a separate land commission to deal with this matter and return their lands. They also
demand to recognize their language, culture, and traditions.
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CHAPTER V
PHULBARI KHONI ANDOLON: AN INDIGENOUS
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
5.1. Introduction
Adibasi communities in the Phulbari mining area are now carrying out a subsistence livelihood
based on agricultural and small-scale business activities. Though they are discriminated against
socially with unequal treatment, which I have shown in Chapter IV of this dissertation, they are
happy with their existing economic and social settings. They feel that any changes would affect
their livelihood negatively. They fear to become landless if any large-scale project, especially open
cast mining, is undertaken in their area. Although most of the people of the Phulbari mining region
are poor farmers, they have their own mechanisms to overcome the existing situation. Many
Adibasis are working as day laborers in other peoples’ croplands. Many of them have their private
lands where they cultivate three-crop agricultural products year around. They do not want any
destruction or any development in their lands which, they expect through previous experiences
elsewhere, would ultimately make them refugees. The National Committee to Protect Oil, Gas,
Mineral Resources, Power and Ports of Bangladesh (NCBD) successfully educated local people
through their campaign, research, and analysis that any benefit to the government from exploring
and exporting coal through the open-pit mining over 30 years would be less than the profits the
local people would get from agricultural and small businesses activities. People understood that
the project would not be economically worthwhile for them.
Environmental degradation has significant implications for Indigenous peoples’ rights due to
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their close affiliation with land and natural resources.1 James Anaya states that as part of their right
to self-determination, Indigenous peoples have the right to decide whether they will allow a
development project in their territory or not.2 This is also guaranteed in the UNDRIP. Hence, to
establish their control over development projects, Indigenous peoples mobilize and resist both the
state and transnational and multinational corporations (TNCs and MNCs).3 During the 18 months
of educating people about the impact of the Phulbari open-pit coal project, motivating them to
raise voices, and inspiring them to attend the protest rallies, Adibasis vowed to sacrifice their lives
to save their livelihoods, lands, and resources of the mining region. My Adibasi respondents
consistently shared their concerns about how the potential for mining activity threatened their
identity as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’ because they would lose their sacred relationship
with the forest. Some of the mining areas include Sal forests and marshlands where Adibasis live.
The place where they live is sacred to them, as they manage surrounding land and resources
traditionally and customarily for generations. They knew that if the company could successfully
develop mining in the area, they would lose their current environmental settings and ecological
circumstances, and ultimately, they would never get back to their traditional lifestyles. The change
triggered by the open-pit mine would be impossible to reverse.4 This consciousness inspired
Adibasi protesters to speak in broad opposition to resource exploitation: “we do not want any
mining in our region which would push us giving away our Indigeneity.” Some of my Adibasi and
Bangalee respondents were also concerned about the possible destruction of the ecosystem of the
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Sundarbans since the company planned to transport the extracted coal through the river of the
forest.
Whiteman and Mamen emphasize that the ‘cumulative social and environmental effects’ of
mining mean that Indigenous peoples must often resist against not just one mine, but rather an
entire mining sector because building mining infrastructure such as roads, ports, railways also
negatively affect local livelihoods and biodiversity.5 The authors argue that conflicts throughout
the world, especially in the global South, between Indigenous peoples and the project proponents
have often resulted because of misrecognition of the right to land and other territorial rights,
neglecting traditional beliefs on land and resource management, absence of access to information
about proposed and existing mining operations, lack of involving Indigenous peoples in decisionmaking process on land access and mine exploration and development plans.6 Indigenous peoples
also resist the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts of mineral exploration, and
seek to rectify environmental and organizational injustice through demands of greater participation
in decisions and project development process.7 Their demands are often ignored by corporations,
and they get involved in conflicts with state-sponsored law enforcement agents.
Bullard and Johnson call for the environmental justice movement to identify some firm
objectives for eliminating existing unequal enforcement of environmental regulations, policies,
and practices. These environmental regulations and policies often prevent some individuals and
groups from participating in decision-making.8 These problems could be eliminated if existing
environmental, health, housing, and civil rights laws were vigorously enforced in a non-
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discriminatory way. Urkidi and Walter study the plurality of the environmental justice movement,
discursive framework, and the distributive dimensions of injustice where they illustrate and
identify the emergence of three dimensions of environmental justice, namely distribution,
recognition, and participation in the anti-mining movements.9 These three notions of justice were
all mentioned by Schlosberg in his definition of justice, “at various times, justice is defined as
equitable distribution, recognition, and participation.”10 Some scholars argue that the
environmental justice movement can lead to environmental sustainability or just sustainability.
In this chapter, my analysis of social and political processes ties together an understanding of
equitable distribution, recognition, and participation in the decision-making process to arrive at an
environmental justice framework.11 In other words, I examine the claims of local and Adibasi
communities in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon against the various theoretical understandings of what
motivates actors in the environmental justice movement. In relaying three narratives (Adibasi
accounts, local and national activists’ accounts, and transnational advocacy groups’ accounts of
the resistance movement) I have addressed in Chapter III, I explore the reasons why the movement
was seen as successful. The following parts analyze if the efforts of these players fit within the
framework of the environmental justice movement, as it manifests in the global South.

5.2. Why did Adibasi Protest in Phulbari?
I had asked my Adibasi respondents about the reason for protesting the coal extracting project,
which is said to bring economic benefit to the country. Their answers were varied. However, most
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of the respondents were concerned about losing their agricultural and household lands and fearing
to be displaced permanently from the area. According to them, Adibasis of the Phulbari mining
area had been facing various vulnerabilities throughout their existence. They are never recognized,
and all decisions are imposed on them. In the case of the mining project, the government never
asked for their contest to lease their lands to a MNC. The foreign company had not consulted
adequately with Adibasi communities or their traditional institutions. The company had continued
deceiving local people with various temptations by appointing Dalal. According to a local Adibasi
leader, Adibasis of the mining area were the first communities who started raising their voices
against the projected open-pit mining.12 Adibasis confirmed with NCBD activists during the
campaign period in their hamlets, “we would die to stop mining.”
Furthermore, Adibasis were so angry that they were ready to be outlawed, but the organizers
of the movement did not let that happen.13 This part of the chapter offers an analysis based on the
rights and interests of Indigenous peoples, or Adibasis of Phulbari reflected in EIA and what
happened in the field. I have identified the following reasons why Adibasi communities had been
involved in resisting the open-pit mining in their region: realizing past injustices and
misrecognition; lack of participation (inadequate information, consents acquired by deception, and
deficient consultation); population displacement and improper plan of resettlement; false promise
and fear of not getting compensation and share of benefits; environmental degradation; water and
food insecurity; foreign company; and corruption and lack of transparency. All the issues are
analyzed in turn based on the claims of the company through the ESIA and Adibasis.

5.2.1. Realizing their Experience of Vulnerability and Misrecognition
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The conflict between economic development, environmental protection, and recognition of
human rights exhibits in the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples.14 Moreover, the communities in
the areas where the resources are located tend to carry a disproportionate share of the negative
impacts of development through reduced access to resources and direct exposure to pollution and
environmental degradation.15 The adverse effects of extractive industries on Indigenous
communities are often enhanced by their lack of access to natural resources.
Paragraph 1 of the IFC Performance Standard 7 and the World bank’s Operational Policy (OP)
number 4.10(2) recognize that Indigenous peoples are among the most marginalized and
vulnerable sections of the world population. Their economic, social, and legal status limits their
capacity to protect their rights and interests in their surrounding environment and restricts their
ability to receive benefits from development projects. Performance Standard 7 further expands:
“Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable if their lands and resources are degraded.
Their languages, cultures, religions, spiritual beliefs, and institutions may also come under
threat, and consequently, Indigenous peoples may be more vulnerable to the adverse
impacts associated with project development than non-Indigenous communities. This
vulnerability may include loss of identity, culture, and natural resource-based livelihoods,
as well as exposure to impoverishment and diseases.”
The dignity, rights, traditional knowledge, and interests of Indigenous peoples to protect their
cultural identities and preserve their traditional and ancestral lands and resources are receiving
increasing recognition within the international development community. Various international
legal instruments16 establish Indigenous peoples as international legal actors and confer rights on
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them. Most of the international hard laws and soft laws recognize their rights to participation,
cultural identity, traditional lands and territories, and self-determination in natural resources
development.17 It is also identified that the increasing recognition of social and cultural diversity
is in the interest of society and is not an obstacle to national development or economic stability.18
Therefore, the development process should accommodate full respect for the human rights, dignity,
aspirations, culture, and natural resource-based livelihoods of Indigenous peoples.19
IUCN recognizes that if all project-affected people, in most cases, Indigenous peoples, are not
involved effectively and fully in all stages of the activity, sustainability strategies can never
succeed. Such involvement enables them to protect their interests in any development project and
ensure sustainable development in their territory.20 Having a long connection and environmental
ethics, Indigenous peoples uphold their traditional cultures, values, and beliefs for managing
natural resources. Though the trend of recognizing the role Indigenous peoples play in
sustainability is insufficient, it is evolving. The preamble of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD) (para 12) states:
“Recognizing the close and traditional dependence of many Indigenous and local
communities embodying traditional lifestyles on biological resources, and the desirability
of sharing equitably benefits arising from the use of traditional knowledge, innovations,
and practices relevant to the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of
its components.”
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However, the provision identifies that environmental and economic benefits accruing from
using Indigenous traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) should be shared with Indigenous
peoples.21 Chapter 26(1) of Agenda 21 states that any strategy for sustainability involving
Indigenous peoples has to respect their traditional way of managing resources such as their sacred
oral history, traditional knowledge, and local decision-making structures.22 Ellis argues that by
promoting the use of their traditional knowledge and its recognition in environmental or resource
management, Indigenous peoples necessarily advocate an increased role for the holders of
Indigenous TEK.23
In Bangladesh, Indigenous peoples are not being recognized by the government as ‘Indigenous
peoples’. The reason behind the exclusion is the government’s position on the recognition of
‘Indigenous’ or Adibasi people, which I have discussed in the previous chapter. Asia Energy, the
company responsible for implementing the open-pit coal project, claimed that they followed
guidelines of different international financial institutions such as the World Bank, ADB, and IFC
regarding Adibasi communities of Phulbari.24 Civil society members, environmental and
Indigenous NGOs, and activists of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon showed their concerns on different
occasions about fears of local and Adibasi communities regarding their displacement, which would
violate their human and fundamental rights.
Section 3.2 of the Indigenous Peoples Development Plan (IPDP) of the ESIA states that only
2,200 out of 49,487 people to be displaced are Adibasis.25 However, nearly half (48.25%) of the
total affected households identified in the draft Resettlement Plan (RP) belong to groups
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recognized as being socio-economically vulnerable. According to environmentalists and Adibasi
leaders, the number of displaced Adibasi population would be several times higher than
estimated.26 It is perceived that one factor contributing to lower estimates of the number of Adibasi
people to be displaced is the denial of the ‘Indigenous’ status of an unknown number of people
affected by the project. A footnote of Section 3.2 of the IPDP reveals that this estimate excludes
households from groups that are more appropriately classified as ‘ethnic minority’ groups rather
than ‘Indigenous’ or ‘Adibasi’.27 Although Santal, Munda, and Mahili communities are recognized
as ‘Indigenous peoples’ in line with international law and legal instruments by the company
through IPDP of the ESIA regardless of the Bangladesh government’s denial situation, there are
certain self-identified Adibasis groups such as the Karmakar, Horizon, Mahato, Rajbangshi were
excluded. The Karmakar is one of the twenty-nine Adibasi communities that had their official
recognition as an Adibasis negated in a highly contested government gazette published in 2010.28
G. Karmakar, a farmer from the Karmakar community, claimed, “although the mining project
would destroy my households and agricultural lands, the company consultants never came to talk
to my family and me. The government never treated us an Adibasi, although we are distinct as like
Santal and some other communities.”29 Therefore, such denials of the Adibasi identity by states
and corporations are frequently applied to ignore Indigenous people’s rights in international
conventions and instruments.30
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According to Section 4, Volume 4 of the ESIA, Adibasis from Mahili people are among those
to be displaced;31 still, IPDP for Asia Energy’s Phulbari Coal Project does not record a single
meeting with members of the Mahili community.32 The methodology for the IPDP included a
Resettlement Survey (RS) designed to determine the number of Adibasi households to be displaced
but was suspended just one month after it was initiated in February 2005. The suspension was done
without showing any reason in the IPDP.33 The draft RP, which the IPDP produces in its final
report, seems vague since it does not provide details of the resettlement procedure and
rehabilitation program. Due to the lack of any information on current patterns of land use in either
of the two proposed resettlement sites for Adibasis, it is unclear if either side has any agricultural
land available for purchase, leasing, or sharecropping.34 Therefore, the removal of Adibsis from
their customary lands to make way for the Phulbari open-pit coal project would be a continuation
of historical patterns of disregard for the Indigenous land rights in Bangladesh.35
One of the issues both my Adibasi and activist respondents raised was that the decision to
develop coal mining in Phulbari was discriminatory. It was easy for the government policy-makers
to decide because most of the population in Phulbari are Adibasi and Bangalee farmers. They said
that the government considers poor farmers and Adibasi as powerless classes and violates the law;
consequently, they never consider consulting the communities and engaging them in decisionmaking processes. They pointed out that if the coal reserve was found in Dhaka, where millions
of people live and all administrative offices, military bases, and the airport are situated, the
government would never think of exploring for coal. The policy-makers had not considered the
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livelihoods of poor farmers and Adibasis, agricultural productions, sacred places, archeological
sites, and the environment. My key respondent Cherobin Hembrom told me, which I believe
arrived in his mind from frustration, “the government policy-makers and other rich people who
want open-pit coal mining in our region in the name of development should interchange their
places with us; they will move here, we will move to their places, then they would understand our
pain.”36 I argue that this is the politics of inequality. These inequalities arise from broader politicaleconomic forces that exert their influences at the local level and result in many types of
environmental health threats.37
According to Iris Marion Young, “the lack of recognition is an injustice not only because it
constrains people and does them harm, but also because it is the foundation for distributive
injustice”.38 Young further argues that a lack of recognition causes damage to both oppressed
communities and the image of those communities in the larger cultural and political sphere.39
Nancy Fraser also insists on highlighting the lack of recognition. She argues that we have to look
at the ‘why’ of inequity in order both to understand and remedy it.40 Both scholars identify a direct
link between a lack of respect and recognition, and a decline in a person’s membership and
participation in the greater community, including the political and institutional order.41 Schlosberg
also points out that the lack of recognition is an injustice because it harms by constraining people
from their basic rights. It is also the foundation of distributive injustice.42 Thus, if someone is not
recognized, he or she cannot properly participate in any process. In this respect, David Schlosberg
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argues that justice must focus on the political process as a way to address both the inequitable
distribution of social goods and the conditions undermining social recognition.43 In the case of the
Phulbari project, the denial of Indigeneity of the Karmakar, Horizon, and other self-identified
Adibasi communities means that they will effectively be excluded from any provisions made for
Indigenous peoples because they do not hold formal title deeds.44 This would be injustice from the
part of the government and the company involved because they do not recognize those people as
Indigenous peoples or groups. Since they would not be recognized as Indigenous peoples, they
could not participate in the process of decision making, through which justice can be established.
Adibasis were important actors in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, although NCBD’s active role
shaded their participation in the movement. Rob Soren said, “I was in the backstage, and nowhere
can you see me in media reports, although I played a vital role in organizing the event.”45 His
statement exposes the normative story of the lack of Adibasi recognition in every level of society.
He mentioned that since the inception of Bangladesh, even before 1947, Adibasis, especially
Santals, actively took part in various democratic movements, but their contributions had never
been recognized.46 Adibasis have been marginalized and discriminated against by colonial powers,
state actors, and societal structures in different periods, which still exist today. Although the
current government had promised in their election mandates to improve Adibasi lifestyles and
economic situations, which is guaranteed by the Bangladesh Constitution as fundamental rights,
the government eliminated the special opportunity for the “backward section of people”. The
government disapproved of their longstanding demand for recognizing their identity in the
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Constitution. The government, on various occasions, instructed all government and nongovernmental bodies not to use the term “Adibasi.”47
The environmental justice movement started in response to environmental inequities, threats
to public health, unequal protection, differential treatment, and discrimination received by the poor
and people of color48, which Robert Bullard terms ‘environmental racism’. According to Bullard
and Johnson, environmental racism is one form of environmental injustice, which is fortified by
different government bodies.49 Schlosberg makes a connection between the environmental justice
movement and environmental racism, both concerned with low-income communities and the
disproportionate risks they face.50 In this case, Adibasis thought that they must be displaced
because the government was supporting the company. Adibasis know that the government is
powerful, and they have all mechanisms to eliminate and displace them. They identified that they
would bear disproportionate risk and exposure to environmental hazards. When they realized that
the government and the company had been ignoring their participation as actors in the decisionmaking process, they resisted as a last resort. Moreover, they have prior experience from
Barapukuria and Modhyopara mining that if the mine is developed without proper measures, their
life would be at stake which was not taken into consideration by the company. The company did
not consider local people as important actors in the decision-making process. They had no choice
but to display their demands through protests.
Rebecca Tsosie argues that environmental justice for Indigenous peoples must be consistent
with the promotion of their self-governance. Therefore, traditional Indigenous institutions must be
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appropriately recognized for upholding their rights.51 However, a system of governance is required
for environmental justice to ensure the participation of all stakeholders in the decision-making
process.52 Leah Temper’s new proposal for the environmental justice framework in the settlercolonial context also highlights the need for recognizing and engaging Indigenous self-governing
authority besides their participation in the decision-making process.53 The right to FPIC confirms
that traditional Indigenous institutions must be discussed when a project proponent goes to the area
and seeks permission. Therefore, it is the company’s responsibility to make sure that Indigenous
self-governing authorities are involved in the decision-making process. In the ESIA process of the
Phulbari Coal Project, people attending a consultation and survey meetings are a self-selected
group and, as such, are not representative of all affected Indigenous people. All Mandals, I had
interviewed of the mining region, mentioned that the company organized meetings at individual
levels. The company consultants did not involve Mandals in focus group discussion, although they
govern Adibasis through their traditional governing system. The company never asked Mandals
to give any input.

5.2.2. Meaningless Participation/Procedural Justice
The right to receive information, the right to impart information, and the right to participate in
environmental decisions are three of the significant rights those combined environmental due
process. The right to participate in the decision-making process is a basic human right that applies
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to all applicable areas.54 These rights are increasingly being regarded as international and national
legal norms. Principle 23 of the World Charter for Nature exemplifies this trend:
“All persons, in accordance with their national legislation, shall have the opportunity to
participate, individually or with others, in the formulation of decisions of direct concern to
their environment and shall have access to means of redress when their environment has
suffered damage or degradation.”55
Again, Principle 24 of the same Charter extends that, “Each person has a duty to act in
accordance with the provisions of the present Charter; acting individually, in association with
others or through participation in the political process, each person shall strive to ensure that the
objectives and requirements of the present Charter are met.”56
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is the body of
independent experts that monitors implementation of the International Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) that calls for state parties to ensure equal rights for
Indigenous peoples concerning effective participation in the decision-making process.57 The
Committee urges not just for consultation, but also informed consent with its interpretation of the
rights of Indigenous peoples in applying the ICERD.58 In General Recommendation No. 23, CERD
requires state parties to ensure that Indigenous peoples have equal rights to participate in public
life and that no decisions relating directly to Indigenous peoples are to be taken without their
informed consent.59 Ultimately, CERD has used the framework of protecting Indigenous peoples
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from any form of discrimination in practicing their right to participation and right to FPIC. 60 As
Indigenous peoples articulate the injustices they face and seek solutions to the problems, there is
a need for a meaningful participatory approach for engaging them in the subsequent development
activities.61 If any development activity takes place in the Indigenous territory, it has to be
formulated within a collaborative framework where all the actors will actively participate in the
decision-making process. The participatory approach attempts to respect their traditional
knowledge and construct a development partnership based on trust.62
Meaningful participation in the environmental decision-making process requires that the
concerned community is informed of actions with environmental effects, giving a basic
understanding of environmental issues, and giving the right to express one’s opinion regarding
environmental affairs. It also requires an effective means of redress are available to the victims of
both ecological harm and violations of procedural rights.63 Environmental justice demands the
right to participate as equal partners at every level of decision making, including needs of
assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation.64 Iris Marion Young contends that state
agencies have the responsibility to make decisions about the distribution of risk. She also argues
that communities should have the right to participate in the decision by having the power to
approve or disapprove of any project.65
The provision of participatory rights of procedural justice plays a vital role in the
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environmental decision-making process in EIA mechanisms. Although Asia Energy had
mentioned that they had conducted full consultation, most of my respondents from Adibasi
communities told me that they were ignored in their focus group discussions and individual level
consultations. The company consultants did not ask for any consent. They said that they do not
know about free, prior and informed consent and therefore, there is no question of FPIC happened
towards them. There is no document available in their languages, nor the state language Bangla.
As such, most of the community members had no chance of gaining knowledge about the project
and its outcome and impacts. The document was not circulated to people who would be affected.
Although there is a volume called IPDP in the ESIA, including resettlement and rehabilitation,
potentially affected people were not adequately consulted.

5.2.2.1.

Inadequate Access to Information

Satisfactory access to environmental information strengthens participatory mechanisms in the
environmental management process. Successful implementation of any project depends on a
corresponding duty of government agencies or companies to report regularly on their activities by
confirming the right to environmental information.66 Most of my Adibasi respondents told me
during interviews that the company neither consulted appropriately nor took proper consent from
them. Before submitting and publishing the EIA and attaining an environmental clearance
certificate (ECC) from DoE, the company conducted surveys and consultation processes. My
Adibasi respondents told me that they were unaware of the project even during the survey.
Consultants had been collecting information about their family members and household goods.
When they asked consultants about the household survey, they had not responded to local people.
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The concealed the information of mining. A Santal farmer was telling me, “some foreign
consultants came to our hamlet for the household survey. We asked them the reason for the survey,
but they could not answer properly. Then they developed roads and started boring on our lands in
different places. We saw they found coals and other minerals.”67 H. Pahan, a farmer from the
Munda community, told me that they did not know about the mining until consultants visited their
households for surveys. Most of my respondents told me that the government had decided to
develop the mine without consulting local people. Before that, the company started boring in
various places in 2003. Adibasi people asked the company technicians about the reason while
drilling on their agricultural lands, but they did not get answers from them. Adibasis did not
understand what was going on. However, at one point, the company started rebuilding roads in the
mining area.
During the consultation process, the information the company consultants had provided was
not clear to them. They just informed local people that if the mine is developed, they would be
benefitted. Consultants did not say anything about the negative impact of open-pit mining on
residents and local biodiversity. S. Mardi was recalling the company’s activities and saying that
consultants had organized focus group meetings with some Adibasi communities as part of their
consultation process where they told local people that they would be benefitted if the mine is
developed through jobs and compensation schemes. However, they did not inform about the
process of the mining and loss incurred due to the mining activity. Some respondents complained
that the consultants also did not tell them that a foreign company would construct the mining.
Giving examples of mining projects in the global North such as Germany, Australia, Canada,
and the USA, the company consultants said the area would not be destroyed, drinking and
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cultivating water would be provided through developed technology. They also said that there
would not be water and air pollution. As Adibasis of Phulbari were not informed properly, they
assumed that the mining would be underground like Barapukuria mining in neighboring subdistrict. Some of my respondents said that they were educated by NCBD activists during the
campaign for the Gherao Kormosuchi occurred on 26th August 2006 that there would be open-pit
mining, which would affect their livelihoods and local biodiversity. That was the first instance
when Adibasis had known that there would be open-pit mining by destroying their agricultural
lands, households, sacred places, forests, and educational institutions. Soon after hearing the
negative consequences of the open-pit mining project, Adibasi leaders and traditional institutions
(Manjhi Parishad) members told consultants that they do not want open-pit mining in Phulbari.
After knowing the process of open-pit mining, people got scared that they must leave their houses
and agricultural lands. However, they had no mechanism of fighting against decisions made by the
government but started mobilizing to protest.
As most of the Adibasis of Phulbari are not formally educated, they did not know about the
ultimate loss and risks they would face for the project, and consequently, some of them consented.
The company provided misinformation throughout the process.68 The general people in
Bangladesh are not aware of the harm of development projects due to lack of information and lack
of their participation in the decision-making process.69 W. Mardi told me that he collected a huge
book (ESIA report) from the local Asia Energy office which was written in English. He only
understood maps of the area and mining footprints. Since most of the local people do not
understand English, according to him, the report should have published in the Bangla language; in
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that case, local people could easily understand what the company’s plan is and how would they
deal with the concerns of Adibasi communities.70
S. Mardi told me that the company only reported the benefits; they did not inform about the
expected losses. Moreover, they were not accurately informed about the compensation either. Most
of my respondents told me the company consultants reported that the mining would benefit the
country and the local area; people would be economically benefitted. Consequently, some of them
gave consents which were not informed, nor attained freely. S. Mardi mentioned:
“We had not given consent to the project, although the company had acquired consents
from some people through deception and temptation. We also identified that the
government should have consulted with us before deciding to develop an open-pit coal
mining on our lands.”71

5.2.2.2.

Consent Acquired by Undue Influences

Paragraph 3 of both the World Bank’s Operational Directive (OD) 4.20 and Operations Policy
(OP) 4.10 state,
“Because of the varied and changing contexts in which Indigenous peoples live and
because there is no universally accepted definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’, this policy does
not define the term. Indigenous peoples may be referred to in different countries by such
names as ‘Indigenous ethnic minorities’, ‘aboriginals’, ‘hill tribes’, ‘minority
nationalities’, ‘scheduled tribes’, or ‘tribal groups’.”
From this perspective, if Adibasis are not even recognized, they cannot exercise the right to
decide whether they want the project or not in their area. I argue that since some Adibasi
communities of the Phulbari region are recognized as Indigenous peoples by the company,
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regardless of the government’s misrecognition they are enabled to exercise the right to FPIC.
ADB’s Indigenous Policy identifies that there is dignity in all cultures, that there should be equality
in opportunity for all segments of society, and that all sections of peoples deserve an equal chance
of access to participation and benefits of development.72 Article 7 (1) of the ILO Convention No.
169 clearly states:
“The peoples concerned shall have the right to decide their own priorities for the process
of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well-being and the
lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, over
their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall participate in
the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of plans and programs for national and
regional development which may affect them directly.”73
Although FPIC is an exclusive right for Indigenous peoples through which they can decide, as
individuals or as groups, about their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural
development, project proponents or states should apply FPIC in every case engaging not only
Indigenous peoples but also all project-affected communities unless it is clearly exhibited that the
impact of the proposed project would be minimal and the project is in the public interest. 74 The
consent they express must be free from any pressure, and in possession of all relevant information
regarding the proposed activity and its potential impact.75 FPIC allows all project-affected
Indigenous peoples to be well informed about all aspects of the project and give consent to a project
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or their territories.76 Once they have given their consent, they can withdraw it at any stage by
exercising their right to self-determination.
Article 10 of UNDRIP states that Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their
lands or territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed consent of
the Indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where
possible, with the option of return. James Anaya states:
“…..companies should conduct due diligence before proceeding or committing themselves
to proceed, with extractive operations without the prior consent of the Indigenous peoples
concerned and conduct their own independent assessment of whether or not the operations,
in the absence of Indigenous consent, would be in compliance with international standards,
and under what conditions. If they would not be in compliance, the extractive operations
should not be implemented, regardless of any authorization by the state to do so.”77
The decision-making process should reflect the concern for all citizens and contribute to
improve the situation of the majority of people and to minimize the number of displaced people.
Decisions to resettle thousands of displaced people in remote regions of a country should be
completed through consultation.78 My Adibasi respondents pointed out that the company
consultants accomplished consents with deception. They lied. They bribed to local journalists and
influential political leaders to force Adibasis to give consent to the project. The company also gave
false promises to local Adibasi people during the consultation process. They tempted poor
Adibasis with money, jobs, and model towns, which they believed would not get. Some people
were tempted by the company’s undue strategy and consented, but most of the people ultimately
were with this movement and actively participated.
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P. Murmu recalled that the company consultants organized a meeting where they gave money
and food to people who attended and asked them after briefing about only the benefits the mining
would bring to the local area “if you would be happy to see the development of your area?” Some
of them consented without knowing the consequences for their future. The company completely
ignored taking permission from local Adibasi people whether they want mining or not. They
directly informed local people that the government would evict them using force.79 The key
respondent of my research Cherobin Hembrom rightly pointed out that any development that
harms local communities cannot be treated as development. He questioned, “development for
whom? If it is for the country and its citizens, the population should be considered first. If people
are not satisfied with any project, the government should not go forward with that project.”80 Since
development occurs for people, if people say ‘no’, nobody should step forward. People will decide
whether they want development or not.81

5.2.2.3.

The Company Failed to Consult and Engage Adibasi Communities

O’Faircheallaigh argues that the powerless in society are, in fact, the least likely to participate
in the decision-making process, both because they lack the resources to do so, and they often find
the processes involved mysterious and intimidating.82 Consultation with Indigenous peoples and
their representatives in the project development process will ensure better decision-making. Prior
consultation between government, corporations, and Indigenous peoples is recognized as an
essential mechanism in extractive resource development processes, as the dialogue often results in
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either community acceptance or rejection of a project. Involving local and Indigenous peoples in
the early phase of the decision-making process reduces the possibility of further conflicts among
residents and the policymakers including creating greater trust in the process.83 Article 6(1) of the
ILO Convention No. 169 instructs states to consult with Indigenous communities through genuine
representatives maintaining proper procedures in any project development in their territory.
Moreover, the same provision requires that Indigenous peoples can freely participate at all levels
of the decision-making process within the nation-state. Article 6(2) of the same Convention affirms
that consultations have to be in good faith with the object of reaching an agreement with the
affected Indigenous peoples.
Although Asia Energy responds in their documents stating that they are concerned about the
importance of meaningful participation of Adibasis in the Phulbari project as it has significant
adverse effects, actual consultation with affected Adibasi communities has been grossly
inadequate.84 The Public Consultation and Disclosure Plan (PCDP) for the Phulbari Coal Project
also states that focus group discussions have been held with various categories of people within
the project, with emphasis on vulnerable and special interest groups, including Indigenous
groups.85 However, my respondents told me that they were not adequately informed about the
mining decision, the process of mining and the impact of mining. Their right to FPIC, participation,
and self-determination in Phulbari were not upheld properly. This is a clear showcase of injustice
towards Adibasi communities of Phulbari.
In this current case, Section 1 of Volume 4 of the ESIA for the Phulbari Coal Project’ states,
“Consultation with stakeholders is an ongoing process, and will continue to be conducted
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throughout the project development, forming a key component of design, development,
implementation, and operation of the project.”86 The company has failed to consult with local
stakeholders for more than five years, but the company is continuing its efforts to force the project
forward. Adibasis of Phulbari would be displaced from at least five administrative unions of the
Phulbari, Birampur, and Nawabgonj sub-districts, but consultation has been limited to one union
of Phulbari only.87 In addition to that, the documentation of these consultations with Adibasi
communities is also inadequate.88
It is widely acknowledged that the knowledge of local communities and the participation of
Indigenous peoples in decision-making for sustainable development are crucial for the protection
of local ecosystems. Mushkat contends that the full involvement of the major stakeholders in
environmental decision-making and implementation must be transparent involving varying
relations of civil society and the private sector.89 I talked to some local and national Adibasi NGOs
whose names are included in the list of NGOs the company consulted, but they denied and told me
that they were never consulted. The chief executive of a leading national environmental NGO told
me that the company did not communicate with her. She does not have any idea of how the
company used her name and her NGO as ‘consulted’. She said, “I was never formally invited. I
never gave my formal consent to discuss with the company. That’s a total lie that they mentioned
in the EIA document.”90 A local Adibasi NGO spokesperson told me that the company had
contacted the NGO to get information and statistics about Adibasi households, but they never
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invited them to participate in any consultation or meeting.91 Asia Energy did not contact
Bangladesh Paribesh Andolon (BAPA) formally. But they recruited some BAPA members as their
consultants and had ‘golden handshakes’. The company wanted to purchase other BAPA
members.92
IPDP of the ESIA states, “Despite the question and concerns that have been raised during the
consultation process, Indigenous peoples have appeared supportive of the project, participating in
the consultation process through attendance at meetings and responding to the various surveys.”93
IPDP further states that just over seventy percent of respondents from Indigenous households
agreed with the statement, “the coal project is necessary for the development of the country”.94 I
identify that these are very questionable and vague claims. The actual scenario is different now
because the consultants did not inform those people about the project.95 Attendance at meetings
and responding to surveys cannot be equated with support for the project, particularly in light of
the very detailed and grave concerns about the project expressed by Adibasi communities. Survey
respondents may use the survey to express their opposition and concerns rather than support for
the project.96
When I was talking to Adibasi communities as part of my research activities, they claimed that
they were not properly consulted, and the company achieved some consents through undue
processes. As a Mandal of his hamlet, R. Mardi presided over many meetings with other members
of the council involving Adibasi men and women. He identified that the company failed to consult
with Adibasis properly. Some of my respondents whose households and lands are included in the
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mining footprint told me that the company consultants never consulted with them. The government
did not consult with the community, not even with community leaders, about the decision to
develop the project in their locality. They were not involved in any decision-making process. There
was not a single hearing held involving local and Adibasi communities regarding the project. Many
Adibasis claimed that they were deceived because they were not properly consulted. I find the
perception the Adibasi communities perceive is clear, “if you want to explore natural resources on
our lands, take permission from us with proper consultation.”

5.2.3. Population Displacement and Resettlement
Many resource extracting projects have similar negative outcomes regarding environmental
impacts, displacement, and resettlement of local and Indigenous peoples. It is observed that most
of the mining projects worldwide are in Indigenous territories and involve negative environmental
impacts, displacement, and resettlement of Indigenous peoples and violation of human rights.97 As
stated, various MNCs, TNCs, and multilateral financial institutions are involved in developing
large-scale resource extraction projects, dams, military bases, and toxic waste sites in Indigenous
areas, which would inevitably affect the conditions of living of Indigenous peoples.
Omar Faruque studies company-community conflict in local settings, drawing on corporate
practices of mining companies and shows that companies adopt various strategies to minimize
conflict. The author, through qualitative research, finds that instead of addressing the complex
issues such as displacement and eviction of local people, the transnational company in Phulbari
tried to convince them with economic gain.98
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Terminski argues that Indigenous peoples are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of
displacement and resettlement because they cannot adapt to a new situation due to inadequate
mechanisms.99 Indigenous peoples have their traditional way of managing resources around them,
but most of the traditional resources would be missing in new places. The author argues that the
displacement of people leads to a violation of many individuals and collective human rights.100
Adibasi communities in the Phulbari region were very much concerned about losing their
Indigeneity. If the project is implemented and if they are displaced from their existing households
and social settings, they would not be able to practice their cultural and social festivals and rituals
on which their identity exists. There are hundreds of religious and archeological sites in the mine
footprint. One of my respondents mentioned, “the mine would kill our identity as ‘Adibasi or
Indigenous’ because we must be displaced from our homes and resettled in a new place where we
cannot practice our religious, cultural and sacred rites, rituals and festivals as we are practicing
now.”101 He mentioned those cultural practices are their base of human integrity. W. Mardi, a
Santal farmer, said:
“There was no problem of developing a mine in the region if that would improve our
lifestyle and would benefit the country. We vastly depend on working and cultivating in
agricultural fields. Hundreds of thousands of Bangalees and Adibasis of the Phulbari
mining region would have been displaced if the mining had been developed. We would not
get a similar life in our new place. Sine the open-pit mining project would affect our
livelihoods, we strongly protested.”102
An Adibasi leader reported discriminatory treatments by the government agencies towards
Adibasis. He said that Adibasis in Bangladesh had experienced various hurdles: a riot situation in
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1947 during the India-Pakistan partition, India-Pakistan war in 1965, and Bangladesh’s war of
independence in 1971.103 They also know the Adibasi displacement and marginalization
experience in the CHT due to the development of a hydropower dam on the Kaptai Lake, which
was built in 1962 and at least 100,000 Adibasi Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and eight other Adibasi
communities were displaced and permanently lost their lands. The government later brought
Bangalees from various parts of the country and settled them in the traditional lands of ‘Adibasi’104.
Adibasis of the CHT never got back to their original and traditional lands, and they are still fighting
for their survival and self-determination. The state’s policy-making and implementing machinery
are depriving them of repression. Through these experiences, they knew once they allow the
foreign company to develop open-pit mining, they would be displaced and could never return to
their ancestral homes.
The fear of displacement from livelihoods, fertile croplands and limited opportunity of the
social sector played a vital role in the motivation of the protesters to join the Phulbari Khoni
Andolon. Adibasis were motivated to protest because they knew from their previous and ancestral
history of deprivation that open-pit mining in the area would make them vulnerable to state
repression, and it would be impossible for them to deal with the new situation. They were selfeducated to recognize that if they were displaced from their lands, they would never return to their
agricultural lands, households and sacred places.105 If the company would have developed mining
in that area, at least fifty thousand Adibasis would be permanently displaced. An Adibasi Santal
elderly woman told me that they went to the Gherao and aftermath protests because they did not
want to be dislocated. She said, “the government can extract coal when they have money and have
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their own technology, but by consulting local people, not through the foreign company and not
with open-pit mining.”106
An Adibasi respondent was motivated to protest the company when he heard from a consultant
that they would provide a single room for a whole family as part of their resettlement plan. I find
his question, “how can we manage to live with family and domestic animals in a single room?”
was valid, as most Adibasi households have domestic animals such as cattle, goats, ducks, and
hens on which their livelihoods also depend; thus, they need larger spaces for taking care of
them.107 The company’s resettlement plans have not provided clear indications of ‘how much
household property they would get.’
ICESCR and ICCPR (Article 1), Agenda 21 (Paras. 7.6 and 7.9 (b)), Para 2(h) of the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Article 27), Habitat II and III have kept various
provisions of right to adequate housing and settlement for people and the obligation of states to
refrain from illegal eviction and displacement. However, displacement or forced eviction would
violate the right to protection and housing as well as the rights to freedom of movement. Moreover,
problems affecting the displaced people as a result of establishing such projects are very difficult
to envisage in the category of violation of the law. The Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights concluded that forced evictions or involuntary displacement are prima facie
incompatible with the requirement of the ICESCR, and all persons should possess a degree of
security that guarantees legal protection against displacement.108
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Adibasis could not believe the company’s promise about the resettlement plan of building a
larger community in the name of an ‘ideal village’, which they think is not feasible. Since Adibasis
understood that if the mine is implemented, they could not stay in their homes, they would lose
their agricultural properties: ‘there is no point of living’ and ‘begging would be their ultimate
destination’ despite having their lands on which they depend,109 so they resisted. P. Murmu said
that he would never transfer his lands to anyone, even to the government. He had recalled Adibasis’
struggle to survive in the area. He pointed out that once Adibasis leave the area, they cannot return
to their original place. He said that living in his house and attaining his land is his right to live. He
was ready to die for protecting his lands and consequently, he joined the movement
wholeheartedly.110

5.2.4. False Promise and Fear of Unfair Treatment regarding Compensation
One of the seventeen environmental justice principles confirms that environmental justice
protects the right of all victims of environmental injustice to receive full compensation and
reparations for damage as well as quality health care.111 The United Nations Basic Principles and
Guidelines on Development based Evictions and Displacement states that “Cash compensation
should under no circumstances replace real compensation in the form of land and common
property resources. Where land has been taken, the evicted should be compensated with land
commensurate in quality, size, and value or better.”112 The Bangladesh Constitution guarantees
that ‘no citizen should be deprived of their right to life and property’.113 If the government,
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following the law, wants to take those rights away for implementing a development project,
compensation must be paid.114 Laws that regulate environmental programs in a particular sector
usually allow objections to be raised and provide for compensation for all rights and interests
affected by relevant projects. Therefore, all people who are adversely affected have the right to
ask for compensation.115 Although compensation may do justice to the victim for a time being, the
injury that would happen can be irreparable or may require a long time to recover.
The project’s draft RP also states that most displaced households will become landless because
there is no provision in the plan that Adibasis would receive land for land as compensation.116 The
lack of land-for-land compensation in the Phulbari Coal Project violates both national and
international regulations.117 Adibasis claimed that they do not want money; they want similar types
of agricultural lands. The government and the company, in this case, are responsible for
compensating and relocating those displaced people in their reclaimed lands or properties in a safe
environment. If the government or the company does not comply accordingly, it will be a violation
of international law.118
The company consultants told Adibasi people that if the mine is implemented in their area,
they would not have to work, they would easily be able to lead their entire life with the
compensation the company would provide. They would have small businesses, and many would
get jobs in the mining industry. Many Adibasis agreed to transfer their lands, as the company
promised to provide several times higher price than the actual market price of lands. My key
informant Cherobin Hembrom said:
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“The company and the government agencies tempted us with undue benefits, but we
somehow understood that we would not be benefitted in any way. Local people did not
understand how they are going to be benefitted. They primarily believed the company’s
temptation, but when they understood the reality, they started mobilizing themselves and
protested.”119
The company consultants later told Adibasis that the government had sold their lands to Asia
Energy for mining which is a complete lie. Adibasi people were told that the government would
acquire their lands without giving compensation. However, they would pay well if they give
consent to them. They surveyed about their households, listed the price of everything they belong
to, which they used to write with pencils. They were anxious and scared that the company would
erase the price they promised during the survey and would write the new price.120
Everyone in Phulbari knows that neither they nor the country would benefit from the project.
According to them, the company would not provide proper compensation, which they learned from
two neighboring mine development processes. Referring to the Barapukuria Underground Mining
and Madhyapara Hardrock Mining, which are situated only a few kilometers from Phulbari mining
area, one of my respondents said:
“People whose properties were acquired for mining, they have not received proper
compensation as companies promised. They had not received land for land compensation
either. Now we found that the promises were false. I know a person who was once a
landowner of an acre, now he is working as a day laborer. The money he received has been
spent in a few years. Most of the people who lost their properties and got compensation are
now destitute in a similar way.”121
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Adibasis understood that the mining project would destroy their households and displace them
from their ancestors’ lands, they would not get actual prices of the alienated lands, and they would
not get proper compensation, and subsequently, they would be destitute, marginalized, and
powerless.122 Even in circumstances where agricultural lands and households fell within the
compensation scheme, Adibasis believe that compensation could not be valued properly. Some
Adibasi respondents also told me that the borderline households and agricultural lands of the mine
footprints would also be affected, but those affected lands or households would not be covered
under the compensation scheme. This matter was not discussed or was not taken into consideration,
and consequently, the owners of those lands were not consulted. An Adibasi leader stated:
“I can be an example of this situation. I have seen the map of the projected plan and found
that some of my agricultural lands are included in the planned map, but my house is not
included in the map. According to the map, I would not be displaced but I have to face all
the negative impacts of open-pit mining. I would get ashes and burning heat. It is not only
people of the mining region but also the surrounding communities would be directly
affected.”123
The concern that “people who would be affected invisibly, would not be compensated” was
firmly constituted among Adibasis, and influenced them to attend the protest rally and assemblies.
Although people whose agricultural lands and households fall under a planned map would be
compensated as ‘damages for land loss,’ this compensation would never be valued properly.
Adibasis could easily understand that most of the affected people would never benefit from the
Phulbari Coal Project. During the survey period, landowners who do not cultivate their lands did
not receive compensation for boring or damaging their lands. However, sharecroppers received
compensation for losing their crops. W. Mardi was telling me that there were six pillars (for each
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pillar he got 33 BDT or 0.5 CAD) on his lands and as he was cultivating the lands, he received
compensation. Some respondents said if they would have known that the government has leased a
company to extract coal by destroying their lands, they would never give consent to bore in their
lands.
When Adibasis heard that they would be more affected and would lose all agricultural lands
with less compensation, Adibasi community leaders, their traditional institutions, and some
Adibasi NGOs of the Phulbari mining region started opposing the project strongly.124 Mobilization
around the value of fostering agricultural production, small businesses and household craft rather
than coal mining motivated people to join the movement.125 Changing the voices of Adibasi
protesters from low to high inspired them to continue and get more involved in the protest. When
they heard a committee was formed in Phulbari town to protest, they went forward and showed
their interest to protest. The project is going to represent a clear breach of multiple rights. The right
not to be deprived of one’s own resources, the right not to be deprived of one’s livelihood, and the
right to both life and family life will not be respected. Therefore, the lives of displaced people will
be disrupted for unwanted hazardous activity. In the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, the
government must take responsibility to protect the rights of local and Adibasi peoples. Also, the
government must engage the company to ensure environmental justice for all.

5.2.5. Claiming a “Fair Share” of Benefits Accruing from the Project
The Phulbari open-pit mining project would destroy houses, educational institutions, religious
institutions, and agricultural lands permanently. While it would make powerful people more
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prosperous, it was not done for the community and the country as a whole. 126 An Adibasi leader
told me with frustration:
“Some advantaged people of the country would be benefitted from this project. Those are
nobody but policy and decision-makers. They make plans, lease out natural resources to
foreign corporations, displace and relocate poor people. Some of them already made huge
money for their double-standard actions. This project would never benefit people who live
in Phulbari, Briampur, and Nawabgonj. The majority of people have to lose everything.”127
Critics of the neoliberal policy argue that through these sorts of development projects, the
government only sees the benefits of corporations and the government instead of seeing the
benefits of citizens or the country as a whole. The government does not see the benefits of local
people; instead, TNCs are being benefitted through the government’s policies. Some Adibasis
bargained with the company consultants at an individual level. One of my Adibasi respondents
told a consultant, “if any mineral resource is found under our lands, that belongs to us, we are the
owner of that resource.” The consultants reminded him that the government would forcefully evict
them anyway; in that case, they would lose their compensation. Like him, some other respondents
said that they should have shared in the mineral resource found on their lands. However, Cherobin
does not think that way. He said:
“Although I have not seen anyone who claimed the share, I don’t see any problem of
claiming the shares from the company or the government. We are the people who would
lose everything, which can never be valued. Although we would get price compensation
for our lands, we cannot buy lands with the compensated money in this land-scarce
country.”128
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Cherobin told me that when he understood that they could not stop mining in their region, the
government might evict them, and for that reason, he asked for several times more price of their
lands and household goods. Their argument was if the government provide them the same number
of agricultural lands in another location, they will leave the place for the better interest of the
country. Moreover, Adibasi communities had decided after discussion in Manjhi Parishad
meetings that since they must leave their lands permanently, the government must provide the
same quality and quantity of agricultural lands for them in another place. The government must
settle the prices of houses, household goods, and cattle, trees, etc. reasonably. Adibasis also
decided and told consultants and policy-makers that people who want coal mine should move to
Phulbari, and people of Phulbari go to their places. Cherobin Hembrom told that people who did
not go through the refugee situation would not understand their pain. Other people may want
development projects in Adibasi areas, but they would never leave their place for mining. He said,
“now, we can demand a mine development in Dhaka and evacuate the whole city, they would
never leave their place.”129

5.2.6. Environmental Degradation Risk and Health Insecurity
The Phulbari Coal Project would lead to severe pollution of air, water, and soil that has plagued
communities living with coal extraction and coal-fired power plants, with grave health impacts on
the local people. Environmental degradation and negative impacts on local biodiversity, drinking
and irrigation water scarcity, climate change, and public health were other concerns for local
Adibasis.130 They learned about the destructive impacts of open-pit mining through NCBD
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campaigners, who showed documentary films on open-pit mining projects in different places
and educated the villagers effectively. They understood that if the project would have been
developed, people could not lead their normal life in the region.131 An open-pit mining method
needs water of the whole area to be drained and the topsoil to be removed. This could cause
deforestation and loss of productivity of agricultural lands.
My Adibasi respondents told me that their livelihood largely depends on forest and wetlands.
They collect flowers for their cultural festivals, which they observe for centuries. They use dry
leaves and bunches of forest trees for cooking. They hunt fishes from nearby wetlands. Adibasis
manage their surrounding natural resources sacredly using their traditional knowledge, which
learned from their thousand years of ancestral traditions. They identify nature as ‘God’.132 They
knew that if the project had been implemented, everything would be destroyed. They are also
concerned about the Sundarbans forest. An Adibasi leader told me that this sea-lying largest
mangrove forest has been saving the country from huge destruction of cyclones.133
Local people would face various health problems too. Extracted coal would create dust and
pollute air and soil, which in various ways that would affect the human health of the local
communities. An NGO worker told me that one of the major concerns of Adibasis and other
protesters to attend the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was environmental degradation, which ultimately
would affect their health. He said, “although my village is five kilometers far from the minefield,
villagers would be affected due to mining activities.”134 He learned about the impact of mining
from the Barapakuria coalfield. He said, “I was observing the environmental change of the local
area as part of my work in my organization and found that the Barapukuria mine contributes
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various ecological problems. For example, the production of coconuts and other fruits has
drastically decreased.”135

5.2.7. Water and Food Insecurity
Water scarcity throughout the country is visible. Water is not seen in small rivers, which are
affecting irrigation throughout the country. Bangladesh has a network of hundreds of small rivers,
meaning that water pollution in one area can spread over a large area. The Phulbari Coal Project
would divert the Little Jamuna River and suck an aquifer dry for more than 30 years.136 The river
is crossing the mining footprint. I have seen during my field activities that the water level of the
river already went down. To implement the mining project in Phulbari, a huge area needs to be cut
to reach coal that lies 150m to 250m below the surface. To prevent the mine from flooding and to
keep the mine pit dry, huge pumps would run 24 hours a day for the whole mining period. Thus,
the mining operation would need to pump up to 800 million liters of water a day out of the mine.
The discharged water often contains large quantities of toxic shock syndrome (TSS), total
dissolved solids (TDS), and hard and heavy metals, which contaminate the surface and
groundwater. This water is sometimes acidic and pollutes the water system.137 The acid mine
drainage may render water sources undrinkable and contaminate groundwater needed for
agriculture for centuries to come. Water will also be polluted from washing of coal, risking
pollution of surrounding water bodies.138 My Adibasi respondents told me that water quality in the
close vicinity of underground mining in Barapukuria became toxic. One of my respondents told

135

Interview with K. Kisku, Phulbari, March 07, 2016.
H. Withanage, Bangladesh: Phulbari Coal Mine -“Losses beyond Compensation”. Bankwatch. (Quezon City,
Philipines: NGO Forum on ADB, 2008)
137
R. K. Tiwary, “Environmental Impact on Coal Mining on Water Regime and its Management.” (2001) Water,
Air, and Soil Pollution, at 186.
138
Ibid.
136

253

me that people of Barapukuria are not getting enough water from underground tube-wells, which
are largely affecting the production of agriculture. Moreover, the taste of drinking water which
they collect through tube-wells turned bad. My Adibasi and Bangalee respondents informed me
that the water in the area changed sometime after the company started functioning.
Due to mining drain out, the groundwater in an area covering about 500 square kilometers
would be lowered.139 In this case, wells would no longer provide enough water for farmers.
Underground water is the most significant source of water for drinking, cooking, washing, bathing,
and other domestic purposes in the area. The pond-water and river-water are not used for drinking
or cooking by the Adibasis but is used for irrigation purpose. The dry season is the toughest time
for getting water through deep tube wells for every purpose since the water level of the
groundwater-surface goes down. Since farmers of the mining area produce rice twice a year, they
need water frequently for irrigation. Most of my respondents pointed out that although they are
getting enough water for drinking and irrigation now, the vast use of water in the mine operation
would largely affect their agricultural production. Once the mining is finished, Asia Energy plans
to create a huge lake, providing freshwater, fisheries, and recreation; according to the company.
But after more than 30 years of digging, water will be toxic.140 Since their livelihoods are
dependent on agriculture and the water scarcity is obvious due to the mine operation, they
resisted.141
Adibasis are most concerned about losing their agricultural lands on which they depend most.
Adibasis consume rice three times a day for a living and claimed that they would be affected most
due to a shortage of food. Most of the areas of the mining footprint cover agricultural lands, which
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would have been destroyed completely. Moreover, the production of crops would be largely
affected by contaminated air, soil, and water.

5.2.8. Foreign Company and Lack of Transparency
Some of the Adibasi respondents told me that if it were a domestic company, the resistance
would not have been so strong. They were concerned that foreign investors, in the name of
investing and helping the country through extracting natural resources, are stealing national
resources by destroying local ecology and livelihoods. But some disagreed and contended that they
were scared because transnational corporations have a direct connection with the government, and
the government always wants to protect them, which was seen throughout organizing the
movement. Asia Energy, with the help of the government’s law enforcement and security agencies,
repressed the protesters and solidarity groups, which I have shown in the previous chapter.
Consequently, many people could not attend the protest because they were scared and hopeless.
An Adibasi farmer from the Munda community expressed that the experience of corruption in
the Barapukuria coal and power plant project and Modhyapara hard rock mining142 also worked to
motivate people to join the Phulbari Khoni Andolon since landslides are happening more often.143
Adibasi and other protesters have still firmly believed that the company will start developing openpit coal mining in the Phulabri region by creating pressure on the government. Indicating
corruption at Barapakuria Coal Mining, W. Mardi told me that Dalal of the company made huge
money out of doing nothing, but villagers who lost their lands are landless now and becoming
refugees as unexpected impacts of the mining. Local people who would have been evicted from
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their lands did not get proper compensation. People learned from the observation and did not agree
with the open-pit mining process.
Although the Prime Minister has said that the government will not develop a mass destructive
project in Phulbari, which will cause damage to the country’s natural resources and local farmers
and Adibasi people, protesters cannot solely rely on her statement. They want to break ties between
the government and the company so that the company cannot continue their share businesses in
London’s AIM. Furthermore, people have known through transnational networks and advocacy
groups—later published by Wikileaks—that the US government has been continuously planning
to implement the project, as 60% of the company’s shares are owned by USA companies.144 A
prominent environmental lawyer told me that it is common everywhere in the world. This is the
double standard of the donor agencies in the global South where they bring MNCs from the global
North into the scenario. Donor countries do not do this practice in their own countries. But they
go to the global South and corrupt their officials through bribes and undue gifts. When local people
were informed by NCBD and other solidarity groups about the company’s corruption and power,
they found a new spirit to resist the company. As Ram Soren told me, “Asia Energy lost all
credibility, and we will not allow the company in Bangladesh.”145

5.3.

Tactics of the Environmental Justice Movements in Phulbari

The environmental justice movement involves various tactics such as road or long marches,
petitions, rallies, coalition, and community empowerment through litigation, violent and
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nonviolent direct action. In fact, a central debate in environmental justice scholarship is over the
relative efficacy of legal strategies versus ‘direct action’. In the following few paragraphs, I
compare various tactics of the environmental justice movement as observed in Phulbari.

5.2.2. Representative Suit and PIEL
Since the right to life and property is a fundamental right under the Bangladesh Constitution,
the right should be enforceable as a prerogative by the High Court Division (HCD) of the Supreme
Court of Bangladesh (SCB) through exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction.146 The court may issue
an interim order for upholding someone’s right to life and property. However, the HCD cannot
exercise the jurisdiction if the order affects the implementation of any development project.
Therefore, the order can only be given if it is not liable to prejudice the program or if the order
prejudices a development project in any manner, no ad interim injunction can be issued.147
Mohiuddin Farooque, the pioneer of public interest environmental litigation (PIEL) and
environmental justice movement in Bangladesh, argues that if the case is allowed to proceed
against a development project without the power of the court to issue an ad-interim injunction,
there is no jurisdiction to allow the case.148 He states that ad interim injunctions/orders are made
to protect the ends of justice. If the court cannot exercise that extra-ordinary jurisdiction, affected
communities would be deprived of their rights because the due process of civil litigations takes a
long time. If a plaintiff gets a decree in favor of him after 15 years through civil litigation, the
proper justice would not be served. Because in the meantime, the project may be implemented.
Although such a decree can only help the plaintiff to get compensation, local people must face the
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disproportionately negative impact of the project.149 The Bangladesh Code of Civil Procedure of
1908 has a provision of the representative suit where a representative on behalf of affected
communities can file a petition to the court of justice to protect their rights (only to seek
compensation as a remedy).
PIEL is considered as an effective strategy to ensure environmental justice in South Asian
countries, especially in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It can provide innovative and accessible
remedies to the people affected by environmental degradation or development projects. PIEL is a
vehicle through which people can be aware of their right to environment, making environmental
justice accessible to the common people and enhancing their participation in the environmental
decision-making process.150 In India, a PIEL can be filed only against the state government, central
government, municipal authorities or any other authority that comes within the purview of a ‘state’
under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution. The litigation can be brought in the Supreme Court of
India under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution, in the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution, and in the Court of Magistrate under Section 133 of the Criminal Procedure Code.151
But in Bangladesh, a PIEL is only filed in the HCD of the SCB through a writ petition to challenge
the action of the public bodies or individuals violating environmental law and regulations. It
prohibits the alleged industry or body from violating environmental law and regulations by
obtaining pre-emptory order to perform a specific duty in public law.152 PIEL also enables the
accountability of the government for its failure to protect the environment and human lives.
Moreover, it extended the meaning of the fundamental rights under the Constitution of Bangladesh
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to ensure everyone is entitled to live in a healthy environment.153 According to Abdullah Al
Faruqe, many conflicts can be avoided and resolved if civil society and NGOs are engaged in the
decision-making process.154 PIEL is considered as ‘participation’ because the suit engages
complainants and respondents in the court’s court process.
The availability of PIEL in Bangladesh is a result of relentless efforts by environmental lawyers
and NGOs. In that process, many human rights and environmental NGOs have set their priority
issues for PIEL, and by instituting PIEL before the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, NGOs have
been making governmental agencies accountable to perform their duties by enforcing
environmental regulations.155 However, the practice of PIEL instituted by NGOs through a writ
petition to the SCB to protect the environment and human dignity was not achieved easily in
Bangladesh. BELA is a pioneer in introducing PIEL in Bangladesh and has filed many PIEL for
the protection of the environment and human life. There was a question among judges whether an
NGO or an individual, who is not affected by any action of a public body or any development
project, has locus standi (standing right) as there was no clear direction, understanding, and
manifestation in the Constitution or any statute. Article 102 of the Constitution allows ‘any person
aggrieved’ to file a suit in these cases. In Dr. Mohiuddin Farooque vs. Bangladesh, Ccivil Appeal
No. 24 of 1995, the apex court resolved the issue of locus standi in PIEL and extended the phrase
‘any person aggrieved’ to ‘any person with sufficient interest’. The petitioner was the SecretaryGeneral of BELA and he achieved locus standi.156 There are some other cases through which
environmental NGOs and individuals have instituted PIEL on ‘sufficient interest’ grounds. 157

153

Farooque, supra note 114 at 152.
Ibid.
155
Faruque, supra note 69 at 348-349.
156
Farooque, supra note 114 at 7.
157
Md. Idrisur Rahman v. Shahiduffin Ahmed and others 51 (1999) DLR, AD, 162. Syeda Rizwana Hasan vs.
Bangladesh & Ors 9 ADC (2012) 816
154

259

Moreover, the judgment also recognized the right to a healthy environment by analyzing the
constitutional guarantee.158 Therefore, the court can initiate legal reforms by filling the gaps
between law, policies and institutional frameworks through PIEL. The judges in Bangladesh
through suo moto rule have redressed injustices committed by government agencies in
contravention to the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.159
I asked a BELA spokesperson if the organization could file a PIEL against Asia Energy or the
government. She said that since a PIEL cannot be filed against the company and therefore, the
court would not hear about the issue of the case. In this regard, BELA or anybody who has locus
standi could file a writ against the government, but the writ would not stand against the
government, because the court may reason that there is no valid agreement between the company
and the government, and the project did not harm anybody yet, and their rights were not violated.
Any affected person or any NGO could file a suit before the environmental court about the validity
of the EIA, but since DoE accepted the company’s EIA which they published later and granted an
environmental clearance certificate, the court, in practice, might not hear the case.

5.3.1. Violence, Repression and ‘Occupying Streets’
5.3.1.1.

Phulbari Khoni Andolon

Most of the respondents of my research stated that ‘occupying the street,’ is an effective way
to achieve justice for people in the Bangladeshi perspective. During interviews, my respondents
shared multiple examples of cases of harassment of Adibasis and non-Adibasis in the mining
footprint. Many protesters were beaten by both by Dalal and security forces before, during, and
after the movement. When protesters heard that ‘three or more people were killed’, they occupied

158
159

Ibid.
Faruque, supra note 69 at 354.

260

the street as their weapon to show their strength. During the four-day protest in Phulbari in 2006,
thousands of local people occupied major streets. Adibasi men and women who could not attend
the rally on 26th August 2006, they cooked, and feed protesters sang, and danced with traditional
dresses on Dhaka-Dinajpur Highway by blocking all communication with the capital city which
inspired hundreds of protesters. They were unmoved until the six-point demands were signed by
the government and NCBD, although security forces tortured unarmed protesters. There were
multiple clashes between protesters and security forces reported during this period.
The government assured the company that they could implement the project despite having
huge local resistance. During the campaign stage of the movement, the government deployed law
enforcement agencies to suppress the protesters from the very beginning of the mobilization. The
company personnel only contacted influential local people, whom they thought, could influence
poor farmers. They manipulated those people with bribes and other undue amenities without
making any connection with the mass of people. According to one of my respondents, company
consultants bribed local administrative authorities. Dalal was empowered with huge money and
power. The company provided money, and the local administration sheltered them. Dalal and other
company agents on different occasions tried to break the ties which were built among protesters.
They used different tactics to stop the movement.
James Anaya, in his “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”
of UN General Assembly, states:
“Many cases have come to the attention of the Special Rapporteur in which Indigenous
individuals or communities have suffered repression for their opposition to extractive
projects. In several of the cases, Indigenous individuals and groups opposing extractive
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projects have been met with acts of intimidation or violence, including violence resulting
in death.”160
Anaya demands that states must adopt necessary measures to secure the rights of Indigenous
peoples so that they can express their disagreement with mining development in their territories.
The states and companies must provide training to their security forces to protect Indigenous
communities from any act of intimidation and violence.161 Anaya also recommends that companies
who are developing resource extractive projects should take reasonable measures to protect
Indigenous cultural and social patterns by adopting sensible policies and practices following
relevant human rights standards.162 Justifying the demands of various environmental justice
leaders, Bullard and Johnson argue that no community or nation, in any race or color, should be
allowed to become a victim of environmental degradation. In connection with the arguments of
Anaya, the authors claim that companies and governments have often exploited local Indigenous
communities through their unsound and risky operations.163 The communities are also
economically deprived due to unequal political power arrangements in society.
In the case of the Phulbari Coal Project, concerned international organizations including the
UN urged the Bangladesh government to stop the project. James Anaya, including six other Special
Rapporteurs164 of the UN, issued a joint press release on 28th February 2012, calling for an
immediate halt to the project and conveyed their concerns about violations of fundamental human
rights of hundreds of thousands of people, including Indigenous peoples.165 They stated,
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“Displacement on this scale, particularly of Indigenous peoples, is unacceptable without their free,
prior and informed consent, and poses an immediate threat to safety and standards of living.”166
The experts warned the government of Bangladesh that the “Phulbari coal mine should not be
allowed to proceed because of the massive disruptions it is expected to cause.”167 In the wake of
the protest, a Bangladesh Supreme Court Committee recommended the project be stopped as they
found it to hurt the environment and Indigenous peoples. The court later asked the company to
come up with proposals for an environmental rehabilitation project and compensation to meet the
demands of protesters.168
I identify that the Asia Energy Office Gherao Kormosuchi against the company was successful
because the outcome of the movement reflected the demand of all people. Throughout the period,
the protesters had been repressed by security forces, local powerful political leaders, and their
goons. Many people could not protest publicly due to political pressures and criminal charges
brought against them. Their anger was great, which was reflected in the Phulbari Khoni Andolon.
In the following two sections, I incorporate examples of Bangladeshi direct action campaigns as
part of environmental justice movements. The first one occurred between 2005 and 2007
(concurrently with the Phulbari resistance movement), where Adibasi communities occupied
streets and became successful without forming a coalition with national and transnational
organizations. I am illustrating two other environmental movements where protesters are still
fighting to be successful.
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5.3.1.2.

Garo Movement to Protect Madhupur Forest

As part of the Forest Department of Bangladesh’s strategy to construct eco-parks aiming to
protect the remaining forest resources and to create employment for local people, an eco-park
project called the Madhupur National Park Development, popularly known as the Madhupur Ecopark, was planned to be constructed in the Madhupur forest in 1999. The Department would
construct a boundary wall occupying 3000 acres out of the 21,000 acres of the total forest land.
The World Bank and ADB supported and financed this eco-park project by giving loans to the
Department.169 The proposed project would create picnic spots, lakes, ponds, and guesthouses to
provide recreational facilities for promoting eco-tourism. Moreover, a road would be built along
the boundary wall so that visitors could walk around the forest.170 The government’s concern was
that national forests were being destroyed by local people, although Adibasi Garo171 and Koch172
communities, who have been living in this forest for several hundred years, rejected the
allegation.173 Their livelihoods largely depend on forest resources, which they manage
traditionally. They also cultivate bananas and pineapples. They believe that ‘forest is the Mother’
because their survival depends on the forest, and there is no point in ‘killing their Mother’.
Moreover, many cluster villages are surrounded by this core area of the forest, where many
Bangalees migrated lately. They cleared some portions of forestlands and grabbed Adibasi
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people’s agricultural and traditional lands. They claimed that the government also alienated their
lands in the name of various projects.174 The Department started a rubber plantation project in the
forest by wiping off 8,000 acres of Sal forest with the loan from ADB and the World Bank.
According to Adibasi communities, banana and pineapple plantations are largely being affected
due to the commercial rubber plantation.175
In this case, Adibasi Garo claimed that they heard the news from media reports and later from
the local administration. The government never asked the surrounding communities whether they
want the eco-park or not. They were never consulted, and therefore, they were not involved in the
decision-making process. Hearing the news of the eco-park, local Garo started resisting the
government’s decision, believing that the eco-park project will, directly and indirectly, affect their
livelihood. The project would obstruct their freedom of movement, which is guaranteed by the
Bangladesh Constitution.176 They formed small groups in each village to discuss the issue, formed
a coalition with some NGOs, and contacted media. They also formed a committee named the
Committee for Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights and Environmental Preservation (CIPLREP) to
protect their interests.177 The Committee negotiated with Department officials, local
administration, and respected ministers to halt the project and submitted a ten-point demand to the
government. However, in most cases, the meetings failed to reach a firm solution. They organized
several protest rallies, focus group discussions, human chains, roadblocks, assemblies and street
events against the project.
During the protests that started in 2000, many Adibasi Garos were arrested, tortured, and
repressed in ways such as filing false criminal cases against protest leaders. A Garo activist named
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Piren was killed, and several were injured on January 3, 2004, when security forces and the forest
department’s guards opened fire on a rally organized by the Committee. The project was
suspended, and the Department was silent until January 2007 when a military-backed new
government came into power. But the death of an Adibasi leader named Choles Ritchil by RAB
force geared the movement up at a new pace.178 Protesters occupied the street until the government
declared the project was suspended. Both the incidents attracted the attention of political parties,
educated professionals and the media, as the Madhupur killings received widespread coverage in
the national dailies. The killing of Piren and Richil boosted the spirit of determination in the Garo
community. They were now ready to sacrifice everything for their cause. Adibasi Garo protesters
did not stop resisting the powerful sectors, although they still have been facing various repressive
actions of the administration. Up to 2007, nothing went wrong against their interests. The
protesters, through negotiation, could create pressure on the Forest Department and could make
the government understand that the forest is their only place for their livelihoods, and they had
been depending on it for centuries.179 Moreover, through their protests, Adibasi Garos pointed out
that they must be recognized as Adibasi and, as such, they have the right to participate in the
decision-making process. Maybe the conflict could be avoided if they were allowed to explain
through public participation that how the project will impact them. In that case, decision-makers
could have designed the project accordingly. The current government appointed a Garo member
of the parliament to the cabinet in the last two consecutive terms. Like Phulbari mining protesters,
Garo protesters also see ‘occupy the street until their demands are fulfilled’ as the solution to
resolve problems in Bangladesh.
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5.3.2.3. Banshkhali and Rampal Movements
In both Phulbari and Madhupur Adibasi protests, there have been violence, killings, arrests,
deception, and lack of transparency that coincides with protesters’ accounts of the tactic of
‘occupying the street.’ But the statement is not always true, even in the Bangladesh perspective.
While I was researching and conducting my field activities in the Phulbari mining area and Dhaka,
Bangladesh, I observed some other events of protest movements stopping at least two coal-fired
power plants (Banshkhali and Rampal) which the protesters thought would be harmful and
disastrous for residents and the environment. In both cases, local protesters gathered together and
protested strongly but failed to stop the operations. The Environmental Justice Atlas (EJATLAS)
labeled both movements as failed environmental justice movements; whereas, Phulbari was
labeled as successful on their website. I have been trying to understand why the same group
(NCBD), who was successful in Phulbari, failed in other environmental justice campaigns in
Bangladesh.
In Banshkhali of Chattogram district, at least five local people were killed by the police force
in four subsequent protest movements to halt an imported coal-based power plant before April 4,
2016.180 The controversial joint venture two 660MW coal plants are being built by a joint venture
company (JVC) comprising two private companies, one from Bangladesh and another from China,
on a forcefully-acquired coastal 600 acres of coastal land even before conducting an EIA.181
Although the company failed to get an environmental clearance certificate from DoE as of May 6,
2016,182 and the company suspended the work after the killing incidents, local protesters are
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worried about their future.183 The Committee to Protect Households and Graveyards organized a
protest rally where thousands of local people joined together to protest and ask the company to
stop developing the project in Gondamara, Banhskhali. Police and local goons attacked and killed
four people and left hundreds injured.184 However, police filed criminal cases against more than
3000 protesters, who left their villages to avoid arrests. The local protesters claimed that the raids
were being conducted to foil their movement against a coal-fired power plant there.185 The locals
alleged that JVC’s local agents forced them to sell their lands to the company. Some of them were
deceived as well.186 They think that since the company is allegedly a close ally of the current ruling
party, they would easily take over the place for building coal-fired power plants disregarding the
local outcries.187
Due to my field activity in Phulbari, I could not attend a five-day long march from Dhaka to
Rampal organized by NCBD in April 2016 as part of the ongoing protest, a joint venture coalbased power plant in Rampal of Bagherhat District. The protest began several years ago
among residents threatened with displacement by a JVC project in the event of a deal between
Bangladesh’s Power Development Board (PDB) and India’s National Thermal Power Corporation
(NTPC). The JVC decided to set up a 1350MW coal-based power plant at Rampal, a few
kilometers away from the Sundarbans forest, at the cost of $1.5 billion.188 The Bangladesh
government acquired 1,834 acres of farmlands without the consent of the people by using the
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police force and local goons even before the EIA was completed.189 The residents are poor farmers
and fishermen whose livelihood depends on agriculture and shrimp cultivation. People of
Bangladesh started protesting when they came to know that the plant would devastate the
Sundarbans and farmlands, displace local people, and disrupt their livelihoods. NCBD organized
another long march to stop this project in 2013 when twenty thousand participants demanded an
immediate halt to the project.190 In May 2015, more than forty environmental groups signed a
declaration in a conference in Dhaka denouncing the Rampal coal-fired power plant for its
potential “to cause significant damage to the unique ecosystem of the forest.”191 The activists
pointed out that the contract for the power plant is non-transparent and unequal. Many alleged that
the Indian government would be more beneficial than the Bangladesh government. The protestors
requested the government to explore an alternative site and means to generate energy without
destroying the Sundarbans. Multiple protests and mobilizations against the project have also
happened in India.192
NCBD has been assisting both Banshkhali and Rampal protesters by providing information
and strategies. None of the demonstrations that local people organized were able to attract national
or international media and solidarity groups’ attention as the Phulbari Khoni Andolon did.
Moreover, they are not as directly involved in this protest as they were involved in the Phulbari
Khoni Andolon. On the other hand, the government and companies learned from the Phulbari
experience. Since protests were not organized strongly like Phulbari and the media was silent on
the government’s repression, the project proponents in both cases created terror situations so that
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protesters could not mobilize large numbers. Additionally, national solidarity and other groups are
under surveillance. As a result, those groups cannot support them even after local protesters
contacted them. Protesters were barred from meetings, assemblies, and rallies. Moreover, local
protesters are being harassed at different times.

5.4.

Does the Phulbari Khoni Andolon Constitute an “Environmental
Justice Movement”?

Toffolon-Weiss and Timmons Roberts argue that direct actions and violent protest tactics are
not always successful. According to the authors, groups with unified, centralized, and
bureaucratized structures were more successful than groups with more decentralized
organizational structures. But, the use of a legal strategy combined with other strategies, such as
demonstrations and lobbying, by protesters can lead to a successful outcome.193 In my analysis,
the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was successful because local, national and transnational
environmental activists are tied together. An impression built in Bangladesh that ‘occupying the
street’ can bring success, but only ‘occupying the street’ alone cannot be fruitful unless the whole
movement is unified and centralized. The Phulbari Khoni Andolon was well planned and moved
forward with the local-national-transnational alliance. I have mapped out and analyzed the
Phulbari Khoni Andolon, which, I believe, is part of the global environmental justice movement,
with some elements distinct to the global South
I describe how this environmental justice movement requires two types of actors such as
grassroots groups (Phulbari Rokkha Committee (PRC), Jatiyo Adibasi Parishad (JAP), NCBD and
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Adibasi leaders) and network groups (BAPA, Bangladesh environment network (BEN), and
transnational environmental justice organizations (TEJOs)). Grassroots groups engage actively in
physical participation in the field, and network groups maintain coalitions with grassroots groups
by providing support and encouragement and by pressuring the project’s proponents and state
actors. Local grassroots groups are multi-political groupings, civil society members, and NGOs
who desire to protect their homelands, natural resources, and the environment from destruction.
These groups including civil society demand for economic reform, transparent, accountable, and
participatory governance, and action against corruption and human rights abuses.194
Organizing the Phulbari Khoni Andolon was not limited to local considerations of the impact
of the open-pit mining on local and Adibasi communities of the Phulbari mining area. Some local
activists, NGOs, and national campaign groups collaborated in the process of forming the concepts
of resistance, which is inspired by the discourse of environmentalism, nationalism, and anticolonialism that ultimately resulted in the 26th August Phulbari movement. In this case, local
communities and activists were facilitated by the national groups to raise their voices against the
open-pit mining involving the interaction of national and local understandings. Their conception
was to protect the national interest and the rights of the affected people.
Most of the network groups are NGOs and advocacy groups who have technical expertise and
professionalism. They can emerge from both host-states and home-states and from other countries
who work with solidarity. They help the local grassroots with academic and policy research and
provide information related to projects in their territory, which ultimately assists in building a
successful resistance movement. TEJOs are inspired by the global discourses of environmentalism
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in the global South.195 They create pressure on the company and both host-state and home-state
governments through their research, publications, and activism.
Chart 1: Coalition Mapping of the Phulbari Movement: Pressure, Power, and Knowledge
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Local and national protesters, and TEJOs may not share common interests, but they collaborate
with others in aiding the communities against the transnational corporation, in this case, Asia
Energy, and form a coalition to resist injustice.196 It is that kind of campaign that establishes
environmental justice. However, there is another Adibasi environmental justice movement had
been happening simultaneously in Bangladesh, where only local protesters succeeded in fighting
an eco-park project of the government’s forest department that was believed to harm the
livelihoods and subsistence of Adibasi communities.
From the Phulbari Khoni Andolon experience, local and national settings of the movement
may not completely stop the operation of the open-pit mining, as the company has a great influence
over the government. The company has both IFIs and the host government who want the opencast project to go forward for economic development, although research says the project would
harm local livelihoods and would not be beneficial for the country. Again, the company’s allies
(shareholders) are powerful Western governments and a group of companies who have all sorts of
power to implement a project and can apply their influence on host governments.197 However, they
do not take the risk in every case. If they find the opposition or protest is weak, they use their
power.
In this case, the coalition between national and transnational network groups has made the
Phulbari Khoni Andolon strong, which created pressure on the government, the company, and IFIs
to keep them away from developing the project. Core movement actors from NCBD have built a
coalition with the Adibasi and their traditional governance institutions through which protesters
understood their future roadmap for resisting the company. They have educated themselves,
motivated themselves, and resisted with the spirit of ‘we would rather die.’ The movement actors
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have built a coalition with different local and national environmental and Adibasi NGOs and civil
society members who have supported them with various resources. When NCBD leaders found
that local and national coalition alone may not stop the company from building the project after
experiencing the repressive activities in Phulbari, they created coalitions with TEJOs. TEJOs put
pressure on the company through its networks, advocacies, and activism. They pressured the host
government by publishing reports and organizing protests. IFIs were also driven by their actions;
consequently, ADB pulled themselves away from funding the company.
Suzana Sawyer investigates how neoliberal interventions of MNCs victimize local and
Indigenous peoples and bind them to protest.198 She argues:
“A shared concern with neoliberal economic policies of privatization and multinational
investment implemented across the country in the resource sector helped formulate unity
on a national level. Local people are not just the victims of all-powerful globalizing forces;
rather their movement strategies invoke the similar transnational processes ‘that enable the
hyper-exploitation under globalization.’”199
Sawyer’s observations emphasize that the success of social movements is defined by a
successful alliance with outside supporters, such as economic groups and environmental groups,
in protesting against state policies that affect local people.200 Sawyer further argues that the protests
against TNCs and their impacts on the land and the rainforests evoke desired conditions of social
justice and accountability.201 In this current case, the protesters and economic and environmental
observers viewed the protest as a successful social movement.
Anu Muhammad, a Professor of Economics and the Secretary of NCBD said in an interview:
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“The 2006 Phulbari coal mine movement was a huge experience for us. It has shown how
people from different ethnic groups, women, and men, joined the resistance movement
even though many from among their leaders were in cahoots with the company. The
movement is unprecedented, both regarding the scale of the uprising and the consciousness
it has ignited and is still successfully resisting this imperialist grabbing project.”202
Muhammad identifies that these counter-hegemonic efforts have mobilized public opinion
against anti-people corrupt deals, and in favor of utilizing natural resources for the country’s own
people and economy.203 According to David Pellow, “critical components of all successful social
movements include organizing and mobilizing resources, framing grievances and goals, and
engaging the political opportunity structures that constrain or enable social change.”204 Pellow
argues that social movements result when the movement actors are excluded from routine decisionmaking processes. Muhammad points out that in the various cases in Bangladesh, policy and
decisionmakers have never considered the outcries for saving natural resources and the
environment as well as protecting the rights of poor farmers and Adibasis.205
In the case of the Phulbari Khoni Andolon, Asia Energy was confident about implementing the
project because they knew that the project was backed by the World Bank, IFC, and ADB, and
consequently, the government would help them. Whenever local people were asking them about
displacement, resettlement plans, and compensation issues, the company could barely inform
them. Most of my respondents claimed that the decision of the project development was taken
without consulting with them. However, people of the Phulbari mining area were happy to hear
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that a significant coal reserve was found in their area, and they accepted the decision of mining
initially. They thought the project would be underground mining, like the neighboring Barapukuria
Coal Project,206 which, they know, has a lesser impact on environment and livelihoods. When they
heard that a foreign company would extract coal through open-cast mining, which would not only
displace people but also destroy the ecology, sacred sites, heritage and biodiversity of the whole
area, they had no option but to protest. Scheidel et al. argue that environmental justice movements
address the impacts of unsustainable and sustainability policies. The actors of movement are,
therefore, the most auspicious social forces for promoting sustainability in society to achieve
change.207 Their struggles against unsustainable extraction, which cause harm to human dignity
and environment, can qualify for both the environmental justice movement and environmental
sustainability.

5.5.

Conclusion

I argue that the demand for public participation in the decision-making process involving
Indigenous and local communities is central to the environmental justice movement and those
communities must be recognized properly. In other words, if Indigenous communities’
participation is not complete, and their rights and cultural aspects are not recognized properly, this
constitutes an environmental injustice. Throughout the discussion of this chapter, I identify that
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the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples (Adibasis) of the Phulbari mining region were not
properly recognized, and their participation in the process of decisions was not considered.
Although the company has published an EIA by following guidelines of Bangladesh and IFIs
where they detailed out every possible outcome for local people and claimed that Adibasi rights
were reflected, the findings of this research indicate differently. Adibasis of the Phulbari area think
that they were not regarded as important actors due to their identity and vulnerability, and as such,
their participation in the process was ignored. Some self-identified Adibasis communities of
Phulbari are recognized while some are not recognized as ‘Indigenous peoples’ by the company,
although some Adibasi leaders of the area claimed that the company would not have recognized if
the current situation would exist that time.
I identify that since Adibasis were not engaged properly, their traditional way of life, land
rights and traditional knowledge have not been recognized. I argue that communities, especially
Indigenous and other marginalized communities including their self-governing authorities, should
have the right to participate in the decision-making process by having the power to approve or
disapprove any project. Although Adibasis are enabled to apply their right to FPIC in this regard,
the company consultants acquired their consents through undue practices. My Adibasi respondents
claimed that the company deceived them by providing wrong and limited information about
compensation, displacement, resettlement and false promises during consultations and surveys.
However, most Adibasi respondents claimed that they were unaware of the consultation processes
as they were not invited. Their concerns were ignored both by the company and the government.
Although Adibasis and other low-income communities articulate that they would face more
risks than other sections of citizens of the country, they have not asked for special benefits. Very
few Adibasis raised questions about economic value sharing. Consequently, some Adibasi leaders
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were very angry and mentioned that policy and decision-makers who live in the capital should
exchange their houses and lands. Since they know about the mishandling of compensation through
two neighboring mining projects, they feared of agreeing ‘money’ as ‘compensation’. They
claimed a similar kind of agricultural and household property as compensation instead of money.
However, their claims for land-for-land compensation were ignored. The company consultants
nowhere in ESIA mentioned about Adibasi claims of land-for-land compensation. Adibasi and
non-Adibasi communities of Phulbari resisted because they thought that they might not be
compensated properly due to longstanding lack of recognition of their rights. They argue that the
government has the responsibility to make decisions based on the fair distribution of risks and
benefits among different actors in the case of mineral resource extraction. But the governments
argue that the decision would bring the greatest benefit to the greatest number.
The company’s recent non-transparent activities, ties with powerful actors, and repression
experiences made them believe that allowing Asia Energy to develop the project in Phulbari would
be disastrous, and their fate would be becoming environmental refugees. My Adibasi and Bangalee
respondents frequently mentioned that the company tried to manipulate their straightforwardness
through undue practices such as temptation, gifts, threat, intimidation, deception, lies, and
repression through security forces and Dalal. Moreover, the company consultants misrecognized
the rights and traditional lifestyles of Adibasi communities, and consequently, their movements
against the company became successful and gained national and international focus. The company
failed because local people already were prepared to sacrifice their lives, which I have shown in
Chapter III by incorporating their conversations and accounts. They argue that there is a real threat
to their social, economic and cultural security, to their health security, to the local environment,
and to their right to participate in the decision-making process. All these threats establish a risk to
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the recognition of their humanity. Through their movement, Adibasi communities claim that
destruction of their livelihoods in the name of development can never bring real development for
them. According to them, a problem cannot be solved without addressing the sustainability of the
solution which, however, may create new environmental conflicts through a redistribution of
environmental benefits and burdens. I argue that all actors, local, national and transnational, who
are involved in fighting to stop unsustainability, can be termed as environmental activists.
Environmental activists can address this issue of justice through their protests, campaigns,
advocacy and solidarity against unsustainable policies.
I have identified two forms that environmental justice movements take in Bangladesh. The first
one is through the court process, and the other is through protest or occupying the street to achieve
environmental justice for affected communities. The emergence of the environmental justice
movement in Bangladesh started with winning a public interest environmental litigation where an
NGO achieved standing right in filing a case in the Supreme Court of Bangladesh on behalf of
affected communities against a government authority who carried out a development project.
Before that, there was no clear direction in the statutes that ‘who has the right to fight’ against the
government or public bodies that harm surrounding people and environment. Again, ‘occupying
the street’ for protecting the rights and interests of affected communities is seen as another form
of environmental justice movement in Bangladesh where some are successful, and some are not.
By analyzing some protest movements in Bangladesh, I argue that the success of any
environmental justice movement depends on how the protesters are unified and how their claims
are presented.
The Phulbari resistance was not only limited to locals, but some national economic and
environmental campaign groups also were involved in the protest movement. I have mapped out
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the building of a coalition among local protesters, national and transnational environmental justice
organizations groups through which everyone is connected to protest the company’s illegal
activities and the government’s repression. Local and national groups collaborated in the
resistance, which was inspired by discourses of environmentalism, nationalism, and anticolonialism. Local communities were encouraged by NCBD in this case to raise their voices
against the open-pit mining involving the interaction of national and local considerations. Such
communities aimed to protect the national interest and the interest of affected people in the mining
region. Other groups, such as international campaign and solidarity groups, also joined with local
and national groups. However, local and national public interest groups and protesters, and
transnational environmentalist organizations come together to give a general meaning and further
momentum to the resistance movement, which falls within the environmental justice movement.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The dissertation has examined the claims of Adibasi communities in a coalmine development
process in Bangladesh by a London-based multinational corporation that ultimately culminated in
violent protests in 2006. The projected mining footprint is densely populated by different ethnic
communities, including Adibasis and Bangalees, whose livelihoods depend on agriculture and
small businesses. This research identified that some traditional groups of the mining region call
themselves ‘Adibasi’, which, to them and the Bangladesh government, is synonymous to the global
term Indigenous peoples. Moreover, non-Adibasis or local Bangalees also refer to the distinct
groups as Adibasi, and they are comfortable with this term. The dissertation started by synthesizing
theoretical and conceptual literature on Indigenous rights, detailed the groups’ struggles against
powerful actors, outlined the dominant environmental justice framework, and situated the groups’
resistance in the transnational or global environmental justice movement. By incorporating various
theoretical understandings, the research examined the claims of Adibasi communities and other
actors and what motivated them to join in the Phulbari resistance movement in Bangladesh. The
research focused on the accounts of Adibasi communities and local and national activists in
organizing the movement and their ultimate goals. In doing so, the dissertation investigated
whether the protesters’ claims fit within the dominant understandings of the environmental justice
movement by analyzing environmental justice frameworks such as recognition, distribution, and
participation. However, throughout the dissertation, the recognition element played a vital role,
and the specific elements of environmental justice movements as they play out in the global South
became critical.
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The journey of my research started in 2010 when I heard from an Adibasi person during his
sharing the movement experience in Dhaka, Bangladesh. My central questions surfaced: How is it
possible? Why are they still bearing their spirit of resisting? Why did not they forget their
movement experience? Why are they still resisting whenever they hear about the development of
open-pit mining in their region? Why do they not want the coal mine though it is said to bring
economic gain for the country and the local people? In the aftermath of the movement, many
researchers have examined the struggle from multiple angles, but few have considered the
Indigenous peoples’ own perception of their resistance. I was asked several times during the
dissemination of this research in different conferences and informal meetings about whether
communities who are demanding their recognition as Indigenous peoples are Indigenous peoples
or not. I argue that recognition of the rights and identity of these communities as Indigenous
peoples is the most important element in their struggle for justice. Adibasi communities of
Bangladesh have consistently demanded official recognition as ‘Adibasi’ or ‘Indigenous peoples’.
They have also accentuated the importance of recognition of their rights to land and control over
natural resources. Since Adibasi communities of the mining region are not recognized by the
Bangladesh state as ‘Indigenous peoples’, and there are restrictions from the government in using
both ‘Indigenous peoples’ and ‘Adibasi’ to describe them, national and transnational
developmental agencies tend not to recognize them in their description of activities as it goes
against the government’s interest. In this current case, the company identified only three Adibasi
communities as ‘Indigenous peoples’ in their official documents, which were prepared before the
government’s current recognition politics. However, the company disregarded some other
communities who claim themselves as Indigenous peoples.
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After reviewing various definitions and interpretations of Indigenous peoples adopted by
scholars that are widely accepted in international law, Chapter IV of the dissertation argues that
those self-identified Adibasi groups should be qualified as Indigenous peoples. The research
identified some firm features or characteristics for ‘being Indigenous’ and tested them through the
conversations and accounts collected in the project areas. The findings of this research showed
that Adibasi communities have most of the characteristics of Indigenous peoples set by
international legal instruments to identify their ‘Indigeneity’. I argue that a national government
does not have the authority to define any people; self-definition and self-identification of any
community are enough for identifying or recognizing their status of identity. The claims of Adibasi
communities in Bangladesh towards their recognition as ‘Indigenous peoples’ will not be defeated
regardless of the non or misrecognition by the Bangladeshi government, and the rights embodied
in international will be applied to those people.
In Chapter II, I focus on the description of the Phulbari Coal Project and conclude that it would
be destructive for local people, their livelihood, natural environment, and local biodiversity. The
Bangladesh government’s neoliberal policy that encouraged MNCs to invest in economic
development projects never worked, which the research showed by examining three MNCs’
intervention cases in resource extractive projects. The dissertation demonstrates that the
governments, in different regimes after the introduction of neoliberal policy, have been dealing
with destructive incidents in mineral resources that occurred by MNCs and identified that MNCs
are more powerful than many states in the global South regarding benefit sharing. Besides, MNCs
often cannot be held responsible for their destructive actions due to their ties with powerful states,
financial institutions, and other actors.
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Returning to the issue of the Phulbari open-pit coal project, Asia Energy has been selling shares
in the London Stock Exchange (Alternative Investment Market) in the name of the ‘Phulbari Coal
Project’, which TEJOs and advocacy groups have been protesting arguing that the company is
doing illegal business. According to those solidarity, campaign and advocacy groups, the project
does not exist, and there is no valid agreement between the government of Bangladesh and Asia
Energy. The Bangladesh government recently conceded to activists’ claims about the validity of
the contract and has been planning to a lawsuit against the company for continuing to sell shares
in the name of the project. International organizations such as UNDP, UNICEF, and UN
Rapporteurs have frequently requested the company to scrap the project in Phulbari. ADB, who
had assured the company to finance the project, has confirmed that it would stop aiding the project.
The second chapter also focused on the importance of EIA in resource extractive industries, which
emerged during the neoliberal policy intervention in Bangladesh. The chapter identified that it is
important that the rights and interests of Indigenous peoples that they acquired from international
legal instruments should be reflected in every process of EIA.
Chapter V answered the central question of the research by articulating the claims of Adibasi
communities who thought that they were not adequately recognized as parties of an open-pit coal
project. I argue that if Indigenous peoples, their rights and interests, and cultural aspects were
appropriately reflected in the decision-making process of a project in their territory, they would
receive proper justice. In other words, if these aspects are not recognized, their participation would
not be regarded as complete, which is an injustice. The dissertation demonstrates that the demand
for ‘complete’ participation involving the affected communities is central to environmental justice.
Indigenous communities, including their self-governing authorities, should be enabled to
participate in every process of decision-making by applying their recognized rights under the
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UNDRIP and by having the power to approve or reject any development project in their territories
which will affect their livelihoods.
Through analysis of the field data and other primary research, the dissertation identified that
the rights and interests of Adibasis of the Phulbari mining region were not properly recognized,
and their participation in the process of decisions was not considered. Adibasi respondents of this
research claimed that the project would not only have been a real threat to their social, economic,
cultural, and health security, it would negate the close ties with forest and natural environment on
which their livelihoods depend. All these threats establish a risk to the recognition of their
humanity. Since Adibasis were not appropriately engaged, their traditional way of life, land rights
and traditional knowledge have not been recognized. Findings also showed that the marginalized
communities were deceived in the process of acquiring their consents, providing information about
compensation, displacement, and resettlement and tempted with dreamy benefits and money
during the engagement process. Both the government and the company ignored Adibasi concerns
and dignity in the process. According to Adibasi respondents, their rights, interests, claims, and
demands were not reflected in the EIA because Adibasi communities were not regarded or
recognized as ‘people’ or ‘parties’ or ‘actors’ in the decision-making process. The findings show
that Adibasi protesters were concerned about their non or misrecognition as important actors and
understood that if they were not recognized adequately, they would be ignored in every process of
the decision. Their demands for recognition as ‘actors’ or ‘parties’ in the decision-making process
and recognition of their rights were justified and strong for establishing environmental justice for
themselves.
Additionally, Adibasi protesters were inclined to join the movement because they recognized
that they would face more risks than other communities of people in the region for their long
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history of marginalization and discrimination, which is explored in Chapter IV. However, the
resistance movement did not ask for special favor or benefit for the uneven risks they would face.
Adibasi protesters were very careful about the compensation the company and the government
offered as their neighbors had been going through discrimination. They were scared that the same
thing would happen to them if they allowed the company to develop the project in their locality
and found their way to protest the project. Adibasis contended that the government has the
responsibility to make decisions based on a fair distribution of risks and benefits among different
actors in the case of mineral resource extraction, although the government argued that the decision
would bring the greatest benefit to the greatest number.
It is common throughout not only the global South but also in the global North that in the
process of determining the approvals for resource extracting projects the voices of Indigenous
peoples are rarely heard. Consequently, they find themselves in conflicting situations opposing
development projects and project proponents. Because the governments in the global South are
not defending the interests of their citizens, foreign companies are waived of their accountability
for destructive actions. However, states should prioritize the interests of their citizens. This
research identifies some imperative questions accrued from the accounts of Adibasi respondents,
such as ‘development for whom’? Is it primarily for the benefit of an MNC, or is it for the benefit
of the country and its citizens? Adibasi and non-Adibasi protesters answered these questions and
claimed that the open-pit project would destroy their livelihoods in the name of development,
which would never bring real benefits for them. In this current case, the action of the Bangladesh
government could not ensure that the interests of local farming communities would be established,
nor that Adibasis could exercise their rights. Consequently, the protesters challenged the
government’s decision on the open-pit coal project and successfully founded a conception among
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all citizens that they have been resisting not only because of their own interest but also for the
significant interest of the country. Their resistance showed that the country would not benefit to
the extent that the foreign company would from developing the project, which can be a lesson for
the Bangladesh government.
The misrecognition of Indigenous rights, their distinctiveness, traditional lifestyle and
knowledge, and lack of engagement of local people in decision-making from the project proponent
had generated inspiration among protesters to join the movements in Phulbari which ultimately
became successful and attracted national and international focus. Chapter III incorporated accounts
of Adibasi protesters, farming communities, and other Bagalee activists. Through their accounts
and conversations, the chapter identified some successful dimensions of their organizing and
building of social movements in Phulbari. The popular Phulbari movement started with local
initiatives to protect the lives and nature of the area. The local initiatives built a coalition with a
national campaign group named NCBD, who successfully motivated all walks of people of the
mining region about the negative impact of the open-pit coal project and fought back against the
multi-dimensional powerful forces (the government, the company, and financial institutions)
through a bloody resistance movement in 2006. Surrounding Adibasi communities, regional and
national environmental justice activists aimed to protect the national interests through their
demonstrations. They found that fighting against powerful allies such as MNCs, TNCs, IFIs, and
the host government will be almost impossible for them; in turn, they built coalitions with different
transnational advocacy, solidarity, and environmental justice organizations (TEJOs).
I conclude that the success of any environmental justice movement depends on how those
resisting are unified and how their claims are presented. The current case is an example of a
successful environmental justice movement where all actors of the Phulbari movement (local,
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national, and transnational advocacy groups) tied together to give a general meaning to the
resistance movement, which can be included under the banner of the global environmental justice
movement. The dissertation also analyzed accounts of key organizers who believe that the Phulbari
resistance movement was successful because movement actors and Adibasi people of Phulbari
were able to overcome divide-and-conquer tactics attempted by Asia Energy. The findings of this
research showed that Adibasi and non-Adibasi farming communities were influenced by the
company’s unfair practices such as temptation, gifts, threat, intimidation, deception, lies, and
repression. The MNC managed to use the state’s security forces against protesters. The dissertation
examined that the company’s recent non-transparent activities, ties with powerful actors and
repression experiences, made local and national protesters believe that allowing Asia Energy to
develop the project in Phulbari would be disastrous and their fate would be becoming
environmental refugees. The research identified two types of environmental justice movements in
Bangladesh: public interest environmental litigation and occupying the streets. The first category
empowers NGOs to file a writ petition before the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in favor of
aggrieved or affected communities against government agencies for establishing their rights.
Occupying the street is another completely different kind of environmental justice tactic seen in
Bangladesh, where affected communities organize themselves and protest against project
proponents to achieve justice. This current case analyzed that the efforts of these players fit within
the framework of the environmental justice movement, as it manifests in the global South. I believe
the resistance actors should be identified as environmental justice activists.
While this research can inform analysis of mining conflict in Indigenous territories and has
demonstrated that these protests form a part of the environmental justice movement in the global
South, there are some shortcomings evident. The company representatives were not found after
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repetitive efforts, which could ensure the reliability of data from a neutral perspective. The
dissertation relied on accounts of Adibasi communities and activists, which critics and scholars
can find as inconsistencies of information. However, a large number of data was gathered from
ESIA and other documents prepared by the company. Another shortcoming of the dissertation is
the data collected from only local Adibasi and some national Adibasi leaders for identifying or
recognizing the ‘Indigeneity’ of Adibasi communities. Since the dissertation could not employ
accounts of other ethnic communities who live in other parts of Bangladesh, policymakers and
government representatives can question that Adibasi communities of the mining footprint can be
identified as Indigenous peoples while others not. However, one of the purposes of this dissertation
is to examine whether Adibasi or ethnic communities who are claiming to be Indigenous peoples
can establish the status of Indigenous peoples or not under international law. I understand, studying
on several self-identified and self-defined Adibasi communities by their accounts and
conversations, and historical evidence cannot justifiably refer to other ethnic communities of a
country.
In researching the recognition of Adibasi communities and their claims for environmental
justice, there are some questions raised which this research could not accommodate. Due to time
and financial constraints, the research could not gather data from transnational environmental
justice groups through interviews or participant observation. But the dissertation used their online
reports, news, blogs, and other resources of their activities in London and other cities for fighting
against neoliberal and unlawful practices of Asia Energy. The research even could not use email
conversation with two transnational advocacy activists due to the limitations of York University's
research ethics protocol, which was expired. Another limitation of the research is that it could not
accommodate the analysis and discussion of host-state and home-state responsibilities to regulate
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MNCs and TNCs in their respective boundaries. The research acknowledges that there is a
limitation under international law in regulating corporations in both home-states and host-states.
However, future research should focus on regulating TNCs and MNCs concerning their mining or
other development activities on Indigenous territories. Therefore, it is ideal that international
communities should consider linking home-state and host-state responsibilities, including
accountabilities. Although the research offered analysis on the environmental justice movement
through the court process, it could not comprehensively analyze judicial activism, which is seen
in South Asian countries. While I suspect that those judges can make a huge impact in this regard,
I was not able to establish that in this research.
I anticipate that this empirical research will attract other ethnographic research on the
environment, Indigenous peoples, resource extractive industries, and sustainable economic
development in the global South. I expect my study will inform the analysis of the contemporary
social, political, and economic policy of Bangladesh as well as other states in the global South.
My study will also contribute to a better assessment and understanding of the content and processes
involved in those cases and provide insights about the resistance that until now have not been
documented.
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